62 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	c01deca048	ci: optimize delivery pipelines and add a production smoke gate ... - One run per ref (concurrency) for CI, security, nightly and release; branch pushes no longer duplicate pull_request runs (push is main-only). - Deploys keep their own concurrency group so two runs never race Coolify. - pnpm store cache on every Node job. - New /api/version returns the deployed commit (no secrets). - New scheduled prod-smoke workflow: readiness, db/stripe health, running commit == main, and the document/credit routes exist (401/405, never 5xx).	2026-11-02 18:24:45 +01:00
admin	48dff2078e	fix(admission): zero maximumCredits means pilot mode, not a missing reservation ... The structure route ran the model with maximumCredits=1 and no reservation when credits were off, so admission returned reservation_required and the route answered 502. Admission now requires a reservation only when maximumCredits>0. Verified against the live stack: DOC0 segments -> LiteLLM/Ollama (inf0-valuation) -> evidence validation -> needs_review (no export).	2026-11-02 16:42:01 +01:00
admin	581a20acd1	chore(workbench): log the structure failure reason and source segment count ... Cloudflare replaces an origin 502 body with its own error page, so the JSON message never reached the client. Log the reason server-side (codes/messages only, never source text).	2026-11-02 16:32:55 +01:00
admin	e93db5fc1f	fix(doc0): call DOC0 as the granted service actor ... DOC0 denies an x-actor-id that the service identity has no actor_grant for, so every upload/structure call from 0pt failed with DOC0_ACCESS_DENIED and became outcome_unknown. The journal and project authorization keep the verified end-user actor; only the DOC0 request acts as the service (DOC0_SERVICE_ACTOR_ID).	2026-11-02 16:17:29 +01:00
admin	35937933b3	chore(auth): log the OIDC failure code (no tokens or claims)	2026-11-02 15:58:52 +01:00
admin	71391db132	fix(auth): fall back to the verified access token for the tenant claim ... Zitadel does not always copy urn:zitadel:iam:org:id into the id_token; the access token always carries it. Verify that token (issuer) before trusting its tenant.	2026-11-02 15:48:51 +01:00
admin	023406c9b6	feat(auth): Zitadel OIDC login for the portal ... The portal had no way to obtain a verified principal: /api/0pt/* requires a Bearer token, but the browser only had the dev-only HMAC cookie. - GET /api/auth/login: Authorization Code + PKCE against Zitadel. - GET /api/auth/callback: code exchange, id_token verification (issuer, audience, nonce) and a signed session cookie with sub + tenant. - middleware accepts the signed session as a verified principal; Bearer wins. - dev login POST is refused in production. - Sign-in link in the portal shell.	2026-11-02 15:48:02 +01:00
admin	d12b8fa55f	feat(workbench): explicit pilot mode without a credit wallet ... OPT_CREDITS_MODE=off skips reserve/settle and reports credits:null, so the document flow can be piloted before prices are decided. It is never a silent fallback and purchases remain disabled.	2026-11-02 15:31:52 +01:00
admin	e3c4bc28c3	feat(workbench): live LiteLLM gateway adapter + explicit project grants ... - createInf0Gateway prefers the live OpenAI-compatible LiteLLM gateway and falls back to the native INF0 surface; admission stays local and fail-closed. - Project authorization: OpenFGA when configured, otherwise a validated server-owned OPT_PROJECT_GRANTS list (deny by default). - Tests for the gateway adapter, the factory and grants.	2026-11-02 14:50:50 +01:00
admin	b3239487b7	feat(document-workbench): wire customer upload, structuring, credits and readiness ... - POST /api/0pt/documents/upload: real multipart bytes into DOC0 through the durable attempt journal and the existing coordinator; verified tenant/actor only, project authorization fail-closed. - POST /api/0pt/documents/structure: DOC0 segments -> INF0 -> evidence-bound validation -> optional JSON/CSV export, with credit reserve/settle. - Credits: balance, server-owned price book, Stripe Checkout and idempotent webhook reconciliation via a Stripe re-read of session + payment intent. - /portal/dokument and /portal/krediter: SIAX-styled workspace. - @siax/access: universal, framework-neutral OpenFGA project relationship primitive reusable by DOC0/N0D/other products. - Readiness: real Redis PING probe instead of presence-only; queue is now a live dependency when configured. - Dockerfile: copy every workspace manifest so --frozen-lockfile works. - Format/build hygiene: .prettierignore, .worktrees ignored, valid manifest YAML.	2026-11-02 14:46:10 +01:00
