12 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	3d2fc6f913	fix(recovery): restore source removed by production documentation merge	2026-11-10 03:42:10 +01:00
admin	a4189333af	docs(production): standardiserad produktionsberedskap och gap-analys ... Lägger docs/production-readiness.md och siax/production-gaps.json enligt SIAX Master Definition of Done. Underlag: git-, kod- och live-evidens 2026-11-11. Nivån är evidensbaserad, inte ett leveransgodkännande.	2026-11-10 03:07:36 +01:00
admin	d40360aabc	feat(auth): dual-accept CL0UD workload identity on the machine routes ... The internal machine routes (`quality/bridge-run`, `canonical/facts`, `internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch`, `internal/er/candidates`, `search/definitions`) trusted a shared `X-Internal-Token` with NO tenant authority: middleware let it through without setting any verified tenant, so `assertTenantMatchesVerified` was a no-op and a caller-chosen `tenant_id` in the body was authoritative. This closes that gap while keeping the engine working during the transition to CL0UD workload tokens: - `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — the server-configured `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` scope, a scope header that only middleware may set, and a parser that strips/ignores client values. - `src/auth/cl0ud-workload.ts` — a real `jose`/JWKS verifier for CL0UD workload JWTs (`iss`/`aud`/`exp`), deriving `tenant_id` and `capabilities` from verified claims only. Fail-closed when a token is presented but the issuer/JWKS/audience/tenant claim does not verify. - `middleware.ts` — strips every `x-0pt-verified-*` header on all forwarded paths. Legacy internal tokens get the single configured tenant as scope (an ambiguous multi-tenant list is refused with 401 instead of widened); a Bearer CL0UD workload token is verified and its claims become the verified tenant/subject/capabilities. - `src/http/tenant-guard.ts` — enforces the service scope on tenant-scoped writes (deny when the tenant is outside the scope) and adds `assertWorkloadCapabilities` for capability-scoped principals. - `quality/bridge-run` now calls `assertTenantMatchesVerified` like `canonical/facts` already did. Tests: `tests/auth/workload-identity-dual-accept.test.ts` (10 cases) covers forged-header stripping, ambiguous-scope refusal, wrong audience, missing tenant claim, cross-tenant denial and missing-capability denial. Real CL0UD provisioning (service accounts + published JWKS) is still required before a workload token exists in production; until then the legacy token path is the only one that authenticates, now tenant-scoped.	2026-11-09 18:34:34 +01:00
SIAX Agent	1a581fde29	fix(auth): en (1) tenant per intern serviceprincipal — multi-tenant nekas ... Den delade X-Internal-Token identifierar EN tjänsteprocess, inte flera oberoende principaler. En allowlist med flera tenants skulle låta varje tokeninnehavare välja mellan dem — samma klientstyrda auktoritet som guarden ska ta bort. Multi-tenant-tjänsteåtkomst kräver verifierad workload-identity-binding (CL0UD-delegation); tills den finns failar en ambig konfiguration stängt (401) och ingen identitet forwardas. Tester: multi-tenant nekas utan side effect, en tenant fungerar, 75/75 i auth+ cross-tenant-sviterna, tsc ren.	2026-11-07 16:39:48 +01:00
SIAX Agent	b97ad0b2f4	fix(auth): bind internal-service tenant authority to server config ... The first revision of this fix copied a CLIENT header (X-0pt-Internal-Tenant) or a single INTERNAL_TENANT_ID into x-0pt-verified-tenant. That is not an authorization source: any holder of the shared internal token could still name any tenant, leaving the original cross-tenant write reachable through a different header. - INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS (server env) is now the only tenant authority for the X-Internal-Token principal; empty => no authority (fail closed, 403). - Middleware strips inbound x-0pt-verified-{tenant,sub} and the service scope header on every path, including the dev escape hatch. - x-0pt-verified-service-tenants carries the allowlist; the tenant guard checks membership and denies anything outside it. - POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run now runs the same tenant guard as canonical/facts (it auto-provisions tenant-scoped rules). - 16 new regression tests; auth + cross-tenant + canonical + bridge suites 87/87; tsc --noEmit clean.	2026-11-07 15:32:51 +01:00
admin	c46ebbf810	feat(0pt): canonical-fact machine route + renumber migration to 022 (#484)	2026-11-05 19:16:13 +00:00
admin	063206d8b0	feat(auth): adopt @siax/auth-zitadel canonical claim normalizer	2026-11-04 02:23:21 +01:00
admin	bd1c20edb2	feat: add guarded document workbench foundations	2026-11-02 01:26:36 +01:00
admin	a1557b2a7d	feat(payments): bind orders to verified tenant and buyer	2026-09-15 19:53:58 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
Claude (SIAX platform session)	1c1e2cb649	fix(auth): make the AUTH_ENFORCE default fail-closed on /api/0pt/* ... The auth seam read `process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE === 'true'`, so an absent env var meant NO authentication: any fresh container, local run, DR restore or redeploy that dropped the variable served /api/0pt/* anonymously, taking the tenant from the caller-supplied X-Tenant-Id header. 0pt.app is deployed and was answering anonymously (verified: an invalid Bearer token plus an arbitrary X-Tenant-Id returned 200), so this was a live hole, not latent. * authEnforced() now returns true unless AUTH_ENFORCE is explicitly "false" (trimmed, case-insensitive). Unset/empty/misspelled => ENFORCED. * assertAuthConfigSafe() throws AuthMisconfigurationError when NODE_ENV=production and enforcement resolved off, naming AUTH_ENFORCE. It runs at middleware module load (startup) and on the env-driven request path, so a production instance can neither boot nor serve a single unauthenticated request with auth switched off. * .env.example no longer teaches AUTH_ENFORCE=false; README's Deploy section states the fail-closed posture (no DEPLOY.md in this repo). * 7 new tests, incl. the regression case: with AUTH_ENFORCE unset and no `enforce` option, an unauthenticated request is rejected with 401. No test was inverted or deleted -- none asserted the open default; the three enforce:false cases now describe the explicit local-dev escape hatch. Tests: 121 passed / 1 skipped before, 128 passed / 1 skipped after. Typecheck and build clean; advisory lint unchanged (16 pre-existing problems). Scope: auth default only. The matcher still covers /api/0pt/* alone, and the handlers still take tenant_id from the query/body rather than the verified principal -- both described in the PR body, neither fixed here.	2026-07-27 13:28:24 +02:00
SIAX Foundation BotandClaude Opus 4.8	1d76d50f3d	feat(auth,foundation): Wave 2 flag-gated Zitadel JWT verify + validation + eslint + tests ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-25 14:32:34 +02:00