* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
795 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
795 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
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import { validatePeriodDuration } from '@/lib/bookkeeping/validate-period-duration'
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import type { FiscalPeriod, PeriodStatus } from '@/types'
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const log = createLogger('period-service')
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/**
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* The two ways a bank transaction can still owe the period a verifikation.
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*
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* Triage is the act of answering "is this an affärshändelse for the company?".
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* The three answers, and what each means for a period lock:
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*
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* is_business IS NULL, is_ignored = false -> NOT TRIAGED. Nobody has looked
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* at it. Counted as `untriaged`; blocks.
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* is_business = true -> TRIAGED AS A BUSINESS EVENT. It
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* owes a verifikation. Blocks unless it already has one (see below);
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* counted as `businessUnbooked` when it does not.
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* is_business = false -> TRIAGED AND EXCLUDED (privat
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* uttag / not the company's affär). Never blocks: there is nothing to
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* bokföra, and holding a lock hostage to a private coffee is over-
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* blocking, not compliance.
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* is_ignored = true -> TRIAGED AND EXCLUDED, the user's
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* explicit "hide this, never going to book it" (migration
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* 20260529190000). Never blocks. The column is NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
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* so `.eq('is_ignored', false)` cannot silently drop rows.
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*
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* "Already has a verifikation" is deliberately NOT `journal_entry_id IS NOT
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* NULL`. That column only covers the 1:1 case; bulk-booked (N tx -> 1 JE, via
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* transaction_voucher_links) and multi-allocated (invoice_payments /
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* supplier_invoice_payments) transactions stay NULL while being anchored to a
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* real verifikat. See lib/transactions/is-booked.ts and its Postgres mirror
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* public.is_transaction_booked(uuid); this helper reproduces all three
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* locations so the guard does not block on already-booked rows.
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*/
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export interface UnbookedInPeriod {
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/** Never triaged: is_business IS NULL AND is_ignored = false. */
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untriaged: number
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/** Triaged as a business event but anchored to no verifikat at all. */
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businessUnbooked: number
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}
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/** PostgREST rejects very long URLs, so `.in()` lists are chunked. */
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const ANCHOR_LOOKUP_CHUNK = 200
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/**
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* Count the bank transactions in [periodStart, periodEnd] that a period lock
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* would strand. Throws on any query failure so the caller can fail closed:
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* never return 0 for a check that did not actually run.
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*/
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export async function countUnbookedInPeriod(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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companyId: string,
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periodStart: string,
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periodEnd: string,
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): Promise<UnbookedInPeriod> {
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// Leg 1: never triaged. This is the canonical "att bokföra" predicate from
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// lib/worklist/categories.ts, so the number here reconciles with the
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// "N st att bokföra" badge instead of being a second, unexplainable count.
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// Served by the partial index idx_transactions_company_unbooked.
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const { count: untriaged, error: untriagedError } = await supabase
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.from('transactions')
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.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.is('is_business', null)
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.eq('is_ignored', false)
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.gte('date', periodStart)
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.lte('date', periodEnd)
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if (untriagedError) {
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throw new Error(`untriaged transaction count failed: ${untriagedError.message}`)
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}
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// Leg 2: triaged as a business event, but no verifikat anywhere. The user has
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// already confirmed this is the company's affärshändelse, so a lock strands
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// it just as hard as an untriaged one, only with less excuse. Fetch the ids
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// and subtract the ones anchored via the non-denormalized locations.
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//
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// Paginated via fetchAllRows with a stable id order: PostgREST silently caps
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// a bare select at 1000 rows, and this candidate set is NOT bounded in
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// practice, because bulk-booked transactions keep journal_entry_id NULL
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// (anchored only via transaction_voucher_links). An unpaginated read would
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// drop every candidate past row 1000, under-counting businessUnbooked and
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// letting a period lock while genuinely unbooked affärshändelser are
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// stranded in it (BFL 5 kap 2 §).
