c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
522 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Mattsson
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c0818bb2d2 |
feat(sales-orders): kundorder with partial delivery and partial invoicing (#2166)
* feat(sales-orders): kundorder with partial delivery and partial invoicing Adds sales orders (kundorder) as their own non-ledger document between agreement and invoice, for companies that deliver or invoice in parts. Schema (20260902130000): sales_orders + sales_order_items with RLS via user_company_ids(), OR-<n> numbering RPC (membership-gated, no anon execute), company_settings.sales_orders_enabled UI gate, and back-links invoices.sales_order_id / invoice_items.sales_order_item_id. The invoiced quantity per order line is DERIVED from the linked invoice lines on non-cancelled, non-credited invoices and enforced by a BEFORE trigger, so no counter can drift and a credited invoice frees its quantity. Header status is draft / confirmed / completed / cancelled; completion is kept by DB triggers from the same derived quantity. Delivery and invoicing progress are derived per line, never stored as status. Service + API: lib/sales-orders (create/update with id-preserving line replace, transitions with compare-and-set, cumulative delivery registration, invoice-from-order through buildInvoiceWriteData so booking stays in the engine, proforma -> order conversion), routes under /api/sales-orders and /api/invoices/[id]/convert-to-order, structured SALES_ORDER_* error codes, archive classification of the new tables. The invoice editor round-trips sales_order_item_id so a draft edit cannot drop the link; GET /api/invoices gains ?sales_order_id=. UI: /sales-orders list, create/edit form reusing the invoice line conventions, detail with deliver and create-invoice dialogs and linked invoices; nav row behind the settings toggle; the webshop row is relabelled webshop_orders; "Skapa order" on proformas. MCP (20260902141000/141001): list/get reads plus four staged writes (create, transition, register delivery, create invoice from order) whose executors call the lib services; op types added to the pending operations CHECK. Tests: route tests for every route (401/400/404/happy), service unit tests, executor and tool tests, and tests/pg/sales-orders.pg.test.ts (16 cases, green on staging) covering RLS, numbering guards, the over-invoice trigger incl. release on cancel/credit and cross-company refusal, the quantity floor, and completion maintenance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RQW7mXvbAPgjUHq7dSEamr * fix(sales-orders): harden kundorder after skeptic and security review Resolves every finding from the PR #2166 review pass in one batch. Order link integrity: replaceInvoiceItems now refuses a line set that drops an existing sales_order_item_id (INVOICE_UPDATE_DROPS_ORDER_LINK), closing the MCP update_invoice header-only edit and the v1 PATCH path that severed the link and freed the quantity for double invoicing. The update_invoice re-fetch, gnubok_get_invoice and the v1 item projection now carry sales_order_item_id so well-behaved clients round-trip it. Quantity math: derived remaining/invoiced quantities are rounded to six decimals and compared with an epsilon (roundQty, qtyGreater) so a float remainder such as 0.5999999999999996 can neither refuse the final partial invoice nor land as an invoice quantity; duplicate explicit picks are summed before validation. Leveransdatum: per-line last_delivery_date (migration 20260902160000); an invoice takes the latest date over the lines it covers and only when the covered quantity was delivered, never the header date and never for an advance invoice (ML 17 kap 24 p.7, FX anchor per ML 8 kap 21-23). VAT drift: the order stores the customer type and VAT-validation flag its lines were priced under; invoicing refuses with SALES_ORDER_CUSTOMER_VAT_CHANGED when they differ, and re-saving the order re-validates the lines. Customer and currency are frozen once invoices exist. Tenant and role gates: composite FK (sales_order_id, company_id) ties a line to its parent's company (Superagent P2); aa_enforce_company_writer_role on both tables so a viewer cannot write through the browser client. Proforma -> order refuses proformas with ROT/RUT, periodisering or negative-quantity lines instead of dropping those fields. RESTRICT FK errors on delete map to SALES_ORDER_LINE_LOCKED / SALES_ORDER_HAS_INVOICES. Also: schema-guard literal payloads in lib/sales-orders (ceiling +2 with reason), regenerated skills/accounted-api (sales_order_item_id on invoice items), pg tests for the composite FK, the viewer gate and the new columns, unit tests for every changed path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW * fix(sales-orders): resolve CodeRabbit round on PR #2166 Quick wins from the review, all in one pass: - replaceInvoiceItems fails closed when the invoice_items snapshot cannot be read (it is both the restore source and the input to the kundorder link guard); the guard branch is explicit in both PATCH routes. - Cumulative delivery registration carries an optimistic predicate on the quantity it read, so two concurrent registrations cannot regress each other; DELETE of an order keeps its allowed status in the predicate and answers a conflict when zero rows match. - Business dates (order date, delivery date, invoice date) default to the Europe/Stockholm calendar day (todayIsoStockholm), never UTC: the delivery date is also the Riksbanken rate anchor. - The invoice-from-order executor treats an event emit failure as non-blocking: the draft already exists. - sales_order_items are archived through their parent with the order currency denormalised, like invoice_items. - Proforma "Skapa order" tolerates a 2xx without a parsable body; the settings toggle refreshes the server-rendered nav. - List route doc states that q matches the order number (customer names are matched client-side). Declined (out of scope for this PR): moving header + line writes and the delivery loop into transactional RPCs (same PostgREST pattern as the invoice PATCH path, tracked as a follow-up), the MCP approval handler's error message shape (pre-existing code outside this change), and the docstring-coverage warning (no repo convention). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW * fix(sales-orders): move hardening migration off a colliding version; archive contract; ceiling - 20260902160000_sales_orders_hardening.sql collided with main's 20260902160000_parties_substrate.sql after the third sync; renamed to 20260902180000 and made idempotent (DROP ... IF EXISTS before each ADD CONSTRAINT) so a preview branch that applied it under the old version replays it cleanly. Staging's schema_migrations row renamed. - sales_order_items goes back to a direct archive dump: the coverage contract (tests/pg/full-archive-coverage.pg.test.ts) requires it for a table with its own company_id; the currency lives on the parent order one file over, joined by sales_order_id. - Scanner ceiling re-baselined after merging main (parties phase 1): 397. - v1 PATCH test queues a real empty invoice_items snapshot now that replaceInvoiceItems fails closed on an unreadable one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW * fix(sales-orders): drop the composite FK before its unique index on replay The idempotent guard in 20260902180000_sales_orders_hardening.sql dropped the unique (id, company_id) before the FK that depends on its index, so the preview branch replay (which had applied the file under its former version) failed with SQLSTATE 2BP01. Order swapped; replay verified on staging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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b68c082ef5 |
feat(bank-sync): close the F2 report: gap backfill, consent and paused chip states, agent-triggered sync (#2165)
