Claude (SIAX platform session)
1c1e2cb649
The auth seam read `process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE === 'true'`, so an absent env var meant NO authentication: any fresh container, local run, DR restore or redeploy that dropped the variable served /api/0pt/* anonymously, taking the tenant from the caller-supplied X-Tenant-Id header. 0pt.app is deployed and was answering anonymously (verified: an invalid Bearer token plus an arbitrary X-Tenant-Id returned 200), so this was a live hole, not latent. * authEnforced() now returns true unless AUTH_ENFORCE is explicitly "false" (trimmed, case-insensitive). Unset/empty/misspelled => ENFORCED. * assertAuthConfigSafe() throws AuthMisconfigurationError when NODE_ENV=production and enforcement resolved off, naming AUTH_ENFORCE. It runs at middleware module load (startup) and on the env-driven request path, so a production instance can neither boot nor serve a single unauthenticated request with auth switched off. * .env.example no longer teaches AUTH_ENFORCE=false; README's Deploy section states the fail-closed posture (no DEPLOY.md in this repo). * 7 new tests, incl. the regression case: with AUTH_ENFORCE unset and no `enforce` option, an unauthenticated request is rejected with 401. No test was inverted or deleted -- none asserted the open default; the three enforce:false cases now describe the explicit local-dev escape hatch. Tests: 121 passed / 1 skipped before, 128 passed / 1 skipped after. Typecheck and build clean; advisory lint unchanged (16 pre-existing problems). Scope: auth default only. The matcher still covers /api/0pt/* alone, and the handlers still take tenant_id from the query/body rather than the verified principal -- both described in the PR body, neither fixed here.