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accounted/extensions/general/mcp-server/index.ts
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TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import type { Extension } from '@/lib/extensions/types'
import { buildProtectedResourceMetadata } from '@/lib/auth/protected-resource-metadata'
import { handleMcpRequest, tools as mcpTools } from './server'
import { isForbiddenOrigin, forbiddenOriginResponse } from './origin-guard'
import { registerAgentTools } from '@/lib/agent/tools/registry'
import type { AgentTool } from '@/lib/agent/tools/types'
import { currentAppVersion } from '@/lib/reports/app-version'
// Make the same tool set available to the in-app chat agent. The chat loop
// (lib/agent/chat/*) dispatches against the core agentToolRegistry so it can
// stay decoupled from this extension's module path. Tools satisfy the
// AgentTool contract structurally: see lib/agent/tools/types.ts.
registerAgentTools(mcpTools as unknown as AgentTool[])
export const mcpServerExtension: Extension = {
id: 'mcp-server',
name: 'MCP Server',
// Build-derived so deploys are distinguishable; '1.0.0' when self-hosted
// without an inlined commit SHA. Same identifier as serverInfo.version.
version: currentAppVersion() ?? '1.0.0',
settingsPanel: {
label: 'MCP-server (API)',
path: '/settings/api',
},
apiRoutes: [
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/mcp',
skipAuth: true, // Auth handled via API key in the handler
handler: async (request: Request) => {
// MCP spec MUST: validate Origin (DNS-rebinding defense). See origin-guard.ts.
if (isForbiddenOrigin(request)) return forbiddenOriginResponse()
return handleMcpRequest(request)
},
},
// MCP Streamable HTTP also needs GET for SSE and DELETE for session termination
{
method: 'GET',
path: '/mcp',
skipAuth: true,
// This server is stateless and offers no server-initiated SSE stream, so
// the Streamable HTTP spec requires 405 Method Not Allowed here. Returning
// 401 (as we previously did) makes spec-compliant clients (Claude
// connector, Claude Desktop, Cursor) treat the SSE GET as an auth failure
// and retry-loop: refresh token → re-open GET → 401 → …: which storms
// the endpoint and churns OAuth key rotation. OAuth discovery is
// bootstrapped on the POST 401 (WWW-Authenticate), not here.
handler: async (request: Request) => {
if (isForbiddenOrigin(request)) return forbiddenOriginResponse()
return new Response('Method Not Allowed', {
status: 405,
headers: { Allow: 'POST, DELETE' },
})
},
},
{
method: 'DELETE',
path: '/mcp',
skipAuth: true,
// Stateless: no sessions to terminate
handler: async (request: Request) => {
if (isForbiddenOrigin(request)) return forbiddenOriginResponse()
return new Response(null, { status: 204 })
},
},
{
method: 'GET',
path: '/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource',
skipAuth: true,
// Endpoint-appended RFC 9728 discovery. Claude.ai's connector setup
// derives the metadata URL from the server URL and tries both the
// path-based root form and this one before any 401; a 404 here reads
// as "Authorization failed". Public by nature: it names the
// authorization server and nothing tenant-specific.
handler: async (request: Request) => {
if (isForbiddenOrigin(request)) return forbiddenOriginResponse()
return NextResponse.json(buildProtectedResourceMetadata(request))
},
},
],
eventHandlers: [],
}