* fix(bank-sync): cron backfills the gap since the last successful sync The daily incremental sync always asked the bank for the last 7 days. Any pause longer than that (a lapsed subscription paid again, a consent renewed after expiry, an outage) silently lost the days in between: the connection came back, looked healthy, and the missing transactions never arrived. The lookback now widens to cover the gap since last_synced_at plus one day of overlap, capped at the 90-day PSD2 limit, and a gap of a month or more asks for strategy=longest like the manual sync route does. Dedup via external_id makes the overlap harmless. First syncs keep their 90-day path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip warns seven days before a bank consent expires The transactions-page chip only reacted once a connection was already dead (expired/error) or had gone stale. A consent that is about to end looked healthy until the morning it stopped syncing. New "expiring" state when a live connection's consent_expires is within seven days, the same threshold as the consent-expiry email in the sync cron. Precedence: attention, expiring, stale, healthy. getChipState moves to lib/transactions/bank-sync-chip-state.ts so the precedence is unit-tested; the component keeps the rendering only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip says paused when the subscription lapsed The daily cron filters connections by the bank_sync capability, so a company whose trial or subscription ended keeps status=active rows with a frozen last_synced_at. The chip read that as "stale, check the connection", which sends the user to re-authorise a connection that is perfectly alive. 56 of 191 active connections on prod were in this state on 2026-09-01. New "paused" state, ranked above everything else, when the company lacks bank_sync: hosted points at billing, self-host at the connector key, the same split BankSyncNowButton already makes. getChipState takes an options object so the clock stays out of render (react-hooks/purity). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(api): agent-triggerable bank sync in v1 and MCP Closes the first wish in the F2 report: an integration could read bank data but never refresh it. New POST /api/v1/companies/{id}/bank-connections/ {connectionId}/sync and MCP gnubok_sync_bank, both on a shared runner (extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/trigger-sync.ts). Cost is bounded structurally, not by policy: the window is never caller-controlled (the cron's gap-aware 7 to 90 day lookback), a connection synced within 15 minutes answers BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN with next_allowed_at (429 + Retry-After on v1; synced=false in-band on MCP so the agent reads on instead of retrying), and a failing connection is throttled per process by attempt time. A dead session is flipped to expired with a remediation that hands the user the connect link: no API call revives a consent. Gated on bank_sync like gnubok_connect_bank; scope transactions:write. Registry, scope map, load-routes, spec snapshot and the generated accounted-api skill updated; five BANK_SYNC_* / BANK_SESSION_EXPIRED codes added to the structured-error registry. The web Synka-nu route is left as is (see DECISIONS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * test(bank-sync): use the options object in the remaining chip-state calls Four multi-line calls still passed the clock positionally after getChipState moved to an options object; tsc flagged them (vitest did not, the extra argument was ignored at runtime). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(api): address skeptic findings on the agent-triggered bank sync Three refutations from the pre-publish skeptic pass: 1. Core imported the extension. The v1 sync route pulled the runner straight from @/extensions, which the core-build gate rejects and which left a live bank endpoint on zero-extension builds. The route now resolves it through the registry's services channel against a contract in lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts (same pattern as the Skatteverket read service) and answers EXTENSION_DISABLED when the extension is absent. 2. The idempotency cache stored the handler-level 429. A same-key retry after Retry-After, which is the documented retry, replayed the stale cooldown as a 400 for the cache's 24-hour TTL. withApiV1 no longer caches 429 responses; regression test added. The endpoint's pitfall no longer claims Idempotency-Key is mandatory (it was never enforced). 3. Two cron tests read the clock twice and failed whenever a millisecond passed between the reads. They now pin the clock with fake timers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(bank-sync): durable cooldown lease and review wording Resolves the PR #2165 review findings in one pass. Superagent P1: the attempt throttle was a process-local Map, so two agent calls on different serverless instances (or a retry after a cold start on a failing connection) could each bill an Enable Banking call, contradicting the one-sync-per-15-minutes promise. New bank_connections.sync_lease_until (migration 20260902150000), claimed with one conditional UPDATE before the bank is called; Postgres row locking makes exactly one claimer win, the rest answer BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN. The lease stays for the full window on success and failure. Tests cover the claim order, a failed attempt seen from a second instance, a lost race, and an expired lease. CodeRabbit: the =1 plural branch now reads "in 1 day" / "om 1 dag" (daysUntilConsentExpiry rounds a partial day up, so "tomorrow" could be today); the cooldown pitfall on the v1 endpoint, the MCP description and the in-band cooldown instruction now say a cooldown can follow a failed attempt and tell the agent to compare last_synced_at before deciding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): lease claim as a literal filter for the schema guard CI's no-phantom-columns guard counts runtime-built query expressions and its ceiling is exact; the templated `.or('sync_lease_until.is.null,...')` claim added one. The column now defaults to epoch (NOT NULL), so "never claimed" is just "expired long ago" and the atomic claim is a single literal `.lte('sync_lease_until', now)` the guard can check. Migration is unshipped (same PR), so it is edited in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): runner verifies company membership before the lease Superagent (round 3): the MCP path reached the shared runner without a membership check of its own. Both callers do enforce it upstream (withApiV1's company resolution and resolveMcpCompanyContext in the MCP dispatcher), but the runner writes transactions and bills a bank call, so it now checks company_members itself, before the cooldown and the lease claim, and answers NOT_FOUND for a non-member. The viewer check that was buried inside the sync block moves up with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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a80ce54b78 |
fix(mcp): eager-auth flag on the Grok connector links so Grok starts OAuth (#2167)
* fix(mcp): eager-auth flag on the Grok connector links so Grok starts OAuth Live test after #2158: pasting the Grok URL into grok.com's custom connector dialog listed all 150+ tools and never opened the sign-in. Grok probes the URL without credentials, like claude.ai, and reads the lazy 200 on initialize as an authless server; only the 401 challenge starts OAuth (#2159 fixed the same thing for the claude.ai link). - lib/onboarding/checklist.ts: mcpServerUrl() builds the server URL with an optional eagerAuth flag; sideDoorServerUrl() gives the Grok side door auth=required and keeps ChatGPT lazy; claudeConnectorLink() reuses it. SIDE_DOORS / SideDoor move here from the component. Tests for all three. - NewUserChecklist copies the door-specific URL (now with a client marker). - ApiKeysPanel's Grok row copies the flagged URL, mirroring the Claude one. - auth-mode.ts comment records the second consumer; registry entry's Grok step carries the flag; DECISIONS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhTJcwgzmN3TsLR8tVHwdi Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> * docs(mcp): registry Claude.ai step carries auth=required too Review pass on #2167: the registry entry flagged the Grok install URL but left the Claude.ai step on the bare URL, which pre-fills "None" in claude.ai's dialog (#2159). Same file, same flag, now consistent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhTJcwgzmN3TsLR8tVHwdi Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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678acfe7ef |
