Föregående fix räckte inte: att stänga av disk-vattenmärket rensar inte ett kluster som redan gått i flood stage — cluster.blocks.read_only_allow_delete ligger kvar och varje skrivning ger 403 index_create_block_exception (run 389046 var fortfarande röd).
Nu:
sätts tröskeln av redan vid boot (cluster.routing.allocation.disk.threshold_enabled: "false"),
rensas read-only-blocket explicit varje försök (read_only_allow_delete: null),
skrivs svarskropparna ut vid fel för framtida triage.
Verifierat lokalt mot opensearch:2.11.1: read-only → 403, därefter PUT {read_only_allow_delete: null} → indexskapande 200.
Föregående fix räckte inte: att stänga av disk-vattenmärket **rensar inte** ett kluster som redan gått i flood stage — `cluster.blocks.read_only_allow_delete` ligger kvar och varje skrivning ger `403 index_create_block_exception` (run 389046 var fortfarande röd).
Nu:
- sätts tröskeln av redan vid boot (`cluster.routing.allocation.disk.threshold_enabled: "false"`),
- rensas read-only-blocket explicit varje försök (`read_only_allow_delete: null`),
- skrivs svarskropparna ut vid fel för framtida triage.
Verifierat lokalt mot `opensearch:2.11.1`: read-only → 403, därefter `PUT {read_only_allow_delete: null}` → indexskapande 200.
Disabling cluster.routing.allocation.disk.threshold_enabled does not clear a
cluster already in flood stage: it keeps cluster.blocks.read_only_allow_delete
and every write returns 403 index_create_block_exception (run 389046, still red
after the previous fix). Clear that block explicitly on every attempt, set the
threshold off at boot, and print the probe/settings bodies for future triage.
Verified locally against opensearch:2.11.1: read-only block -> 403, then
PUT {... read_only_allow_delete: null} -> index creation 200.
CODEOWNERS rules
requested review from sax3l 2026-11-02 19:29:40 +00:00
admin
merged commit 6a4a45a480 into main2026-11-02 19:41:49 +00:00
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Föregående fix räckte inte: att stänga av disk-vattenmärket rensar inte ett kluster som redan gått i flood stage —
cluster.blocks.read_only_allow_deleteligger kvar och varje skrivning ger403 index_create_block_exception(run 389046 var fortfarande röd).Nu:
cluster.routing.allocation.disk.threshold_enabled: "false"),read_only_allow_delete: null),Verifierat lokalt mot
opensearch:2.11.1: read-only → 403, därefterPUT {read_only_allow_delete: null}→ indexskapande 200.Disabling cluster.routing.allocation.disk.threshold_enabled does not clear a cluster already in flood stage: it keeps cluster.blocks.read_only_allow_delete and every write returns 403 index_create_block_exception (run 389046, still red after the previous fix). Clear that block explicitly on every attempt, set the threshold off at boot, and print the probe/settings bodies for future triage. Verified locally against opensearch:2.11.1: read-only block -> 403, then PUT {... read_only_allow_delete: null} -> index creation 200.