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let candidates: Array<{ id?: string }>
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try {
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candidates = await fetchAllRows<{ id?: string }>(({ from, to }) =>
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supabase
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.from('transactions')
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.select('id')
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.eq('is_business', true)
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.eq('is_ignored', false)
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.is('journal_entry_id', null)
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.gte('date', periodStart)
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.lte('date', periodEnd)
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.order('id', { ascending: true })
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.range(from, to)
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)
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} catch (err) {
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throw new Error(
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`business transaction lookup failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
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)
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}
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const candidateIds = candidates
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.map((row) => row.id)
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.filter((id): id is string => typeof id === 'string')
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if (candidateIds.length === 0) {
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return { untriaged: untriaged ?? 0, businessUnbooked: 0 }
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}
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const anchored = new Set<string>()
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for (const table of ['transaction_voucher_links', 'invoice_payments', 'supplier_invoice_payments'] as const) {
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for (let i = 0; i < candidateIds.length; i += ANCHOR_LOOKUP_CHUNK) {
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const chunk = candidateIds.slice(i, i + ANCHOR_LOOKUP_CHUNK)
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const { data, error } = await supabase
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.from(table)
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.select('transaction_id')
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.in('transaction_id', chunk)
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if (error) {
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throw new Error(`${table} anchor lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
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}
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for (const row of data ?? []) {
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const id = (row as { transaction_id?: string | null }).transaction_id
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if (id) anchored.add(id)
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}
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}
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}
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return {
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untriaged: untriaged ?? 0,
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businessUnbooked: candidateIds.filter((id) => !anchored.has(id)).length,
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}
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}
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/**
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* Lock a fiscal period: prevents new journal entries from being posted.
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* Requires: period exists, belongs to company, not already locked/closed.
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*/
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export async function lockPeriod(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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companyId: string,
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userId: string,
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fiscalPeriodId: string
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): Promise<FiscalPeriod> {
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// Fetch period
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const { data: period, error: fetchError } = await supabase
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.from('fiscal_periods')
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.select('*')
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.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.single()
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if (fetchError || !period) {
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throw new Error('Fiscal period not found')
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}
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if (period.is_closed) {
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throw new Error('Period is already closed')
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}
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if (period.locked_at) {
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throw new Error('Period is already locked')
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}
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// Refuse to lock while the period still holds bank transactions that would be
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// stranded. BFL 5 kap 2 § requires every affärshändelse to be bokförd in the
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// period it belongs to; once locked_at is set the enforce_period_lock trigger
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// makes these rows unbookable in place, leaving affärshändelser that can only
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// be entered by unlocking again or via a rättelse.
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//
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// Hard block, not an advisory warning with a bypass. There is no legitimate
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// "lock anyway" case: locking is a voluntary internal control with no legal
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// deadline, while the affärshändelser it would strand do have one (BFL 5 kap
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// 2 §: kontant senast nästa arbetsdag, övrigt "så snart det kan ske").
|
|
// Every escape hatch the user could want is already an exit from the
|
|
// predicate and is named in the message: book it, mark it privat, or mark it
|
|
// ignored. Locking first and unlocking later is strictly worse, because the
|
|
// unlock lands in the immutable audit_log as a control override.
|
|
let unbooked: UnbookedInPeriod
|
|
try {
|
|
unbooked = await countUnbookedInPeriod(
|
|
supabase,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
period.period_start,
|
|
period.period_end,
|
|
)
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
// Fail closed. A guard that cannot run must not wave the lock through:
|
|
// that is exactly how the previous dead predicate went unnoticed.
|
|
log.error('unbooked-transaction guard failed, refusing to lock', {
|
|
companyId,
|
|
fiscalPeriodId,
|
|
reason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
|
|
})
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
'Kunde inte kontrollera obokförda banktransaktioner i perioden. Perioden lämnas olåst. Försök igen.'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const blockingCount = unbooked.untriaged + unbooked.businessUnbooked
|
|
if (blockingCount > 0) {
|
|
// Message wording is load-bearing for two separate matchers; keep both
|
|
// phrases when editing:
|
|
// - "saknar bokföring" -> both lock routes map this to the
|
|
// PERIOD_HAS_UNBOOKED_TRANSACTIONS envelope (400) instead of a 500
|
|
// (app/api/bookkeeping/fiscal-periods/[id]/lock/route.ts and
|
|
// app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/fiscal-periods/[id]/lock/route.ts)
|
|
// - /Kan inte låsa period:.*affärstransaktion/ -> inferCode() in
|
|
// lib/errors/get-structured-error.ts derives the same code for the
|
|
// MCP/agent surfaces, which have no HTTP envelope to read. The word
|
|
// "affärstransaktion" therefore has to appear unconditionally, not
|
|
// only in the breakdown clause that the untriaged-only case omits.
