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83 lines
3.8 KiB
TypeScript
83 lines
3.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* P014 regression test: before this pass, POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run
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* -- the ONE route the Python engine's quality_bridge.py actually calls,
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* using X-Internal-Token, never a Bearer token -- was rejected 401 by
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* middleware.ts in any environment enforcing auth (the default), because
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* middleware required a verified Zitadel Bearer token unconditionally on
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* every /api/0pt/* path. See src/auth/internal-token.ts's doc comment for
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* the full story. Neither existing test suite caught it: the TS bridge test
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* calls the route's POST function directly (bypassing middleware.ts
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* entirely) and the Python test mocks the HTTP layer.
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*
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* This test exercises the actual `middleware` function, not the route
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* handler, so it proves the fix at the layer where the bug lived.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
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import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
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function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
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}
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describe('middleware.ts: internal-token path for /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', () => {
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const saved = { auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE, internal: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN, node: process.env.NODE_ENV };
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beforeEach(() => {
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delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
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process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(saved)) {
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const envKey = k === 'auth' ? 'AUTH_ENFORCE' : k === 'internal' ? 'INTERNAL_TOKEN' : 'NODE_ENV';
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if (v === undefined) delete process.env[envKey];
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else process.env[envKey] = v;
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}
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});
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it('REGRESSION: a valid X-Internal-Token lets the engine through with NO Bearer token (was: 401)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(
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req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
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);
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// NextResponse.next() carries no body/status override -- it is not an
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// error JSON response the way a rejection is.
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('a valid X-Internal-Token lets the acquisition engine write canonical facts', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(
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req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('an invalid X-Internal-Token still falls through to the ordinary Bearer requirement (401, not a bypass)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong-secret' }));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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const body = await res.json();
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expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED');
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});
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it('a valid X-Internal-Token on a DIFFERENT /api/0pt/* route does NOT bypass auth (not a blanket exemption)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/sources', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('no INTERNAL_TOKEN configured on the edge -- the internal-token path never activates, even with the right-looking header', async () => {
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delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
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const res = await middleware(
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req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('a real Bearer-authenticated caller can still reach bridge-run directly (not internal-token-only)', async () => {
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// No X-Internal-Token at all, no Authorization header either -> falls to
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// the normal Bearer requirement -> 401, proving this path is additive,
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// not a replacement for the existing Zitadel flow.
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run'));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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});
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