admin	5137bf87a1	fix: distinguish failed sources from empty results	2026-11-02 06:58:15 +01:00
admin	bd1c20edb2	feat: add guarded document workbench foundations	2026-11-02 01:26:36 +01:00
admin	1c87b82e70	feat(import): ImportDispatchPolicy (DES1GN ADR D3 §31) — ett objekt, en sanning ... - lib/import-dispatch-policy.ts: maxInlineRows=500 (inline-tak, oförändrat kontrakt), maxRows=5000 (N0D-dispatch-signal), maxBytes=1_000_000 (bytes, UTF-8), format-allowlist ['csv']; ren evaluateImportDispatch() med deterministisk precedens format > bytes > rows - route: taken härstammar från policyn; bytes-koll (ersätter chars); rows > maxRows -> 413 n0d_dispatch_required med hint {capability_id: 0pt.import_execute, job_type: 0pt.import_execute_job, status: UNVERIFIED} (descriptor-gate stängd: aldrig tyst trunkering, aldrig tyst dispatch) - tester: 9 nya (verdict per kombination inkl. gränsvärden 500/501/5000/5001, bytes-gräns, allowlist, precedens; route-koppling 200/413/413) — 21/21 gröna i sviten; full N0D-worker-integration markeras UNVERIFIED	2026-09-30 21:48:16 +02:00
admin	04813c34b0	feat(collab): order-anteckningar — @siax/collaboration-kernelns första produktkonsument (spår C) ... Kernel 0.3.0 används som capability, inte som paket-dekor: - lib/order-notes-store.ts: varje note ÄR en CollaborationOperation; nextLamportClock för nya klockor, mergeOperationLog/compareOperations för deterministisk listning; optimistisk version -> 409 vid stale skrivning. - lib/order-notes-client.ts: kernel-CollaborationTransport över host-API; offline = medvetet no-op + varning (ingen tyst förlust), 409 -> ConflictError. - app/api/admin/order-notes: requireRouteAuth (fail-closed 401), server-authoritative tenant-guard (403), AUD0-audit via hostens klient. - app/admin/notes: admin-yta med offline-växel, konflikt-banner + reload. - sql/016_order_notes.sql: persistens (DB-tabell, version + Lamport-klocka). Tester: API (happy/conflict 409/empty/400/401/403/404), klient-adapter (offline no-op utan fetch, 409-mappning, presence), SSR-render. 18 nya test.	2026-09-30 17:07:21 +02:00
admin	c1648c04a7	feat(orders): CSV-import admin-yta — första riktiga ImportWizard-värden (C8) ... Symmetrisk mot våg 3.4 CSV-export: POST /api/orders/import (validate | dry_run | execute) + /admin/import som renderar @siax/ui ImportWizard (0.14.0) över @siax/import-export runtime (0.2.0). - Servern är enda auktoritet: RFC4180-parse (ingen eval), omvalidering via frysta @siax/contracts-kerneln (validateRows) + hostregler, exekvering genom BEFINTLIG orderlogik (createOrder, tenant-guardad). - Fail-closed: 401 utan principal, 400 okänd header, 413 vid radtak (500), per-rad-atomsäkra inserts — felrad kan aldrig skada OK-rader. - Partiell import: OK-rader skapas, felrader rapporteras per rad (row/field/code). AUD0-audit via 0pts enda producer-boundary (durable outbox under DATABASE_URL). - Reload-persistens: efter execute läses /api/orders om och de nya raderna listas på sidan. - Tester: 12 route-test (happy, partial, auth fail-closed, tak, no-write validate, header, quoting, rad-fel mitt i batch) + 3 SSR-render-test av ImportWizard över runtime-storen. - Deps: @siax/ui ^0.14.0, @siax/charts ^0.5.0, @siax/import-export ^0.2.0; pnpm-overrides till contracts 0.10.0 / import-export 0.2.0 (ui 0.14.0 deklarerar 0.11.0/0.2.1 som ännu ej publicerats).	2026-09-30 15:36:02 +02:00
admin	bc76ebc5e5	feat(orders): CSV-export-endpoint — export-kernelns första adoption (våg 3.4)	2026-09-29 17:01:13 +02:00
admin	a2377215e7	feat(admin): InboxList — orderkön som universal inkorg (våg 3.3-adoption) ... Servern projicerar öppna ordrar (draft/quoted/in_production/review) på universal-inbox-konvolverna via createInboxItem (buildOrderInboxItem i lib/order-flow, ADR-0001-mönstret: policy/resolution i serverlagret). Admin renderar InboxList (@siax/ui 0.11.1) ovanpå orderkön — resolve- aktionen gateras genom advance_action-state (available krävs). Terminala statusar ger ingen post. tests/order-flow 6/6; full svit 1144/1144; build ✓.	2026-09-29 16:10:10 +02:00
