23 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	92eb78ba0a	fix(upload): an idempotent retry returns the same verified receipt ... A client retry with the same idempotency key replayed the journal and got 'outcome_unknown' even when the first upload had succeeded, because the verified DOC0 receipt was never persisted. Store document/version/checksum/ stage on the attempt (sql/021) and return it on replay; only a missing receipt falls back to observation. No second POST, no duplicate document.	2026-11-03 00:35:32 +01:00
admin	dade37ee05	feat(credits): one-time trial grant so the ledger runs in production ... - Ledger accepts kind='grant' (a server-owned balance grant, not a payment). - OPT_TRIAL_CREDITS=N grants N credits once per tenant (idempotent key trial:<tenant>) on balance/structure, so reserve -> settle is exercised before any customer purchase. - sql/020 extends the kind constraint (re-runnable). - Tests for the grant helper; full suite 1345 passed.	2026-11-02 22:05:06 +01:00
admin	0f734297ce	fix: enforce tenant isolation on credit storage	2026-11-02 07:39:35 +01:00
admin	cf37a66d35	feat: persist scoped document upload attempts	2026-11-02 03:48:13 +01:00
admin	bd1c20edb2	feat: add guarded document workbench foundations	2026-11-02 01:26:36 +01:00
admin	04813c34b0	feat(collab): order-anteckningar — @siax/collaboration-kernelns första produktkonsument (spår C) ... Kernel 0.3.0 används som capability, inte som paket-dekor: - lib/order-notes-store.ts: varje note ÄR en CollaborationOperation; nextLamportClock för nya klockor, mergeOperationLog/compareOperations för deterministisk listning; optimistisk version -> 409 vid stale skrivning. - lib/order-notes-client.ts: kernel-CollaborationTransport över host-API; offline = medvetet no-op + varning (ingen tyst förlust), 409 -> ConflictError. - app/api/admin/order-notes: requireRouteAuth (fail-closed 401), server-authoritative tenant-guard (403), AUD0-audit via hostens klient. - app/admin/notes: admin-yta med offline-växel, konflikt-banner + reload. - sql/016_order_notes.sql: persistens (DB-tabell, version + Lamport-klocka). Tester: API (happy/conflict 409/empty/400/401/403/404), klient-adapter (offline no-op utan fetch, 409-mappning, presence), SSR-render. 18 nya test.	2026-09-30 17:07:21 +02:00
admin	c3582838aa	feat(orders): kanonisk statusmaskin + guardad DB-constraint (ADR-0002, C3)	2026-09-29 21:15:35 +02:00
admin	d272e52ba0	fix(db): subscriptions.created_at — migration 014 reparerar GET /api/subscriptions (42703 mätt live) ... lib/subscriptions-store.ts listSubscriptions() SELECT:ar created_at men sql/001_init.sql definierade aldrig kolumnen — GET /api/subscriptions har alltså ALWAYS brutit mot Postgres i prod (42703 errorMissingColumn, mätt live mot 0pt.app 2026-09-22: 500). Kolumnen är nu ADD:ad live på 0pt-edge-postgres (idempotent IF NOT EXISTS); denna migration gör ändringen reproducerbar. GET svarar nu 200 [].	2026-09-22 05:33:13 +02:00
admin	a1557b2a7d	feat(payments): bind orders to verified tenant and buyer	2026-09-15 19:53:58 +02:00
admin	195c4611dc	chore: remove redundant search definition index	2026-09-07 18:09:44 +02:00
admin	1c1d14a3eb	feat: persist versioned search index definitions	2026-09-07 18:07:45 +02:00
admin	8432d19d8c	fix: scope dataset version idempotency uniqueness to real keys	2026-09-07 18:01:14 +02:00
admin	298c965448	feat: add durable dataset version store	2026-09-07 18:00:58 +02:00
admin	ca0b060c6d	feat(evidence): add durable AUD0 outbox schema	2026-09-07 17:11:31 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	1a12e8a882	feat(analytics): BI-P061 — dashboard releases, with the publish race measured both ways ... DRAFT -> PUBLISHED -> SUPERSEDED as a ledger (sql/010) rather than a column on the frozen version: sql/008 already makes DashboardVersion immutable at the database, and a lifecycle column there would have meant weakening that. Rollback mints a NEW version carrying the old document and publishes it, so "we went back to v3" is a timestamped fact (v5 = rollback_of_version 3) rather than a hole where v4 used to be. It is verified by BI-P060 canonical hash, and documentOf() refuses to serve a stored document whose hash no longer matches the release — a dashboard that renders an unapproved definition is worse than one that will not open. The claim worth attacking is "only one release can be live". The application check is read-then-write, so it is NOT