fix(mcp): eager-auth flag so claude.ai's connector dialog detects OAuth, not "None" (#2159)
claude.ai's two-step "Add custom connector" dialog probes the server URL without credentials and pre-fills the Authentication choice from the answer. Our lazy-auth endpoint (issue #1814) answers 200 on an anonymous initialize, which the dialog reads as an authless server: it suggests "None", and a connector added with that default never opens the sign-in when the challenge arrives later. Per Anthropic's connector docs a 401 is the only answer it reads as OAuth ("Claude does not honor a WWW-Authenticate header on a 200 response"). - `auth=required` on the endpoint URL (extensions/general/mcp-server/ auth-mode.ts) turns lazy auth off for that URL: every tokenless request, initialize included, answers the 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge. Callers with a token are unaffected; the bare URL keeps lazy auth for Claude Code, the plugin, Cursor and ChatGPT, and existing connector records are untouched. - The links we control carry the flag: Settings -> API & MCP (install link and copy block), the onboarding checklist, both docs pages and claude-plugin/CONNECTORS.md (plugin 1.2.3). The docs' Path A now describes the eager flow (sign-in opens on Add) instead of telling users to override the dialog's "None". - Tests: eager-auth.test.ts (401 on initialize/tools/list/public tools, namespaced metadata pointer, token no-op, exact-flag only); checklist link shape updated. Companion: gnubok-website PR (Kom igång connector link + regenerated connect-claude / anslut-claude pages). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yw62FMXGSzo6icFDiBwP3 Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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f266c386f3 |
chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150)
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp, lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format, lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body + v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas). No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list of things left alone on purpose. tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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18cbc4c30a |
fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
6e8d76a9cb |
fix(skattekonto): remove the drift email, its event and the unused drift route (#2149)
The nightly skattekonto sync emailed "Skattekontot stämmer inte med bokföringen" whenever Skatteverket's saldo differed from BAS 1630 by more than 1 kr, every 24 hours while it lasted. On 2026-09-02 it fired on a 35 842 kr gap that the reconciliation explained to the last krona with 14 unbooked rows, while the Hem notice and the reconciliation page (both gated on unexplained_difference) said nothing was wrong. The check shipped in May 2026 (#525) before any in-app skattekonto view existed; the dashboard tile its comments promise was never built and the drift API route had no consumer. Since 2026-08-25 the reconciliation page and the Hem notice are the surface, with one definition of "stämmer inte". Removed: skattekonto-drift.ts, skattekonto-drift-email.ts, their tests, the skattekonto.drift_detected event type, the handler registration, the cron's drift hook, GET /api/extensions/skatteverket/skattekonto/drift, and the ROPA activity for the mail. The route is dropped from the ungated extension route allowlist to lock the ratchet. skattekonto_drift_tolerance stays: the Hem notice reads it. Stale skattekonto_drift_last_alert_at rows in extension_data are inert. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
|
867767a22f |
feat(inbox): document-type badge and filter, +lev/+ver plus-addressing (#2129) (#2148)
* feat(inbox): document-type badge and filter, +lev/+ver plus-addressing (#2129) Phase 1: every inbox row shows its document kind (Kvitto, Leverantorsfaktura, Myndighetsbrev, Ovrigt) from the existing AI documentKind, and a second menu next to the status filter narrows the list to leverantorsfakturor or underlag. Pure predicate in lib/documents/inbox-kind.ts with tests. Phase 2: the shared inbox address accepts RFC 5233 plus-addressing. The webhook splits the local part at the first + and looks up the base, so <local>+anything@ now reaches the company instead of 404ing. +lev and +ver land in the new nullable invoice_inbox_items.kind_hint column (CHECK supplier_invoice | receipt), threaded through EmailMeta into both inbox inserts and returned by GET /items. kind_hint wins over documentKind for the badge and the filter and survives re-extraction because it is a column. The sources panel shows both tagged addresses with a one-line hint (sv + en). Tests: filter predicate per kind and null; parser and tag mapping; webhook routes +LEV and an unknown tag; pg test pins the CHECK and NULL default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr * fix(inbox): honest empty state under a type filter, detail pane shares the row's kind resolution Skeptic findings on #2148: with a type filter narrowing 'Att göra' to zero the empty state claimed 'allt är bearbetat' while the status trigger still counted pending rows; it now says no items of that type are here (sv + en). The fields rail printed the AI documentKind only, so a +lev hint could disagree with the row badge; it now uses resolveInboxKind like the list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr * fix(inbox): keep the type-filter empty state off purchase lists, carry kind_hint onto rejected attachment rows CodeRabbit on #2148: the purchase lists (Saknar underlag, Hämta från portal) ignore the type menu, so a leftover kind filter must not pick their empty-state copy. A rejected attachment (unsupported MIME, too large) now keeps the sender's +lev / +ver hint on its error row like every other inbox insert; the allowlist test covers it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr * fix(inbox): set the +lev/+ver kind hint only when the shared address resolved the company CodeRabbit on #2148: the hint was computed before recipient resolution, so a tag on an unknown or retired shared address could ride along onto a custom-domain match. It is now assigned inside the active shared-inbox branch only; regression test covers the multi-recipient case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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8b09b06e14 |
feat(skatteverket): ombudsregister grant verification, honest session expiry, daily ombud sync (#2130)
* feat(skatteverket): ombudsregister grant verification, honest session expiry, daily ombud sync
Users reported the Skatteverket connection "just disappearing" with no
banner, needing BankID again every time. Two causes, both fixed here:
1. SKV's per-flow refresh token lives 65 minutes. /status and the
skv_disconnected notice called any stored refresh token "refreshable",
so a days-dead session reported healthy and the reconnect banner never
fired until a submission failed live. lib/skatteverket/session-lifetime
now decides refreshability (expires_at + 5 min, refresh cap) for both
surfaces; the settings panel states the one-hour session lifetime.
2. The durable fix is the ombud (system certificate) path, dormant since
July behind SKATTEVERKET_SYSTEM_AUTH_MODE. Skatteverket added scope
`obr` (Ombudshantering v2) to our application id on 2026-09-01, so grant
verification can now ask the ombudsregister instead of classifying 403s
from the read services:
- lib/ombud-client.ts: GET /ombud/autentisieratOmbud, GET /roller,
POST .../djuplank/utseombud, on the system identity, per the public
tjanstebeskrivning v2.0 (mirrored in dev_docs/skatteverket/ombudshantering).
Role codes are env-pinned (SKATTEVERKET_OMBUD_ROLL_LASOMBUD/_MOMS) or
matched on rollbeskrivning text; a deep link never mints with a
guessed code.