admin	a49bc148fc	feat(admin): authz-pilot — server-renderad advance-resolution + ActionGate (ADR-0001) ... GET /api/orders returnerar per order frozen advance_action (resolveAction ur lib/order-flow); admin renderar via ActionGate — policy i serverlagret, presentation i klienten (DoD §21). Terminala/okända statusar → read_only med varför-text i stället för missvisande 'klar'. tests/order-flow.test.ts 3/3; full svit 1138 godkända; typecheck grön.	2026-09-29 12:21:02 +02:00
Claude	0062edbec3	fix(readiness): /api/ready svarade 200 med en död motor i produktion ... Mätt live 2026-09-25 mot produktionsdeployen (0pt.app / api.0pt.app, container shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g-172514162615 på server6, uppe 17,9 h, Docker-status "healthy" hela tiden): GET /api/health -> HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"ok":false,"service":"0pt-web","db":"ok","queue":"not_configured", "engine":"error","stripe":"not_configured", "detail":{"engine":"This operation was aborted"}} GET /api/ready -> HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"ready":true,"service":"0pt-web","db":"ok","engine":"error",...} ENGINE_URL pekade på http://0pt-engine:8000. Mätt inifrån containern: `getent hosts 0pt-engine` ger ingen post, och det finns ingen sådan container på någon av server5-11. Ett direktanrop mot motorn misslyckas efter ~5 s (DNS). Datamotorn — 0pt:s hela produkt — var alltså BORTA, och samtliga signaler ovanför den var gröna: Docker healthy, /api/health 200, /api/ready 200. `ok:false` i en 200-kropp är ingen signal. Ingenting i kedjan läser kroppar; allt läser statuskoder och exitkoder. isReady skilde tidigare bara på "db ok". Den skillnad som saknades är inte konfigurerad-vs-ej-konfigurerad utan FRÅNVARANDE-vs-TRASIG: * not_configured / not_integrated -> fortsatt ready. 0pt är byggt för att kunna köra utan motor, Stripe och kö (se .env.example). * error -> INTE ready. Statusen "error" betyder att någon medvetet konfigurerade beroendet och att en riktig round trip mot det just misslyckades. Det är inte längre en valfri integration. Ändrar ingenting i driften i dag: container-HEALTHCHECK pekar på /api/health (liveness) och Dockerfilen säger uttryckligen att en readiness-probe inte ska peka dit. Den här ändringen gör bara att den ärliga ytan faktiskt blir ärlig, så en yttre övervakning kan använda den. Regressionstest tillagt; verifierat att det FALLER mot den gamla isReady (1 failed | 18 passed) och passerar mot den nya (24 passed över health-checks/ready/health). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 13:34:42 +02:00
Claude Code	fc1a62bb81	feat: decision-plane wiring — ER-pair decision.match tie-break (@siax/0pt-decision) ... - packages/decision: erMatchDecision (0pt.er.pair_match mot siax-decision :4600) - comparePair async + borderline-band (±0.05 av review_threshold) → decision.match (D1 advisory) — deterministisk status GÄLLER om decision abstainar - OPT_DECISION_ER_ENABLED=1-gate (off tills kalibrering) - tests async-anpassade (await generateCandidates/rejects.toThrowError) - typecheck: 13 fel = pre-existing extraction-route (main-paritet), 0 nya fel - tester: 1108 passed | 184 skipped	2026-09-23 00:15:27 +02:00
admin	c7fd9d45a2	fix(prod): map SiaxError in the 7 legacy money routes — DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE/503 instead of opaque 500 (0pt#53) ... getSqlForDurableStore throws SiaxError(DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE, httpStatus 503, retryable) when a money-bearing store would fall back to an in-memory Map in a production runtime (the durable-store guard). The /api/0pt/* surface already maps it via src/http/siax-error-response.ts; the seven legacy routes outside the middleware matcher did not — the documented 503 leaked as Next's opaque 500 with no body. - app/api/siax-error-mapping.ts: shared isSiaxError + siaxErrorResponseForLegacy - orders (POST/GET), orders/[id] (GET/PATCH), subscriptions (GET/POST), payments/deposit, payments/release, admin/metrics: try/catch -> mapper, each route's own typed error contract preserved (idempotency conflict 409 etc.) - webhooks/stripe: store outage -> 503 received:false reason:store_unavailable so Stripe's delivery retry path stays open (never a silent received:true) - tests/api/legacy-routes-siax-error-mapping.test.ts: pins the 503 + body	2026-09-22 04:33:57 +02:00