the guarantee, and the evidence says so in both directions against Postgres 16.15: guard_absent partial unique index dropped -> BOTH concurrent publishes commit, dashboard ends with TWO live versions guard_present index in place -> loser fails 23505 on opt_analytics_dashboard_release_one_published, one live evidence/bi-p061/dashboard-release-race.json, reproducible with scripts/bi-p061-release-race.mjs. Two findings while writing the tests, both fixed here rather than papered over: the one-draft-per-dashboard index makes the two-draft race impossible to even construct (so the race is run as two create-and-publish transactions, which is what a "save and publish" button does), and an UPDATE matching zero rows raises nothing — which reads as "refused" to a careless test, so the immutability test asserts the row exists first. 23 tests: 8 unit + 15 against live Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-07 03:51:04 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	2bfbd3f159	feat(analytics): sql/009 — execution metadata, metric governance, semantic registry, quarantine, usage ledger ... The migration the previous commits' comments promised. Additive and idempotent throughout, so the restore drill can replay it onto a live database. BI-P018 adds principal_id, workload, compiled_query_hash, datasets, metrics, cache_status and cost_units to the execution record — and deliberately NO `query_text` column, with a CHECK pinning the hash to 64 hex characters so a statement smuggled into that field is refused by the database. A test asserts the absence of `query_text` and `sql` as columns. BI-P031's DoD gets a Postgres TRIGGER, not just the TypeScript guard: a certified metric whose meaning_hash changes without a version bump raises. That is the layer that holds when something writes without going through the application — a migration script, a psql session, an admin tool. A compiler opinion does not survive `psql`; a trigger does. BI-P030 gets a version-history table whose CONTENT is immutable (status and valid_from may still move) plus a PARTIAL UNIQUE INDEX enforcing at most one ACTIVE version per model per tenant. Two active versions is a silent correctness failure in which half the dashboards read a different model, so it is an index rather than application discipline. BI-P021's usage ledger is append-only by trigger: update and delete both raise. BI-P026's freshness table DEFAULTS TO 'UNKNOWN' — a dataset nobody has computed freshness for must not read as FRESH — and requires a non-empty disclosure, because a state with no words attached is a state a dashboard renders as a silent green dot. BI-P025's quarantine record requires a principal and a reason on release. A BUG IN THIS MIGRATION, FOUND BY RUNNING IT: `SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = '...'` is NOT schema-scoped. conname is unique per schema, not per database, so on a database that already had these tables in `public` every guarded CHECK was silently skipped when the file was applied into a second schema. The constraints simply were not there, and the tests that should have proven them PASSED — because the INSERTs they expected to fail succeeded, and `expect(message).toContain(...)` on an undefined message reads as a type error, not as "the constraint is missing". Every guard now scopes via `conrelid = '<table>'::regclass`, and the fix is proven by applying the file to `public` FIRST and then running the suite into a fresh schema: 20/20. Two flaws in my own test harness, also found by running it: * `sql.unsafe("SET search_path ...; SELECT ...")` is a multi-statement simple query, and postgres.js returns the LAST statement's result — so a SELECT silently returned the connection object and two assertions compared against nonsense. search_path is now pinned on the CONNECTION. * the fixture INSERT used column names that do not exist in sql/008's dataset table, which surfaced as a suite-level failure rather than as 20 skips. 