- grant-probe.ts: register first, read-service probes only as fallback.
- New daily cron /api/extensions/skatteverket/ombud/sync/cron (30 3 * * *):
one register call discovers every company that granted us, creates or
downgrades connection rows by org number, runs from shadow mode on,
and never mass-revokes on an empty register.
- POST /system-connection/deeplink + "Utse {app} som ombud" button:
the company lands in SKV's e-service with roles pre-selected.
- Default system scopes include `obr`; skvRequestWithAuth gains an
`accept` option (Ombudshantering requires the Accept header).
Still inert in prod until the org certificate and avtal land; the cron and
verify routes no-op while system auth is off or unconfigured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu
* fix(skatteverket): skeptic round on ombud sync, register 404 fallback, opt-in-only rows, mass-downgrade guard
Cron touches only existing connection rows (a tenant's own Verifiera or
deep-link opt-in; the deeplink route now records a pending row), so an
org-number twin never gets auto-verified, and rows the tenant revoked
locally stay revoked. A register 404 throws by default (spec: wrong URI)
and is empty only for the cron, which guards it. Decisions are planned
before any upsert; a run that would fully deny >= 3 rows and > 50% of the
granted ones applies no downgrade. Grants that classify as neither
behörighet are 'error', not 'denied'. Literal select in listConnections for
the phantom-column scanner. window.open without 'noopener' so the
pre-opened tab exists; opener nulled by hand. Deeplink route test added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu
* fix(skatteverket): CodeRabbit round: exact role labels, paginate connections, deny never-listed rows, fail deeplink without opt-in row
Role descriptions match the whole label so 'Momsdeklaration,
deklarationsombud' is never read as the narrow moms role. listConnections
pages through fetchAllRows on (created_at, id). A pending row the register
never lists is written once as denied instead of staying 'Inte verifierad'.
The deeplink route returns 500 when the opt-in row cannot be stored, and the
panel navigates in-tab when the pre-opened tab was blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu
* fix(skatteverket): fence ombud grants on contested org numbers; cron honours unrecognised role codes
An org number claimed by more than one live company is contested: verify
and deep link answer 409 ORG_NUMBER_CONTESTED and the nightly sync changes
nothing on it, so a tenant that typed a victim's public org number cannot
inherit the victim's grant. The sync also skips huvudmän whose register
roles classify as neither behörighet (pinning problem, never a denial),
mirroring probeViaOmbudsregister.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu
* fix(skatteverket): validate the ombud deep link host; withdraw grants on contested org numbers
The register's djuplank must be an https skatteverket.se URL before it is
returned or navigated to (the settings page follows it). The nightly sync
now withdraws a grant already recorded on an org number that more than one
live company claims, instead of only refusing new ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
|
d8cf78330e |
docs(self-hosting): own-credentials section, stale connector lines, complete .env.example (#2146)
* docs(self-hosting): own-credentials section, stale connector lines, complete .env.example (#2131) SELF-HOSTING.md said the Skatteverket client wiring "ships in a following release"; PR #2103 merged it, so both bank sync and Skatteverket now carry traffic through the hosted proxy with a key. The two stale sentences are replaced and SOVEREIGN.md line 48 says the same thing. New "Own credentials (no connector key)" subsection documents the path an operator takes without a key: Enable Banking app in restricted production mode with the callback URL, the Skatteverket developer-portal application with the redirect URI, every variable the code reads, the five production base URLs (all defaults point at the test environment), the kill switch, and the rule that any own credential switches that upstream out of connector mode. .env.example gains the Skatteverket block, the optional Enable Banking variables, and RESEND_INBOUND_DOMAIN / RESEND_INBOUND_WEBHOOK_SECRET, which the invoice-inbox manifest requires but the example never listed. DOCKER.md no longer claims Enable Banking is excluded from the self-host preset (docker/extensions.self-hosted.json ships it). ENABLE_BANKING_SANDBOX is removed from the enable-banking manifest and the index.ts header: declared as optional, never read anywhere; the sandbox is selected by ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL. Logged in DECISIONS.md. Closes #2131 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012C6M2ZoZc6QDRxU3m9WzgE Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> * docs(self-hosting): correct key format, AISP scope caveat, SKV scopes and rotation note (#2131) Skeptic findings on PR #2146, one pass: - ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY: the decoder base64-decodes first and wraps anything else as DER, so a raw PEM fails at JWT signing. The docs and .env.example no longer claim it is accepted. - Enable Banking restricted mode covers the operator's own accounts only; an instance hosting client companies is doing licensed AIS and needs the connector key or its own AISP registration. Said so. - Listed the OAuth scopes the app requests (both AGI scopes), noted that the kill switch gates API calls, not the BankID login, and that the token encryption key has no dual-key rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012C6M2ZoZc6QDRxU3m9WzgE Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
dd84d6c1bb |
fix(mcp): tag unmapped tool failures with their cause vocabulary (#2051) (#2135)
Closes #2051. errorCauseTag() shipped in #2027 written and tested but wired to nothing. This connects it: the two execution catch paths (sync call and task) now pass errorCause into mcp.tool_called, carrying the SQLSTATE or coded-error code, else the error's class name, capped at 64 chars. The rows this exists for are the UNKNOWN_ERROR residue, whose errorMessage is the constant "Något gick fel. Försök igen." and whose errorDetail is the English constant: 465 such rows in the last 30 days (create_voucher 58 of its 60 failures, query_journal 122) with nothing to cluster on. A five-character SQLSTATE is protocol vocabulary; a raw driver message can quote row values from a constraint violation and belongs in the server log, never in event_log, so the raw message is deliberately not captured. A plain `new Error(...)` tags null rather than 'Error': tagging everything is the same as tagging nothing. Pre-execution denials (scope, capability, validation, unknown tool) pass nothing because their errorCode already is the cause. Self-tested by unwiring one call site and watching the new test name it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
53c9c0c4f9 |
feat(mcp): second examples batch: five more tools, seven examples, 80 tokens (#2137)
Continues #2100 under the margin the envelope trim (#2123) created: 58 999 to 59 079 against the 60 000 ceiling, spending under half the room and leaving ~920. Picked by evidence, not traffic alone: gnubok_search_tools was sent a nonexistent `offset` in prod today, so its examples show the actual levers (query, detail, limit) and the description of the mistake; the create/complete document-upload pair's examples ARE the two-step flow, same upload_id and file_name on both sides; list_uncategorized_transactions is the highest-traffic read (15 122 calls/30d) and gets the pagination shape; link_document_to_voucher gets the minimal linking call. All seven pass the input-examples validation suite (same unknown-key guard the server runs, plus required/type/enum/pattern and the placeholder-id check), and the pinned tool list is updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
8d9bf383d1 |
perf(mcp): trim the one schema 58 catalogued tools share, reclaiming 2 552 tokens (#2123)
The catalog had 116 tokens of headroom and server.ts took 70 commits in the preceding 14 days, so the next ordinary tool addition would have failed CI. Measured before cutting, which is what made this findable: outputSchema is 38% of the whole catalog (23 290 tokens), and STAGED_OPERATION_SCHEMA alone accounts for 14 736 of it, the same envelope transmitted 58 times. Descriptions, which the three previous rounds trimmed, are 10%. Three edits to one constant, no tool demoted and no field removed: period_status stops declaring its three sub-properties as JSON Schema and carries them in one sentence (actor, approve and preview were already bare objects, so this makes the envelope internally consistent), the next hint drops args' redundant additionalProperties: true, and operation_id's description loses six words. Every change is in the looser direction on purpose. The server emits structuredContent for every tool and the documented failure mode is a declaration too TIGHT making a strict client reject a successful call; a looser one cannot do that. next keeps additionalProperties: false because staging.test.ts pins it as a closed shape, and a guard whose reason is not in front of you is not a guard to loosen for 420 tokens. Ceiling ratcheted 61 600 to 60 000, leaving ~1 070 tokens of deliberate working margin rather than the ~300 the previous rounds left. The bench log records the cycle that margin causes: ratchet tight, block the next feature, bump, demote. If more is needed the lever is priced: the envelope still costs ~11 800 tokens across those 58 tools, and the fix is to stop repeating it, not to trim it further. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
|
b56da5d6c5 |
feat(api): expose bank-connection freshness in MCP and v1 REST (#2124)
* feat(api): expose bank-connection freshness in MCP and v1 REST
gnubok_connect_bank now returns last_synced_at, consent_expires and
error_message per connection, and its instructions tell the agent to
flag stale or expiring connections. New read-only endpoint
GET /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/bank-connections exposes the same
fields to API-key integrations (scope companies:read).