admin	a1557b2a7d	feat(payments): bind orders to verified tenant and buyer	2026-09-15 19:53:58 +02:00
admin	cecc2bc637	fix(payments): authenticate order detail and deposit checkout	2026-09-15 19:09:53 +02:00
admin	7ce92827c0	fix: close demo payment bypass and guard order transitions	2026-09-15 18:52:23 +02:00
admin	ae190fa60d	fix: advance orders only after matching paid Stripe events	2026-09-15 18:15:42 +02:00
admin	8911709931	fix: do not acknowledge unverified Stripe webhooks	2026-09-15 18:08:13 +02:00
admin	d0cba02ee0	feat: expose idempotent N0D-backed batch ER submission	2026-09-07 18:18:23 +02:00
admin	7d11ea895c	feat: expose generic tenant-safe ER candidate API	2026-09-07 18:18:12 +02:00
admin	9782eaf42c	refactor: share ER request validation across HTTP surfaces	2026-09-07 18:17:00 +02:00
admin	84945a2ff7	feat: expose tenant and purpose constrained search query route	2026-09-07 18:11:58 +02:00
admin	e400afc882	feat: expose governed durable search definitions	2026-09-07 18:11:44 +02:00
admin	e13d550837	fix(er): country-qualify company registration identifiers	2026-09-07 18:09:12 +02:00
admin	04d861b920	fix(er): require human review for score-only company matches	2026-09-07 18:07:56 +02:00
admin	ccda286022	feat: expose tenant-safe dataset version describe route	2026-09-07 18:07:09 +02:00
admin	e70acc8981	feat: expose durable dataset version create and query routes	2026-09-07 18:07:01 +02:00
admin	b5ffdbc091	feat: expose tenant-safe dataset describe route	2026-09-07 18:06:46 +02:00
admin	102e1e1616	feat: expose tenant-safe dataset registry HTTP surface	2026-09-07 18:06:36 +02:00
admin	5338975eea	fix: make conflicting company identifiers dominate ER matches	2026-09-07 17:57:23 +02:00
admin	4c7132728a	fix: use raw AUD0 client in outbox dispatcher	2026-09-07 17:55:10 +02:00
admin	351afc54e1	security(er): validate internal ER bridge thresholds and scope	2026-09-07 17:22:05 +02:00
admin	71f2d13ae1	feat(er): expose canonical ER candidate engine to internal pipeline	2026-09-07 17:19:10 +02:00
admin	56b1ce01b3	feat(evidence): add protected AUD0 outbox dispatch endpoint	2026-09-07 17:15:36 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Opus 5	9267576b7c	feat(data-os): P060-P068 durable ingestion plane — source classification gate, connector contract, common envelope, schema evolution, quality enforcement, queryable lineage, idempotent backfill ... BEFORE_STATE (verified, with evidence): * P060 PARTIAL/BROKEN. The registry persisted rights/provenance/health/ freshness to Postgres, but carried no authorization, no schedule, no checkpoint, no schema and no owner distinct from created_by — and the activation DoD was inverted: postgres-source-repository.ts wrote `${input.status ?? "active"}`, so a source with no rights, no provenance and no authorization was ACTIVE the instant it was registered. No activation operation existed at all. * P061 MISSING. services/api/sources/connectors.py had per-source fetch_*() functions only — no lifecycle, no cursor, no resume, no health, no conformance suite. * P062 MISSING, already documented as such in services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:10-19 (no CDC pipeline anywhere; workers/pipeline.py has no persistence at all). * P063 MISSING. schema_version existed as a free string; no comparison, no policy, no versioned source schema. * P064 PARTIAL. Rules/runs/issues/scores existed, but a failing rule only opened an issue and the data flowed on. No quarantine anywhere. * P065 DUPLICATE (confirmed). Two ER engines: src/er/entity-resolution- service.ts (canonical) and services/api/workers/resolve.py (simplified, still called by pipeline.py:110). * P067 PARTIAL. Lineage was emitted to AUD0 but nothing here could ANSWER a lineage question — no store, no query, no