20 tests against a real Postgres 16, gated on ANALYTICS_TEST_DATABASE_URL, and each of them attempts the write the constraint exists to refuse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-07 03:00:56 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	84bb9faa4f	feat(analytics): BI-P002..BI-P012 analytics core — domain model, tiers, contracts, Arrow, ClickHouse engine, isolation, governance ... Implements the eight BI program prompts that make 0pt the canonical SIAX analytics capability. Every file is NEW: not one existing file is modified, and src/analytics/clickhouse-analytics.ts is byte-identical to main. BI-P002 — the nineteen canonical entities, verbatim, with tenant_id + project_id on every tenant-owned record. sql/008 gives each one a table. The four version entities BI-P002 names as immutable are enforced by BEFORE UPDATE/DELETE triggers, not by a TypeScript `readonly` — proven by direct SQL against a live Postgres. BI-P003 — RAW/NORMALIZED/CURATED/SERVING with the read rule enforced: assertReadableByBiSurface refuses a RAW dataset to a dashboard unless a recorded exception exists. All eight required declarations are NOT NULL. BI-P004 — DatasetContract and a fail-closed compatibility gate. Fifteen breaking-change classes are each tested twice: refused under a minor bump, accepted under a major one. BI-P005 — Arrow IPC alongside JSON, with a hand-written FlatBuffers writer so no npm dependency (or CVE surface) is added. Conformance comes from three independent implementations, not from self-agreement: pyarrow 25.0.1 and DuckDB 1.5.5 read identical values from both ClickHouse's Arrow and ours, and ClickHouse's own Arrow C++ ingests our 20,000-row batch with exact aggregates. BI-P009 — SiaxAnalyticsEngine with all eight capabilities. The existing ClickHouseAnalytics is COMPOSED, never replaced. executeQuery (analyst SQL) is declared and deliberately refused with CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE until BI-P017 and BI-P033 land, rather than opening the raw-SQL hole BI-P011 enumerates. BI-P010 — four purpose-built tables, not one giant one, and the difference is measured against the counterfactual: 48.8ms/40,960 rows vs 174.4ms/5,400,000 rows for the same question; 5/660 granules vs 660/1149. BI-P011 — layered isolation, each layer proven with the layer above removed. Without the forced predicate the same statement returns 50,050 (both tenants); with it, t_alpha gets 50. Without a row policy an unrestricted user sees 2 tenants; the restricted user running the IDENTICAL statement sees 1. BI-P012 — every named limit, fired individually and identified by ClickHouse error code, plus the half usually skipped: an unrelated tenant is timed while a real CPU bomb is in flight and must still return the CORRECT answer. Three defects found by writing tests that can fail: * `CHECK (array_length(purposes,1) >= 1)` can NEVER fail — array_length is NULL for '{}' and a NULL CHECK passes. Fixed with coalesce(); the test that caught it is pinned. * EXPLAIN ESTIMATE run under the caller's own max_rows_to_read fails with code 158 exactly when the estimate would be over budget. Planner calls now use a narrower envelope. * result_overflow_mode=break returns HTTP 200 with 65,409 of 100,000 rows and no indication it is short. Every SELECT ships `throw`. Verified rather than assumed: server7's ClickHouse holds `opt_scraped` (51 tables, 407,793,471 rows, `persons`/`cz_owners` included) — the b0ts plane this module is prohibited from touching — has no `opt_analytics` database, zero tenant_id columns and zero row policies. Nothing there was modified; every proof ran against disposable containers. Evidence: evidence/bi-p002-p012/{test-transcript.txt,bi-p010-benchmark.json, bi-p005-arrow-roundtrip.json,server7-clickhouse-probe.md} Docs: docs/analytics/BI_ANALYTICS_CORE.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-06 23:01:27 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Opus 5	9267576b7c	feat(data-os): P060-P068 durable ingestion plane — source classification gate, connector contract, common envelope, schema evolution, quality enforcement, queryable lineage, idempotent backfill ... BEFORE_STATE (verified, with evidence): * P060 PARTIAL/BROKEN. The registry persisted rights/provenance/health/ freshness to Postgres, but carried no authorization, no schedule, no checkpoint, no schema and no owner distinct from created_by — and the activation DoD was inverted: postgres-source-repository.ts wrote `${input.status ?? "active"}`, so a source with no rights, no provenance and no authorization was ACTIVE the instant it was registered. No activation operation existed at all. * P061 MISSING. services/api/sources/connectors.py had per-source fetch_*() functions only — no lifecycle, no cursor, no resume, no health, no conformance suite. * P062 MISSING, already documented as such in