Background: a user's PSD2 feed died silently in July; bookkeeping
looked complete while three weeks stale, and nothing on the API/MCP
surface could reveal it. Sync stays cron-driven; an agent-triggerable
sync was considered and deferred (see DECISIONS.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix
* fix(api): address skeptic findings on bank-connection freshness
- Map the bank-connections group into skills/accounted-api (apiskill:check
crashed on the unmapped group; regenerated skill files included).
- Gate the v1 route on the bank_sync capability, mirroring the MCP twin:
a lapsed entitlement now answers with a capability error instead of
status=active with a frozen last_synced_at.
- Reword MCP instructions + v1 pitfalls: null last_synced_at right after
connecting is normal, staleness threshold aligned to the UI's 36 hours,
and re-authorisation is only advised for expired/error/consent-out, not
for stale-but-active connections (lapsed subscription or deselected
accounts are the usual causes there).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix
* fix(mcp): keep gnubok_connect_bank schema under the tools/list token ceiling
The enriched outputSchema plus the worked examples that landed on main
(#2100) pushed the projected tools/list payload 20 tokens over the
61.6K context-budget ceiling. Drop the per-property descriptions from
the new freshness fields; the instructions string (runtime output, not
catalog payload) already explains them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jakob Wennberg
|
169e7eaf4e |
feat(mcp): worked examples on five high-traffic tools, and in the error that rejects a call (#2100)
#2066 asked for input_examples on the top ~20 tools by call volume. The binding constraint turned out to be budget, not writing: after #2089 reclaimed 3 763 tokens, its own policy required ratcheting the tools/list ceiling down with it, so the real headroom was 317 tokens. Ten examples across five tools cost 199, leaving ~118. The ceiling is not raised. Tools picked from 30 days of mcp.tool_called crossed with the combinations the descriptions already warn about and callers still get wrong: account_override without an explicit vat_treatment (books gross, no moms line), representation without deltagare and syfte, confirmed on a high-risk approval, a balanced voucher where the moms leg is its own line, and get_kpi_report, where one caller sent `metric` 604 times over seven days to a tool whose only parameter is period_id. Examples are also surfaced in the unknown-parameter error. That costs nothing in tools/list, because it only ships on the response to a call that already failed, and it reaches the caller that most needs it: a key list told DueCue's agent which parameter was wrong but not what a correct call looks like, and the same rejected call repeated for a week. Every example is validated against its own schema by the same findUnknownArgKeys guard the server runs, plus required/type/enum/pattern checks. An example our own boundary would reject is worse than none: it teaches the exact mistake the guard then punishes. That test caught three invented enum values in this change's own first draft. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
|
cd40127f0e |
feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API (#2118)
* feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API
The PSD2 sync has fetched the bank's reported balance for years but the
data was stranded (F7): the Bank-page source picker read a cash_accounts
column no sync ever updated (frozen at connect time), reconciliation
hard-coded external_balance to null for bank accounts, and neither MCP
nor the v1 API exposed any balance at all, so the only path to a current
bank balance was logging into the bank.
- getAccountBalance now returns booked + available from the same
quota-limited BALANCES response (previously all but one type discarded)
- every sync (manual + cron) mirrors balance, available_balance and
balance_updated_at into cash_accounts, fixing the stale picker
- new cash_accounts.available_balance column (additive migration)
- reconciliation bank kind: external_balance = bank-reported balance,
plus bank_reported_* fields and fetch timestamp in the bank block;
difference math stays movement-based and untouched
- reconciliation view shows "Saldo enligt banken ... hamtat {date}"
- MCP gnubok_list_cash_accounts returns the three balance fields; the
cash_today prompt now reports the bank's figure instead of teaching
agents to answer with the bookkept 19xx balance
- new GET /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/cash-accounts endpoint
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm
* fix(bank): keep external_balance null for bank sign-offs; never fabricate a zero balance; guard the mirror against stale writers
Post-review fixes from the skeptic pass + CodeRabbit on PR #2118:
- external_balance stays null for the bank reconciliation kind: sign-off
persists it into account_reconciliations and bokslutsbilagor computes
closing - external from that row, so a today-balance stored on a
balansdag sign-off printed a phantom warning-red differens in the
year-end appendix. The bank-reported figure lives only in the
timestamped bank_reported_* pair in the bank block, and only when its
fetch timestamp exists (a balance of unknown age is suppressed).
- AccountOverview no longer falls back to today's date when the balance
timestamp is missing; the line is omitted instead.
- getAccountBalance returns null on an empty BALANCES response instead
of fabricating amount 0 with a fresh timestamp; sync keeps the
previous stored value.
- updateBalancesFromSync only writes over an older-or-missing
balance_updated_at, so an older sync run finishing later cannot move
the mirrored balance backwards.