|
|
// The infra message above deliberately matches neither: an unreachable DB
|
|
// must not send an agent off remediating transactions.
|
|
const breakdown = [
|
|
unbooked.untriaged > 0 ? `${unbooked.untriaged} ej hanterade` : null,
|
|
unbooked.businessUnbooked > 0
|
|
? `${unbooked.businessUnbooked} markerade som affärshändelse men utan verifikat`
|
|
: null,
|
|
]
|
|
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
.join(', ')
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`Kan inte låsa period: ${blockingCount} banktransaktion(er) i perioden saknar bokföring ` +
|
|
`(${breakdown}). Alla affärstransaktioner måste vara bokförda innan perioden låses. ` +
|
|
`Gå till Transaktioner, bokför dem eller markera dem som privata eller ignorerade, och lås perioden därefter.`
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.update({ locked_at: new Date().toISOString() })
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (updateError || !updated) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to lock period: ${updateError?.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const result = updated as FiscalPeriod
|
|
|
|
await eventBus.emit({
|
|
type: 'period.locked',
|
|
payload: { period: result, companyId, userId },
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Unlock a fiscal period: clears `locked_at` so new entries can be posted.
|
|
* Requires: period exists, belongs to company, is currently locked, not closed.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function unlockPeriod(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
fiscalPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<FiscalPeriod> {
|
|
const { data: period, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !period) {
|
|
throw new Error('Fiscal period not found')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (period.is_closed) {
|
|
throw new Error('Cannot unlock a closed period')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!period.locked_at) {
|
|
throw new Error('Period is not locked')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const priorLockedAt = period.locked_at
|
|
|
|
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.update({ locked_at: null })
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (updateError || !updated) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to unlock period: ${updateError?.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const result = updated as FiscalPeriod
|
|
|
|
// BFNAR 2013:2 kap. 8 (behandlingshistorik): unlocking a locked period is a
|
|
// sensitive control change. Persist it to the immutable audit_log (not just
|
|
// event_log, which has 30-day TTL) so an auditor can reconstruct who
|
|
// unlocked which period and when, even years later.
|
|
await supabase.from('audit_log').insert({
|
|
user_id: userId,
|
|
company_id: companyId,
|
|
action: 'UPDATE',
|
|
table_name: 'fiscal_periods',
|
|
record_id: fiscalPeriodId,
|
|
description: `Period unlocked: ${result.name} (${result.period_start} to ${result.period_end})`,
|
|
old_state: { locked_at: priorLockedAt },
|
|
new_state: { locked_at: null },
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
await eventBus.emit({
|
|
type: 'period.unlocked',
|
|
payload: { period: result, companyId, userId },
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Close a fiscal period: marks it as permanently closed.
|
|
* Requires: period is locked AND closing_entry_id is set (year-end must run first).
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function closePeriod(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
fiscalPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<FiscalPeriod> {
|
|
|
|
const { data: period, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !period) {
|
|
throw new Error('Fiscal period not found')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (period.is_closed) {
|
|
throw new Error('Period is already closed')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!period.locked_at) {
|
|
throw new Error('Period must be locked before closing')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!period.closing_entry_id) {
|
|
throw new Error('Year-end closing must be executed before closing the period')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.update({
|
|
is_closed: true,
|
|
closed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (updateError || !updated) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to close period: ${updateError?.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return updated as FiscalPeriod
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Create the next fiscal period following the current one.
|
|
* Computes dates based on the current period's length (handles brutet räkenskapsår).
|
|
* Sets previous_period_id for chain validation.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function createNextPeriod(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
currentPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<FiscalPeriod> {
|
|
|
|
const { data: current, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', currentPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !current) {
|
|
throw new Error('Current fiscal period not found')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute next period start (day after current end) in pure UTC, see
|
|
// findNextPeriod for the DST off-by-one rationale.