route. * P068 MISSING, documented in test_known_gaps.py:44-52 ("no delivery-store persistence layer exists to dedupe a backfill against"). BUILT (only what was PARTIAL/BROKEN/MISSING): * P060 sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql adds authorization/schedule/schemas/ checkpoints/ledger/quarantine/lineage tables, owner_id, and flips the opt_sources status DEFAULT to 'pending' so even a raw psql INSERT cannot produce an unclassified-but-active source. SourceRegistryService gains classifySource/activateSource/deactivateSource + authorization/schedule accessors; registration NEVER activates (asking for status:"active" goes through the gate, not around it); a service identity cannot authorize a source. Routes: activate (GET classification / POST activate), authorization, schedule. * P061 src/connectors/connector.ts — all nine operations on one interface. src/connectors/conformance.ts — a runnable suite (15 checks, no "skip" verdict). HttpJsonConnector (real HTTP, opaque cursor) and JsonlFileConnector (real file, line offsets, CDC deletes) both pass it. The suite caught a real defect while being written: an API that drops next_cursor at the end left the connector unable to resume, which is why HttpJsonConnectorConfig has cursor_field. * P062 src/types/ingestion.ts + src/ingestion/{envelope,ingestion-runner}.ts. One envelope for batch/stream/cdc; durable per-(source,partition) checkpoints; resume proven by killing a run inside the sink. * P063 src/schema/{record-schema,compatibility,schema-registry}.ts. Two enforcement points, both upstream of any consumer write: a discovery gate before the first read, and per-record conformance before the page reaches the sink. A producer cannot widen its own policy retroactively. * P064 src/quality/quality-policy.ts composes the EXISTING ExpectationEngine (not a second engine) and adds the missing consequence: block / quarantine / warn, with quarantine durable and recoverable. No policy is reported as "none_declared", never as a pass; an unexecutable expectation counts as a violation, never a silent pass. * P067 src/lineage/{lineage-edge,lineage-store}.ts + GET /api/0pt/lineage. AUD0 stays the system of record; this is 0pt's own queryable projection. * P068 opt_ingestion_ledger + IngestionRunner.backfill: bounded, idempotent on repeat, leaves the live checkpoint alone, still re-emits real changes. A BUG THIS PASS WROTE AND CAUGHT: the first IngestionRepository draft combined the idempotency check and its recording into one atomic call BEFORE the sink. The crash/resume test then delivered 7 of 10 records — the page in flight when the sink died was already marked delivered, so the resumed run skipped it as a duplicate. Permanent, silent data loss. Fixed by splitting peekDeliveries/commitDeliveries and committing both the ledger and the checkpoint only after the sink resolves. NOT DONE, stated rather than deferred quietly: * P065 is NOT met. resolve.py is still a second simplified production engine. Closing it means rewriting it as an adapter over the canonical service, which cannot be verified from this repo today: services/api is not built by this repo's Dockerfile, api.0pt.app answers 404, and NO CI workflow runs its pytest suite. The duplication is now stated at both sites in code and the removal plan is in STATUS.md. The new ingestion plane performs no ER, so it adds no third engine. * P066 (Iceberg) untouched — ST0RE is owned by another workflow. Contract read only. * Delivery is AT-LEAST-ONCE, not exactly-once (no per-partition run lock). * No CDC *source* exists; the contract is met, a CDC connector is not built. * 0pt does not schedule itself — the schedule row is a declaration ACT0 would read. VERIFIED: pnpm typecheck clean; pnpm test 365 passed / 25 skipped (was 311/18); pnpm build clean with all four new routes in the route table; lint unchanged at 12 pre-existing errors. Real Postgres 16 (tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, 7 passed) plus a real `docker restart` of that container with an identical read-back through the production code path — that is P060's "a restart preserves all sources", measured. DEPLOYMENT REALITY (curl, 2026-09-04): 0pt.app/api/health returns 200 