- The inline initial backfill (picker save) now mirrors fetched
balances into cash_accounts too (accounts_data is deliberately not
re-written there).
- cash_today MCP prompt mentions the gnubok_call_tool bridge for hosts
that only see the default catalog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm
* fix(bank): express the stale-writer guard as two literal predicates for the schema guard
The .or() with a template literal pushed the no-phantom-columns
unresolvable-expression count over its ceiling. Same semantics, two
updates: one for rows with an older timestamp, one for rows with none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm
* fix(bank): rank interimBooked (ITBD) as a booked balance type before the generic fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
|
a57a8d968b |
fix(webshop-orders): stop syncing failed WooCommerce orders, remove stale unpaid rows (#2119)
* fix(webshop-orders): stop importing failed WooCommerce orders, remove stale rows on failed transition Failed checkouts carry no money event but imported as permanently unbookable 'Ej betald' rows (user report). orderImports() now excludes 'failed' alongside 'trash', and a re-polled order that transitioned to failed deletes its existing row via removeWebshopOrders(), which enforces the freeze boundary app-side: frozen rows are never deleted, and a parent with a frozen refund child is spared because parent_order_id cascades. Removal failures hold the sync cursor like upsert failures do. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C * fix(webshop-orders): make failed-order removal race-safe per skeptic findings Repeat every guard on the DELETE statement itself, not only the candidate select: a row booked/marked/invoiced between the two round trips must survive (TOCTOU refutation). Never remove paid rows (orderRemoves gated on !orderIsPaid plus is_paid=false on both statements): money moved at some point, and paid parents are the only rows that can carry refund children, which also closes the cascade race without a DB trigger. Spare cross-marked rows (legacy_transaction_id): the order may be booked via the retired transactions feed without any freeze column set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C * fix(webshop-orders): audit-log successful failed-order removals Compliance swarm finding (ISO A.8.10): the hard delete logged only its failure path. Every successful removal batch now logs companyId, deleted row ids and the requested external_ids, the only deletion record for pre-bokforing rows that carry no behandlingshistorik. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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fa69174aa0 |
fix(bank): never pre-check or mirror another company's accounts in the EB callback (#2116)
* fix(bank): never pre-check or mirror another company's accounts in the EB callback At one-session banks (SEB) the PSU's single consent can cover accounts a sibling company books. The OAuth callback stored whatever the session returned into the active company: all pre-enabled, mirrored into its cash_accounts, ledgers allocated from its chart: one 'Spara val' away from booking another aktiebolag's transactions (user report F1, 2026-09-01). The deliberate reuse path (findReusableSessions) already guards claimed IBANs; the callback now runs the same check via fetchCrossCompanyAccountContext: - accounts claimed by another of the user's companies are stored disabled + flagged (claimed_by_company_*), skipped by the cash_accounts mirror, and the picker names the claiming company - a 'Synkas ej' deselection made on any other connection row is carried onto fresh rows (the recurring came-back-pre-checked complaint, C2) - lookup failure fails closed: new accounts stored deselected - accounts the row itself already carried keep their own state, so a renewal can never switch a working feed off Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0197wmwP6zNaYvsGfbZuQHGA * fix(bank): close the skeptic-found holes in the cross-company claim guard Consolidated fixes from the three-skeptic review of PR #2116 (all three refuted the first cut): - Active-company standing state (enabled cash_accounts + enabled accounts on its live-ish connection rows) now outranks sibling claims company-wide, not row-wide: a bank-list renewal arrives on a FRESH row with no priors, and the old row-local check would have let a sibling claim switch a working feed off while supersede demoted its cash row. - pending_selection rows no longer claim accounts or feed deselection memory: their flags are unconfirmed callback output (including this guard's own fail-closed writes), so an abandoned picker or a transient lookup error can no longer poison later connects. - Guard-disabled accounts are never mirrored from the callback: upsertFromPsd2 with enabled:false for a new-to-row account could promote the seeded primary 1930 manual row and flip it to disabled under a foreign identity. - The selection save skips ledger allocation and the cash_accounts mirror for disabled never-mirrored accounts, so 'no cash row, no 19xx slot burned' holds past the mandatory Spara val, and strips the claimed_by_*/deselected flags when the user deliberately enables an account. - Deselection carry is no longer silent: deselected_elsewhere flag + picker note 'Tidigare bortvald'. - Claim lookups paginate via fetchAllRows: the bare select's silent 1000-row PostgREST cap failed open for exactly the multi-company consultants the guard exists for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0197wmwP6zNaYvsGfbZuQHGA * fix(bank): claim-guard round 2: pending_selection claims asymmetrically, paged reads ordered Skeptic re-verification of 25a339810 found two holes: - Excluding pending_selection rows from claims reopened the attach-to-picker window: an attach-created row holds deliberately offered enabled accounts with no cash_accounts rows until its picker is saved, and a full-OAuth connect in another company inside that window could take the same physical account. Enabled accounts on pending_selection rows claim again; their disabled flags still stay out of the deselection memory (unconfirmed callback output, including the guard's own fail-closed writes). - Both fetchAllRows claim queries now order('id'): unordered .range() pagination can silently skip rows at page boundaries, and a skipped row is a missed claim, failing open at exactly the 1000+-row scale the pagination was added for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0197wmwP6zNaYvsGfbZuQHGA --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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f1d76deaba |
fix(providers): stop dead-ending on a resource 403, and stop dropping every migrated kreditfaktura (#2113)
* fix(providers): stop dead-ending on a resource 403, and stop dropping every migrated kreditfaktura
Two independent defects in the provider migration, both customer-visible.
A per-resource 403 was classified as a dead grant. classifyProviderError mapped
any 401 or 403 to PROVIDER_AUTH_EXPIRED, which is fatal, so a Fortnox account
without leverantorsregister permission aborted the whole migration at the
suppliers step with "Anslutningen har gatt ut. Ateranslut" even though the same
token had just succeeded on the previous step. Reconnecting can never fix that,
and steps 4 and later never ran. The provider's own reason ("Saknar behorighet
for leverantorsregister.") never reached the user. A 403 is now non-fatal once
the same token has already succeeded in the run, the migration continues, and
the provider's reason is surfaced. A 401, or a 403 on the first call, keeps the
auth-expired path.
fetchCompanyInfoDirect swallowed every error and returned null, which made the
existing PROVIDER_API_MODULE_INACTIVE remediation unreachable: a Visma customer
whose api_standard module is off got a silent 200 with an empty company card
instead of the precise Swedish explanation that was already written.