|
|
const nextStart = new Date(current.period_end + 'T00:00:00Z')
|
|
nextStart.setUTCDate(nextStart.getUTCDate() + 1)
|
|
|
|
// After a broken first fiscal year, subsequent years should always be
|
|
// 12 months (standard fiscal year). The first year is the only one that
|
|
// can be longer/shorter than 12 months per BFL 3 kap.
|
|
const nextEnd = new Date(nextStart)
|
|
nextEnd.setUTCMonth(nextEnd.getUTCMonth() + 12)
|
|
// Go to last day of the previous month: setUTCDate(0) rolls back into
|
|
// the prior month's last day.
|
|
nextEnd.setUTCDate(0)
|
|
|
|
const nextStartStr = nextStart.toISOString().slice(0, 10)
|
|
const nextEndStr = nextEnd.toISOString().slice(0, 10)
|
|
|
|
// Validate period duration: subsequent periods always start on 1st of month
|
|
const durationError = validatePeriodDuration(nextStartStr, nextEndStr, { isFirstPeriod: false })
|
|
if (durationError) {
|
|
throw new Error(durationError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for overlapping periods
|
|
const { data: overlapping } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.lte('period_start', nextEndStr)
|
|
.gte('period_end', nextStartStr)
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
|
|
if (overlapping && overlapping.length > 0) {
|
|
throw new Error('Next fiscal period already exists or overlaps with an existing period')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate name: e.g. "FY 2025" or "FY 2025/2026"
|
|
const startYear = nextStart.getUTCFullYear()
|
|
const endYear = nextEnd.getUTCFullYear()
|
|
const name = startYear === endYear ? `FY ${startYear}` : `FY ${startYear}/${endYear}`
|
|
|
|
const { data: newPeriod, error: insertError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.insert({
|
|
company_id: companyId,
|
|
user_id: userId,
|
|
name,
|
|
period_start: nextStartStr,
|
|
period_end: nextEndStr,
|
|
previous_period_id: currentPeriodId,
|
|
})
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (insertError || !newPeriod) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to create next period: ${insertError?.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return newPeriod as FiscalPeriod
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Look up the next fiscal period after the given one without creating it.
|
|
*
|
|
* Used by year-end closing to handle the common case where the next period
|
|
* was already created (e.g. by SIE import, manual creation, or a previous
|
|
* partial year-end run). Returns null when no such period exists.
|
|
*
|
|
* Matches first on previous_period_id chain, then falls back to a
|
|
* period_start = (current.period_end + 1 day) lookup so periods created
|
|
* before the chain was wired up are still recognised.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function findNextPeriod(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
currentPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<FiscalPeriod | null> {
|
|
const { data: current, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', currentPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !current) {
|
|
return null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { data: chained } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('previous_period_id', currentPeriodId)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
|
|
if (chained) {
|
|
return chained as FiscalPeriod
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UTC-only arithmetic: anchor the date string at UTC midnight, then
|
|
// advance via setUTCDate. Using Date(string) + setDate/getDate causes an
|
|
// off-by-one on servers in TZ+ when the day after period_end crosses a
|
|
// DST spring-forward, because setDate(local) writes local-time fields
|
|
// and toISOString() converts back through the shifted offset.
|
|
const expectedStartStr = addDaysUTC(current.period_end, 1)
|
|
|
|
const { data: byDate } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('period_start', expectedStartStr)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
|
|
return (byDate as FiscalPeriod | null) ?? null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add `days` to a YYYY-MM-DD string in pure UTC and return YYYY-MM-DD. */
|
|
function addDaysUTC(isoDate: string, days: number): string {
|
|
const d = new Date(isoDate + 'T00:00:00Z')
|
|
d.setUTCDate(d.getUTCDate() + days)
|
|
return d.toISOString().slice(0, 10)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Create a previous fiscal period before the given one.
|
|
* Computes a 12-month period ending the day before the given period starts.