services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:10-19 (no CDC pipeline anywhere; workers/pipeline.py has no persistence at all). * P063 MISSING. schema_version existed as a free string; no comparison, no policy, no versioned source schema. * P064 PARTIAL. Rules/runs/issues/scores existed, but a failing rule only opened an issue and the data flowed on. No quarantine anywhere. * P065 DUPLICATE (confirmed). Two ER engines: src/er/entity-resolution- service.ts (canonical) and services/api/workers/resolve.py (simplified, still called by pipeline.py:110). * P067 PARTIAL. Lineage was emitted to AUD0 but nothing here could ANSWER a lineage question — no store, no query, no route. * P068 MISSING, documented in test_known_gaps.py:44-52 ("no delivery-store persistence layer exists to dedupe a backfill against"). BUILT (only what was PARTIAL/BROKEN/MISSING): * P060 sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql adds authorization/schedule/schemas/ checkpoints/ledger/quarantine/lineage tables, owner_id, and flips the opt_sources status DEFAULT to 'pending' so even a raw psql INSERT cannot produce an unclassified-but-active source. SourceRegistryService gains classifySource/activateSource/deactivateSource + authorization/schedule accessors; registration NEVER activates (asking for status:"active" goes through the gate, not around it); a service identity cannot authorize a source. Routes: activate (GET classification / POST activate), authorization, schedule. * P061 src/connectors/connector.ts — all nine operations on one interface. src/connectors/conformance.ts — a runnable suite (15 checks, no "skip" verdict). HttpJsonConnector (real HTTP, opaque cursor) and JsonlFileConnector (real file, line offsets, CDC deletes) both pass it. The suite caught a real defect while being written: an API that drops next_cursor at the end left the connector unable to resume, which is why HttpJsonConnectorConfig has cursor_field. * P062 src/types/ingestion.ts + src/ingestion/{envelope,ingestion-runner}.ts. One envelope for batch/stream/cdc; durable per-(source,partition) checkpoints; resume proven by killing a run inside the sink. * P063 src/schema/{record-schema,compatibility,schema-registry}.ts. Two enforcement points, both upstream of any consumer write: a discovery gate before the first read, and per-record conformance before the page reaches the sink. A producer cannot widen its own policy retroactively. * P064 src/quality/quality-policy.ts composes the EXISTING ExpectationEngine (not a second engine) and adds the missing consequence: block / quarantine / warn, with quarantine durable and recoverable. No policy is reported as "none_declared", never as a pass; an unexecutable expectation counts as a violation, never a silent pass. * P067 src/lineage/{lineage-edge,lineage-store}.ts + GET /api/0pt/lineage. AUD0 stays the system of record; this is 0pt's own queryable projection. * P068 opt_ingestion_ledger + IngestionRunner.backfill: bounded, idempotent on repeat, leaves the live checkpoint alone, still re-emits real changes. A BUG THIS PASS WROTE AND CAUGHT: the first IngestionRepository draft combined the idempotency check and its recording into one atomic call BEFORE the sink. The crash/resume test then delivered 7 of 10 records — the page in flight when the sink died was already marked delivered, so the resumed run skipped it as a duplicate. Permanent, silent data loss. Fixed by splitting peekDeliveries/commitDeliveries and committing both the ledger and the checkpoint only after the sink resolves. NOT DONE, stated rather than deferred quietly: * P065 is NOT met. resolve.py is still a second simplified production engine. Closing it means rewriting it as an adapter over the canonical service, which cannot be verified from this repo today: services/api is not built by this repo's Dockerfile, api.0pt.app answers 404, and NO CI workflow runs its pytest suite. The duplication is now stated at both sites in code and the removal plan is in STATUS.md. The new ingestion plane performs no ER, so it adds no third engine. * P066 (Iceberg) untouched — ST0RE is owned by another workflow. Contract read only. * Delivery is AT-LEAST-ONCE, not exactly-once (no per-partition run lock). * No CDC *source* exists; the contract is met, a CDC connector is not built. * 0pt does not schedule itself — the schedule row is a declaration ACT0 would read. VERIFIED: pnpm typecheck clean; pnpm