Kreditfakturor were dropped entirely. entity-mapper wrote document_type
'credit_note', but invoices_document_type_check allows only invoice, proforma
and delivery_note, and credit notes are modelled by credited_invoice_id. Every
migrated kreditfaktura was rejected and counted as skipped. One customer
imported 255 sales invoices and 0 credit notes on 2026-08-31; AR and revenue
are overstated by the credited amounts, and kreditfakturor are
rakenskapsinformation. They now import as invoice rows with reversed amounts
and status 'credited', following the in-app credit convention. They import
unlinked: no provider DTO carries a reference to the invoice being credited, so
there is nothing to match on and guessing would corrupt the AR ledger. The
wizard says so instead of burying them in skipped.
Also makes the OAuth callback non-replayable from browser history (no-store
plus history replacement), which is what the "state rejected" events were: a
replay of a callback that had already succeeded seconds earlier. No
already-connected page, so consumed-vs-unknown state stays unobservable to an
unauthenticated caller. Expected PSD2 session expiry drops from error to warn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
* fix(arcim): entity line needs the failed flag
The unlinked-credit-note row omitted `failed`, which the entityLines element
type requires. Caught by the zero-extensions build, not by vitest: the unit
suite does not typecheck.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
* fix(arcim): write the missing-reference disclosure onto the credit note itself
Review finding (swedish-compliance-review-bot): ML 17 kap 22-23 § wants a
kreditfaktura to reference the invoice it credits, and BFL 5 kap 6-7 § wants a
verifikation to reference its underlag. No provider DTO carries that reference,
so the pairing cannot be resolved at import and guessing it would corrupt the
AR ledger. Reporting the count in the migration wizard is not enough: a result
screen is not rakenskapsinformation, and the gap has to be legible on the
record itself years later.
The disclosure now goes into invoices.notes and supplier_invoices.notes,
preserving whatever note the provider sent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jakob Wennberg
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088754d61a |
fix(processing-history): register the missing event types, and strip the PII two of them carry (#2111)
* fix(processing-history): register the missing event types, and strip the PII two of them carry Ten event types are emitted by code but absent from processing_event_types, so every append fails the foreign key. Appends are best-effort try/catch, so no user request fails, but the internal audit trail is empty for ten kinds of legally motivated act, including the BFL 5 kap 5 § rattelse record when a user swaps a transaction's underlag (TransactionDocumentReplaced) and the SOC 2 revocation record (OAuthClientRevoked). Order matters and is deliberate. Two invoice-inbox events, RateLimitedDropped and AttachmentsTruncated, put the raw sender address and mail subject in their payload. Registering those types first would start persisting that PII into an append-only table whose UPDATE is trigger-blocked and which the archive's erasure path excludes. The strip therefore ships in this same commit, ahead of the migration. Only the invoice-inbox emitter was edited. whatsapp-inbox shares the RateLimitedDropped type name with a payload that carries no phone number. Closes the class rather than the two logged instances: a TypeScript union makes an unregistered literal a compile error, and the pg test asserts the database catalog is a superset of the code's list, generated from the union. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc * fix(processing-history): strip the inbound-mail PII in the database, not by deploy ordering Review finding (superagent-security, P2): shipping the emitter fix and the catalog migration in one commit is not the same as one instant. Migrations apply on merge while the replacement build takes minutes, so an old instance can still write a sender address and mail subject in that window, and such a row is permanent: processing_history takes no UPDATE and no DELETE, and the archive export excludes it from the erasure path. Adds a BEFORE INSERT trigger stripping `from` and `subject` from the RateLimitedDropped and AttachmentsTruncated payloads, and keeps it afterwards so the invariant belongs to the table rather than to one emitter's good behaviour. The jsonb object check is load bearing: `payload - 'key'` raises on a jsonb array and payload's shape is not constrained. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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08b1119c7d |
feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2) (#2103)
* feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2) In connector mode (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY set, no own SKV credentials) the Skatteverket extension now routes through the hosted connector stack (#1757) instead of calling Skatteverket directly: - skvRequestWithAuth routes to the data proxy: base URL maps to a service segment (moms/skattekonto/agd-inlamning/agd-period), the user's SKV Bearer moves to X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization, the connector key authenticates the proxy, and the gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret are omitted (the proxy adds Arcim's). Connector-layer 4xx bodies (code CONNECTOR_*) are classified before the SKV-shaped 401/403 sniffing so a broker refusal surfaces operator guidance (check GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY), never APIGW/BankID guidance for knobs the instance does not have. - OAuth: /authorize starts the consent via the broker's authorize-url (persisting its redirect_uri + connector_state), the hosted SKV callback bounces the code back to the instance, and exchangeCodeForTokens / refreshAccessToken exchange through the broker's /oauth/token, unwrapping its { data } envelope. Tokens still rest encrypted on the instance; client_id/client_secret never exist there. - Broker refresh 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED maps to SESSION_EXPIRED (terminal; reconnect fixes); broker 502 stays a raw error so a transient SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner (#1155). - getSkatteverketEnvironment() reports 'prod' in connector mode: the upstream env is hosted's, and the instance's unset defaults would show a false Testmiljo badge on real filings. - System (CCG/ombud) auth is deliberately not brokered: hosted-only, stays direct. Hosted and own-credentials self-hosts are byte-identical: every branch gates on skatteverketConnectorMode(), which is null whenever own SKV credentials exist or no connector key is set. Direct-path tests pin that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS * fix(connect): classify SKV dead-refresh-token dialects broker-side; forward diagnostic headers; connector-aware gateway guidance Skeptic refutation on PR #2103 (found independently by the correctness and compliance skeptics): the broker's /oauth/token catch-all collapsed SKV's terminal dead-refresh-token dialects (404 id_not_found, 400 invalid_grant, "Refresh Token status is expired": the dominant refresh outcome, per-flow tokens live 65 minutes) into the generic 502 CONNECTOR_SKV_TOKEN_FAILED, so a connector instance could never classify ordinary session expiry: raw English 500s instead of the reconnect flow, staged filing operations consumed as non-recoverable, crons retrying raw forever. - Broker /oauth/token: re-codes those dialects as 401 CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD, refresh grant only (invalid_grant on the code exchange means an expired one-shot code and keeps the generic 502). The classifier (isSkvDeadRefreshTokenError) uses the same regex set the extension's direct path classifies with. - Instance dead-token classifier maps CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD to SESSION_EXPIRED alongside 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED; the generic 502 stays a raw error so a transient SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner. - Data proxy: forwards WWW-Authenticate and x-skv-*/x-amzn-*/x-api-* response headers (the instance's MISSING_SCOPE classification reads them; body-less gateway rejections carry no other signal). - Instance gateway-refusal guidance is connector-aware: a self-host has no SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID and no Utvecklarportalen access, so connector mode points at /api/connector/status and support instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS * fix(connect): reject redirects on the instance's broker OAuth requests CodeRabbit inline finding (CWE-200): the connector-mode authorize-url and token requests followed redirects by default, so a 307/308 would resend the connector key (and code/refresh token) to the redirect target. redirect 'error', matching the broker's own postToken rule; the token response must only ever come from the broker endpoint itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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aabddb592f |