|
|
* Updates previous_period_id chain so the given period points to the new one.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function createPreviousPeriod(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
currentPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<FiscalPeriod> {
|
|
|
|
const { data: current, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', currentPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !current) {
|
|
throw new Error('Current fiscal period not found')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute previous period end (day before current start)
|
|
const prevEnd = new Date(current.period_start + 'T12:00:00Z')
|
|
prevEnd.setUTCDate(prevEnd.getUTCDate() - 1)
|
|
|
|
// Compute previous period start (1st of month, 12 months before prevEnd)
|
|
const prevStart = new Date(prevEnd)
|
|
prevStart.setUTCMonth(prevStart.getUTCMonth() - 11)
|
|
prevStart.setUTCDate(1)
|
|
|
|
const prevStartStr = prevStart.toISOString().split('T')[0]
|
|
const prevEndStr = prevEnd.toISOString().split('T')[0]
|
|
|
|
// Validate period duration
|
|
const durationError = validatePeriodDuration(prevStartStr, prevEndStr, { isFirstPeriod: false })
|
|
if (durationError) {
|
|
throw new Error(durationError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for overlapping periods
|
|
const { data: overlapping } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.lte('period_start', prevEndStr)
|
|
.gte('period_end', prevStartStr)
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
|
|
if (overlapping && overlapping.length > 0) {
|
|
throw new Error('Previous fiscal period already exists or overlaps with an existing period')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate name
|
|
const startYear = prevStart.getFullYear()
|
|
const endYear = prevEnd.getFullYear()
|
|
const name = startYear === endYear ? `FY ${startYear}` : `FY ${startYear}/${endYear}`
|
|
|
|
const { data: newPeriod, error: insertError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.insert({
|
|
company_id: companyId,
|
|
user_id: userId,
|
|
name,
|
|
period_start: prevStartStr,
|
|
period_end: prevEndStr,
|
|
})
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (insertError || !newPeriod) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to create previous period: ${insertError?.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Update the current period to point to the new one
|
|
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.update({ previous_period_id: newPeriod.id })
|
|
.eq('id', currentPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to update period chain: ${updateError.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return newPeriod as FiscalPeriod
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export type PeriodStatusValue = 'open' | 'locked' | 'closed'
|
|
|
|
export interface PeriodStatusForDate {
|
|
period_id: string | null
|
|
status: PeriodStatusValue
|
|
/**
|
|
* For `locked` status: either the period's `locked_at` timestamp (ISO) or the
|
|
* company-wide `bookkeeping_locked_through` date (ISO), whichever applies.
|
|
* `null` for open/closed, and `null` when `lookup_failed` is true.
|
|
*/
|
|
lock_date: string | null
|
|
/**
|
|
* True when the lock lookup itself failed (PostgREST error, an overlapping
|
|
* fiscal_periods pair breaking `.maybeSingle()`, a network blip). `status`
|
|
* is then reported as `'locked'`, because a period whose state we could not
|
|
* read must never be presented as writable.
|
|
*
|
|
* Keep the three cases distinguishable, callers treat them differently:
|
|
* { status: 'open', period_id: <id> } -> verified open
|
|
* { status: 'open', period_id: null } -> verified: no
|
|
* covering period exists at all. Not an error: the engine's
|
|
* ensure-period helper creates one on write.
|
|
* { status: 'locked', period_id: null, lookup_failed } -> unverified.
|
|
* Nothing is known about the date. Retryable; a genuinely locked
|
|
* period always carries a real period_id or lock_date.
|
|
*
|
|
* Deliberately an additive optional field rather than a fourth
|
|
* `PeriodStatusValue`: the union is consumed as an exhaustive
|
|
* `Record<PeriodStatusValue, string>` in lib/agent/intents/bokslut-step.ts,
|
|
* so widening it would break unrelated callers at compile time.
|
|
*/
|
|
lookup_failed?: boolean
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Fail-closed verdict for a lock lookup that could not be completed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reported as `locked` on purpose. The alternative (`open`) is the bug this
|
|
* exists to prevent: every caller of resolvePeriodStatusForDate uses the
|
|
* result to decide whether a write into a period is allowed, so a swallowed
|
|
* query error used to read as "go ahead" on the storno, MCP staging, agent
|
|
* draft and pending-operation commit paths.