test 365 passed / 25 skipped (was 311/18); pnpm build clean with all four new routes in the route table; lint unchanged at 12 pre-existing errors. Real Postgres 16 (tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, 7 passed) plus a real `docker restart` of that container with an identical read-back through the production code path — that is P060's "a restart preserves all sources", measured. DEPLOYMENT REALITY (curl, 2026-09-04): 0pt.app/api/health returns 200 from Vercel with db:not_configured; 0pt.app/api/0pt/sources returns 404; api.0pt.app/health returns 404; cd.yml still guards on a placeholder Coolify app id. None of the capability layer runs in production. Nothing here is LIVE_VERIFIED and STATUS.md says so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-04 17:03:14 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	07b13bd833	feat(data-os): Source Registry Postgres persistence + full HTTP route surface ... Replaces the in-memory (per-instance, not even per-process-shared) Maps in SourceService/SourceRegistryService with real Postgres persistence, and adds the register/query/describe/health/rights/provenance/freshness HTTP routes that never existed (grep for SourceRegistryService in app/ previously returned nothing). - sql/002_source_registry.sql: opt_sources, opt_source_rights, opt_source_provenance, opt_source_health_checks, opt_source_freshness. Numbered 002 (not 006) because 004's opt_source_rate_policies already forward-references opt_sources, which no sql/ file defined until now — fixes 004's pre-existing broken migration ordering (opt_datasets remains a separate, unrelated, still-open gap in 004, flagged not fixed). - src/repositories/*: SourceRepository / SourceRegistryRepository seams, each with an in-memory implementation (business logic extracted verbatim) and a Postgres implementation, chosen via resolveStoreMode — production still fails hard with no DATABASE_URL (Master-DoD §3), but a configured production now actually works instead of always being blocked. - SourceService / SourceRegistryService: storage moved behind the repository seam; getHealth/getFreshness are now async and tenant-scoped at the accessor itself (needed once they're reachable directly over HTTP, not only after an earlier caller's tenant check). - src/services/source-registry.ts: shared singleton instances for the sources/* route group, fixing the "each route module owned its own private registry" defect (source-rate-policies and .../query previously couldn't see a source registered via POST /api/0pt/sources). - New routes: POST/GET /api/0pt/sources, GET /api/0pt/sources/[id], GET+PUT .../rights, GET+PUT .../provenance, GET+POST .../health, GET .../freshness. - Business logic unchanged: fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant NOT_FOUND (no existence oracle, §50), bounded 100-row health history. Tested against a real Postgres container (not mocked) — tests/p0/source-registry-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, env-gated on SOURCE_REGISTRY_TEST_DATABASE_URL, skips honestly when unset. All 249 pre-existing P0 tests + 7 new realinfra tests pass; also smoke-tested the full HTTP route surface end-to-end against next dev + live Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 20:42:41 +02:00
adminandClaude Sonnet 5	bda21e87eb	Live-verify Iceberg write path against ST0RE + close field/contract gaps ... Re-runs this session's task spec against 0pt's actual repo state, which turned out to already have a substantial, tested implementation from a prior pass (35b6ec6): dataset<->Iceberg-table mapping, source rate policy, and an ST0RE lakehouse client that was honestly marked "not live-verified". This pass found api.st0re.siax.io IS reachable from this environment and used it -- first via curl to safely discover the real contract, then through 0pt's own updated code -- to drive a real namespace -> table -> snapshot write against production ST0RE (task item 3's "write ONE first test dataset" proof). That surfaced and fixed three real bugs the mock-only pass could not have caught: - ST0RE requires X-Tenant-Id/X-Actor-Id headers on every lakehouse route; the previous HTTP client sent none. Fixed via a threaded St0reRequestContext. - IcebergTableInput.datasetId is a foreign key into ST0RE's OWN dataset table, not a free-form string -- sending 0pt's dataset_id 400s live with a Postgres FK violation. Fixed by no longer