from Vercel with db:not_configured; 0pt.app/api/0pt/sources returns 404; api.0pt.app/health returns 404; cd.yml still guards on a placeholder Coolify app id. None of the capability layer runs in production. Nothing here is LIVE_VERIFIED and STATUS.md says so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-04 17:03:14 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	9740e20818	feat(data-os): TS/Python quality bridge + provenance fields + fault-injection tests ... Continues P010 (branch renamed from feat/p010-source-registry-persistence): closes the three remaining BEFORE_STATE.md gaps (§2 TS/Python split-brain, §3 missing provenance fields, §4 untested failure modes), all additive to the production pipeline — the Python QA filter's delivery decision is unchanged by any of this. TS/Python bridge (§2): - New route surface app/api/0pt/quality/* (rules/runs/issues CRUD + POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run) over the shared QualityService singleton (src/services/quality.ts), fixing the same "no shared instance" defect the Source Registry had. - src/quality/quality-bridge.ts auto-provisions a deterministic, tenant-scoped baseline rule set on first use so the Python engine never pre-registers rules through the CRUD surface. - services/api/workers/quality_bridge.py: the Python-side HTTP client. Feature-flagged off by default (OPT_QUALITY_BRIDGE_ENABLED), fails open on any error (never raises into run_job, never changes `delivered`). Advisory only — real per-row gating against the TS engine isn't implementable yet (ExpectationEngine returns dataset-level pass/fail counts + samples, not a per-row boolean array); documented, not faked. - Live-verified end-to-end: `next dev` (AUTH_ENFORCE=false) + the real Python pipeline hitting the real brreg.no API, round-tripping through the real bridge route, receiving a real QualityService score. Provenance (§3): sources/connectors.py's Provenance dataclass gains retrieved_at, transform, connector_version, producer, quality, entity_resolution, artifact_ref (all previously absent from the real dataflow entirely) via a make_provenance() factory used by every connector. resolve.py stamps entity_resolution on merged records' provenance (never on unmerged ones). pipeline.py stamps artifact_ref at delivery and quality once the bridge succeeds. Failure tests (§4), real fault injection against real code (services/api, new pytest + respx suite, not vitest mocks): - dedup-determinism + duplicate-input + out-of-order: resolve.py under shuffled/interleaved/exhaustive-permutation input, plus an explicit, verified test of the one case that IS legitimately order-sensitive (non-transitive similarity in a greedy clusterer) instead of hiding it. - schema-evolution: respx-mocked upstream responses with added/removed/ alien-shaped fields through the real brreg connector + pipeline. - restart: connector exceptions mid-job (including one from respx itself) never crash run_job. - backfill: the real property that holds given no persistence layer exists (replay is compute-idempotent) — NOT a fabricated dedup-store test. - CDC-interruption and true backfill/delivery-store idempotency: explicitly documented as not implementable against this codebase (no CDC pipeline, no delivery store exist anywhere) via skip markers with reasons, in tests/test_known_gaps.py, rather than silently dropped or faked. Testing: 256/256 vitest (249 pre-existing + 7 new bridge route/service tests) and 28/28 pytest (2 documented skips) green locally. tsc -p tsconfig.check.json has zero new errors (14 pre-existing errors, all in the untracked/unaudited src/fleet, src/graph, src/metrics, src/projections paths this pass does not touch, per BEFORE_STATE.md). No PR opened, per instructions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 21:02:14 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	07b13bd833	feat(data-os): Source Registry Postgres persistence + full HTTP route surface ... Replaces the in-memory (per-instance, not even per-process-shared) Maps in SourceService/SourceRegistryService with real Postgres persistence, and adds the register/query/describe/health/rights/provenance/freshness HTTP routes that never