|
|
*/
|
|
function periodLookupFailed(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
date: string,
|
|
stage: 'company_settings' | 'fiscal_periods',
|
|
error: { message?: string } | null,
|
|
): PeriodStatusForDate {
|
|
log.error('period status lookup failed, failing closed', {
|
|
companyId,
|
|
date,
|
|
stage,
|
|
reason: error?.message,
|
|
})
|
|
return { period_id: null, status: 'locked', lock_date: null, lookup_failed: true }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Resolve the period status for a given affärshändelse date: answers
|
|
* "can a verifikation with this entry_date be posted right now?" using the
|
|
* same two-layer logic the DB triggers enforce:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. company-wide bookkeeping_locked_through (covers everything on/before)
|
|
* 2. the fiscal_period covering the date (is_closed or locked_at)
|
|
*
|
|
* Returned shape is the canonical `period_status` envelope threaded into MCP
|
|
* tool responses so agents and widgets can disable writes without round-trips.
|
|
*
|
|
* Fails CLOSED: if either lookup errors we report `locked` with
|
|
* `lookup_failed: true` rather than `open`. Never reintroduce a bare
|
|
* `const { data } = await ...` here; dropping the `error` is what turned this
|
|
* shared helper into a fail-open on every write path that consults it.
|
|
*
|
|
* Mirrors lib/api/v1/check-period-lock.ts (used by the v1 REST surface). The
|
|
* two helpers share the same query pattern; if either changes, update both.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function resolvePeriodStatusForDate(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
date: string,
|
|
): Promise<PeriodStatusForDate> {
|
|
// Layer 1: company-wide lock date.
|
|
const { data: settings, error: settingsError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('company_settings')
|
|
.select('bookkeeping_locked_through')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
if (settingsError) {
|
|
// Unknown company lock date: the date could be behind it. Fail closed.
|
|
return periodLookupFailed(companyId, date, 'company_settings', settingsError)
|
|
}
|
|
const lockThrough = settings?.bookkeeping_locked_through ?? null
|
|
if (lockThrough && date <= lockThrough) {
|
|
// Find the covering period if any: useful for widget greying. An error
|
|
// here is deliberately non-fatal: the verdict is already `locked` on the
|
|
// company lock date alone, so a failed refinement can only cost the
|
|
// period_id, never flip the answer to open.
|
|
const { data: period } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.lte('period_start', date)
|
|
.gte('period_end', date)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
return { period_id: period?.id ?? null, status: 'locked', lock_date: lockThrough }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Layer 2: fiscal period status.
|
|
const { data: period, error: periodError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('id, is_closed, locked_at')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.lte('period_start', date)
|
|
.gte('period_end', date)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
|
|
if (periodError) {
|
|
// Distinct from `!period` below: that is "verified, no covering period
|
|
// exists"; this is "we do not know what period covers this date".
|
|
return periodLookupFailed(companyId, date, 'fiscal_periods', periodError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!period) {
|
|
// No covering period: treated as open at this layer; the engine's own
|
|
// ensure-period helper will create one. Agents should still warn the user.
|
|
return { period_id: null, status: 'open', lock_date: null }
|
|
}
|
|
if (period.is_closed) {
|
|
return { period_id: period.id, status: 'closed', lock_date: null }
|
|
}
|
|
if (period.locked_at) {
|
|
return { period_id: period.id, status: 'locked', lock_date: period.locked_at }
|
|
}
|
|
return { period_id: period.id, status: 'open', lock_date: null }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Get status summary for a fiscal period.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function getPeriodStatus(
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
fiscalPeriodId: string
|
|
): Promise<PeriodStatus> {
|
|
|
|
const { data: period, error: fetchError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (fetchError || !period) {
|
|
throw new Error('Fiscal period not found')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Count draft entries in this period
|
|
const { count: draftCount } = await supabase
|
|
.from('journal_entries')
|
|
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.eq('status', 'draft')
|
|
|
|
// Check if next period exists via the chain pointer
|
|
const { data: nextPeriod } = await supabase
|
|
.from('fiscal_periods')
|
|
.select('id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('previous_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
is_locked: !!period.locked_at,
|
|
is_closed: period.is_closed,
|
|
has_closing_entry: !!period.closing_entry_id,
|
|
has_opening_balances: period.opening_balances_set,
|
|
draft_count: draftCount ?? 0,
|
|
next_period_exists: !!nextPeriod,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|