sending it; 0pt's dataset<->table linkage lives entirely in DatasetIcebergMapping. - ST0RE enforces a real unique constraint on lakehouse namespaces (tenant_id, project_id, name) with no upsert route. Fixed with a client-side lookup-or-create (listNamespaces + findOrRegisterNamespace). Also closed a field-level gap against the task's literal schema spec: 0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1 now carries namespace_id (a real reference to ST0RE's LakehouseNamespace.namespaceId, not guessed) and mapped_at, both additive alongside the existing namespace/created_at fields (sql/005, JSON schema, types, service). tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.realinfra.test.ts replaces the prior it.todo with a real SEAM-pattern live test: attempts the real HTTP call, skips honestly if ST0RE is unreachable, never fabricates success. It ran successfully against production ST0RE this session (real namespace/table/ snapshot UUIDs logged in docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md). Two ST0RE-side cross-tenant read bugs were found and flagged (not fixed here -- out of scope for this repo): GET .../namespaces ignores its own tenant header and query filters; GET .../tables/:id doesn't check the caller's tenant against the table's owner. npm test: 155 passed, 0 failed, 0 todo (up from 154 passed + 1 todo). npx tsc --noEmit: 1 pre-existing, unrelated error in quality-report-service.ts (present before this pass, part of the wider uncommitted P0 data-platform build already in this repo) -- not touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-13 00:18:10 +02:00
adminandClaude Sonnet 5	35b6ec63bf	Add 0pt Iceberg write-path ownership: dataset<->table mapping + source rate policy ... Real, tested implementation of docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md's items 2-8 (the "future implementation session" that doc named): 0pt is now the canonical writer of Iceberg tables through ST0RE's real, shipped /v1/st0re/lakehouse/* table registry (sax3l/st0re commit 9ea0abb), never persisting lakehouse table/catalog/snapshot state itself. - src/types + src/services for 0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1 (dataset -> ST0RE tableId reference) and 0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.v1 (the sourceRatePolicy ownership repair, moved out of N0D per ADR-0030). - src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts: new client matching ST0RE's actual camelCase route contract, with the same mock/HTTP boundary convention as this repo's existing cl0ud/n0d/aud0/st0re clients. Honest caveat in its module doc comment: not verified against a live ST0RE instance in this pass (no reachable ST0RE_URL); every test exercises the deterministic mock. - src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts: registers tables/snapshots through ST0RE, requests N0D jobs only for heavy writes (never executes them in-process), emits all four AUD0 event names (dataset_iceberg_table_mapped / iceberg_write_requested / iceberg_snapshot_created / source_rate_policy_created). - sql/004, packages/schemas/*.json, app/api/0pt/lakehouse + sources/rate-policies routes, tests/p0/*.test.ts (154 passed + 1 honest it.todo for the live-ST0RE case, up from 142 baseline, 0 failures). - Reconciled a real collision: an earlier untracked draft schema/test pair (tests/p0/enterprise-data-os-expansion.test.ts) asserted a different, now-superseded source_rate_policy shape; updated that one test block only. - docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md states the ownership boundary plainly and is explicit throughout about what's real-and-tested vs. contract-only. docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md gets a status-update section, not a rewrite. - Data quality rules (quality-check-service.ts, quality-report-service.ts) were not touched -- confirmed still 0pt-owned. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 19:46:47 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 4.8	15c65a584c	feat(api): Vercel-native platform API + Postgres schema ... Route Handlers (Vercel Functions): /api/health, /api/estimates (single-source estimate math, ore), /api/catalog, /api/sources (legal sourcing map). sql/001_init.sql = full docs/03 data model (entities + bridge_provenance + platform tables, pgvector). Ready to wire Vercel Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-24 17:56:30 +02:00