existed (grep for SourceRegistryService in app/ previously returned nothing). - sql/002_source_registry.sql: opt_sources, opt_source_rights, opt_source_provenance, opt_source_health_checks, opt_source_freshness. Numbered 002 (not 006) because 004's opt_source_rate_policies already forward-references opt_sources, which no sql/ file defined until now — fixes 004's pre-existing broken migration ordering (opt_datasets remains a separate, unrelated, still-open gap in 004, flagged not fixed). - src/repositories/*: SourceRepository / SourceRegistryRepository seams, each with an in-memory implementation (business logic extracted verbatim) and a Postgres implementation, chosen via resolveStoreMode — production still fails hard with no DATABASE_URL (Master-DoD §3), but a configured production now actually works instead of always being blocked. - SourceService / SourceRegistryService: storage moved behind the repository seam; getHealth/getFreshness are now async and tenant-scoped at the accessor itself (needed once they're reachable directly over HTTP, not only after an earlier caller's tenant check). - src/services/source-registry.ts: shared singleton instances for the sources/* route group, fixing the "each route module owned its own private registry" defect (source-rate-policies and .../query previously couldn't see a source registered via POST /api/0pt/sources). - New routes: POST/GET /api/0pt/sources, GET /api/0pt/sources/[id], GET+PUT .../rights, GET+PUT .../provenance, GET+POST .../health, GET .../freshness. - Business logic unchanged: fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant NOT_FOUND (no existence oracle, §50), bounded 100-row health history. Tested against a real Postgres container (not mocked) — tests/p0/source-registry-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, env-gated on SOURCE_REGISTRY_TEST_DATABASE_URL, skips honestly when unset. All 249 pre-existing P0 tests + 7 new realinfra tests pass; also smoke-tested the full HTTP route surface end-to-end against next dev + live Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 20:42:41 +02:00
admin	a88ad04867	fix(health): report real per-dependency status instead of hardcoded ok:true ... BACKLOG P0-3: /api/health only ever checked *presence* of DATABASE_URL/ REDIS_URL and always returned ok:true regardless of whether anything was reachable -- ARCHITECTURE.md's own words, "an uptime monitor watching HTTP 200 would show green for a dying instance". lib/health-checks.ts adds real dependency probes: - db: a live `select 1` round trip (not just DATABASE_URL presence) - engine: a real HTTP call to the FastAPI engine's own GET /health - stripe: Stripe's documented lightweight balance.retrieve() liveness call - queue: honestly reports "not_integrated" when REDIS_URL is set but unused -- no Redis client is wired anywhere in this repo, so reporting "ok" would fabricate a check that doesn't exist /api/health stays a liveness check (always 200 while the process can respond; the body's `ok` field is the honest signal). New GET /api/ready fails closed with 503 when the load-bearing dependency (db) isn't both configured and reachable -- the "no /ready route" gap. contracts/openapi.yaml, docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md, and docs/slo.md updated to match. 17 new unit tests (dependency-injected fakes, no real network/DB) + 5 route-level tests.	2026-08-11 13:49:23 +02:00
adminandClaude Sonnet 5	15a0dbe3b1	fix(security): require auth on GET /api/orders and GET /api/admin/metrics ... A live compliance audit against 0pt.app confirmed both endpoints returned HTTP 200 with zero authentication -- the full order queue and financial pipeline aggregates (deposit/pipeline totals) were readable by anyone. Root cause: middleware.ts's matcher only covers /api/0pt/:path*, by design ("does NOT touch ... the unrelated payment/order APIs"), so nothing upstream of these two handlers ever verified the caller. Fix: both GET handlers now call the same fail-closed Zitadel verifier /api/0pt/* relies on (resolveAuthContext, src/auth/context.ts) directly, via a new thin wrapper (src/auth/require-route-auth.ts) that maps a rejected decision to the same 401/403 JSON shape middleware.ts already returns. The wrapper re-verifies the bearer token itself rather than trusting any x-0pt-verified-* header on the request, since middleware never runs in front of these routes to overwrite a client-supplied one. POST /api/orders (anonymous draft/quote creation before the deposit-payment step) is intentionally left as-is -- only the read paths that leaked data are gated. Tracked as part of docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md P0-3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 04:06:13 +02:00
Claude (SIAX platform session)andClaude Opus 5	bcf285f057	merge: unify GitHub main into Gitea main (0pt) ... Merges github/main (6 commits: 17-bug audit fix, CI quality gate, .env.example + .gitignore fix, missing platform clients + registry services, docs accuracy overhaul) into gitea/main (8 commits: Iceberg write boundary + live ST0RE verification, lakehouse mapping routes, Waves 1-4 foundational hardening). 16 conflicts. Both sides had independently written the four src/clients/*.ts and the two registry services, so those are combined rather than picked: - st0re-client.ts: GitHub's endpoint wins on evidence. POST goes to /v1/st0re/artifacts/register, not /v1/st0re/artifacts -- verified in sax3l/st0re src/api/routes/artifacts.ts, where the bare path is a GET-only list route. Gitea's URL normalisation, error-body text and mock kept. - n0d-client.ts: field is `status`, not `state`, with N0D's real 13-state union -- verified in sax3l/n0d packages/schemas/n0d.job.schema.json, which says explicitly not to add "succeeded". Gitea's mock echo, URL normalisation and error-body text kept. - cl0ud-client.ts: Gitea's fail-closed HTTP normalisation kept (a 200 with no `decision` reads as "deny", not as a silent allow). GitHub's PolicyDecision/PolicyDecisionValue naming kept; PolicyResult retained as an alias. - aud0-client.ts: permissive union of both input types (optional payload/metadata/correlation_id), GitHub's echo return, Gitea's URL normalisation and error-body text, plus a JSON-parse fallback so a successful POST with an empty body does not throw. - dataset-service.ts / source-service.ts: GitHub's record/DTO split and event naming (0pt.source_created / 0pt.create_source, which the merged docs already reference) plus Gitea's name validation, description / created_by fields and actor_id derivation. List filters are the union. - lakehouse mapping routes: GitHub's shared lakehouse-mapping-registry singletons (without which every write 400'd "mapping not found") AND Gitea's Zod parseBody validation. Both, not either. - src/types/source.ts, src/types/dataset.ts: unions of both vocabularies; GitHub's `access` legal-sourcing field kept. - .env.example: GitHub's audited inventory plus Gitea's Zitadel / AUTH_ENFORCE block. - CLAUDE.md, docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md: GitHub's corrections kept, Gitea's live-verification kept and marked as superseding the "would 400 outright" finding (Gitea had already added the required X-Tenant-Id/X-Actor-Id headers). - pnpm-lock.yaml: regenerated with pnpm 9.15.9, not merged. Also corrects CLAUDE.md's claim that the banned services/scrapers stack was "since removed" -- the removal PR is open, not merged, and this branch inherits that code from Gitea main. Nothing here resurrects, extends or re-wires any of it; services/scrapers/ is byte-identical to Gitea main. Verified on the merged tree: typecheck (src/ + tests/) clean; 17 test files, 121 passed, 1 skipped (the realinfra test skipping honestly on ST0RE HTTP 401), 0 failures. Gitea main baseline was the same 121/1; GitHub main baseline could not even `pnpm install` ("packages field missing or empty") -- Gitea's pnpm-workspace.yaml fix resolves that. Whole-repo `typecheck:app` reports 9 errors, an identical set to Gitea main's baseline, so it is advisory in both CI workflows rather than deleted. Lint: 16 problems, identical to Gitea baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-28 12:38:01 +02:00
SIAX Foundation BotandClaude Opus 4.8	1d76d50f3d	feat(auth,foundation): Wave 2 flag-gated Zitadel JWT verify + validation + eslint + tests ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 14:32:34 +02:00