feat(billing): multi-user paywall: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy (#2099)
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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05dce83a2b |
feat(connect): Enable Banking client routes through the hosted proxy in connector mode (PR6b-1) (#2094)
* feat(connect): route the Enable Banking client through the hosted proxy in connector mode PR6b-1 of the instance-side client wiring. Until now bankConnectorMode() had no consumer but the status label; this makes a self-host with a connector key and no own EB credentials actually reach Enable Banking through the hosted bank proxy. - api-client authenticatedFetch: in connector mode swap the base URL to the proxy and send the connector key as a Bearer token. The EB JWT signer (getAuthorizationHeader) is never called: the instance holds no private key. On hosted and on own-credentials self-hosts the direct path is byte-identical. - startAuthorization forwards X-Connector-Company so the proxy can meter the per-company connection quota; index.ts passes companyId at both connect sites. - createSession forwards the signed connector_state so the proxy binds the /sessions exchange to the pending ledger row (single-use, race-safe). - callback route reads connector_state from the query (echoed by the hosted callback) and threads it through finalizeConnection. Tests: connector-mode base/auth/company-header/connector_state assertions in api-client, direct-path and own-credentials byte-identity, and the callback threading both connector and direct paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): gate X-Connector-Company on connector mode, not on companyId Skeptic regression finding: index.ts passes companyId to startAuthorization unconditionally, and the header was attached whenever companyId was truthy. On hosted and on own-credentials self-hosts companyId is always set, so every direct POST /auth to the real Enable Banking API carried the tenant's internal company UUID: a needless behavior change on the production path and an identifier leak to a third-party PSD2 processor (the "byte-identical direct path" claim was false). Gate the header on bankConnectorMode() so it is sent only when the request actually goes to the hosted proxy. Adds a direct-path test asserting the header is absent even when companyId is passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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b643e6ce64 |
perf(mcp): demote ten unused catalog reads, reclaiming 3 763 tokens of budget (#2089)
* perf(mcp): demote ten unused catalog reads, reclaiming 3 763 tokens of budget The tools/list payload bench sat about 20 tokens under its 65 000 ceiling, so the next tool or field anyone added failed CI. That is not hypothetical: it already cost the agent-briefing field in #2079, which was built and then removed for want of roughly 85 tokens. The bench's own comments deferred the fix twice, in the same words both times: picking which read to demote needs prod usage data, not a guess inside an unrelated PR, so do the demotion as its own change and ratchet the ceiling back down. This is that change. Selection is from 60 days of mcp.tool_called: default-catalog READ tools with 25 or fewer calls, excluding anything named in RECOMMENDED_WORKFLOW_LOADOUTS. Ten qualified. Measured 65 046 -> 61 283, ceiling ratcheted to 61 600. Usage data is necessary but not sufficient, and three classes were kept in the catalog despite low counts: - gnubok_call_tool, which IS the search-only bridge. - the connect_* onboarding tools and gnubok_lookup_company. A fresh agent has not learned to search yet, which is exactly why #1936 put them in the catalog. - every arsredovisning, dispositioner, depreciation and accrual PROPOSAL tool. A 60-day window ending in August cannot see bokslut season: most Swedish companies close on 31 December and do the work January to June, so summer counts understate these to near zero. Demoting them would hide the year-end flow precisely when it is needed. Widget tools are a hard exclusion, and I found that by tripping over it: gnubok_receipt_matcher and gnubok_vat_review_widget were demoted in a first pass and their own suites failed. A widget is rendered from the _meta.ui it publishes in tools/list, so search-only leaves it callable but unrenderable. Both are back in the catalog, and a general invariant now holds the rule for every widget tool added later, verified by demoting one and watching it fail. Only READ tools are demotable at all: gnubok_call_tool refuses writes, so a search-only WRITE is uncallable on Claude.ai. Demoted reads stay callable through the bridge; they are no longer listed up front. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: code-span the connect_* identifier in DECISIONS A bare asterisk opens an emphasis span in Markdown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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37e50c272d |
feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) (#1757)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored (encrypted) there. - lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret, the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB JWT relocation. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV connection quota, pending ledger row. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) + sha256(refresh_token). - app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto / agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank. - The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there). - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS. Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean; no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR: instance-side wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard) The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs; what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx, a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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10bbfb9d79 |
fix(mcp): make agent failures diagnosable from the log, not just from the source (#2087)
* fix(mcp): make agent failures diagnosable from the log, not just from the source Mining event_log for mcp.tool_called: VALIDATION_ERROR ran at about one a day until 2026-08-25, then jumped to a hundred a day and stayed there. One integration's gnubok_get_kpi_report has been refused 604 times over seven days and is still failing. The cause is the unknown-parameter guard from #1856, which is correct and stays. The caller is even told precisely what is wrong: getStructuredError puts "Unknown parameter "x" for <tool>. Valid parameters: ..." into message_en, which the agent receives. What was broken is what we recorded about it. Two things, both cheap: - Telemetry logged only message_sv, which for VALIDATION_ERROR is the registry default "Förfrågan innehåller ogiltiga uppgifter." and names neither the parameter nor the tool. A seven-day outage was indistinguishable from a typo, and the cause was only findable by reading the dispatcher source. errorDetail now carries message_en, stored only when it differs from errorMessage, so the many domain failures whose message_sv is already the specific text cost nothing extra. - errorKind said 'company_access_denied' for all 604, because the arg guard throws inside the company-routing try. That is an active misdirection: it sends triage looking for a tenancy bug that does not exist. Exactly two things in that block raise VALIDATION_ERROR, the unknown-parameter guard and a malformed company_id, and neither is a permissions failure, so they now log as 'invalid_arguments'. Tests reproduce the production call shape and were verified to fail when either fix is reverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): derive the telemetry payload type from the event contract Two review findings, both valid. The local ToolCalledPayload interface was a hand-maintained duplicate that omitted sessionId and half the errorKind union. That is not cosmetic: it is why errorDetail could be added to the emitter and to lib/events/types.ts while the test file type-checked against a stale shape. Deriving it from EventPayload<'mcp.tool_called'> removes the drift. The null-detail assertion was also conditional, so it would have passed on a wrong-but-present value. Replaced with two determinate cases: a scope denial carries both languages without duplicating either, and the unknown-tool exit, which supplies no diagnostic, stores null. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): pin the scope name in the diagnostic assertion 'A different string' passes on any placeholder. The reason errorDetail is worth storing is that it names what the caller lacks, so assert that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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523beaa18b |
fix(mcp): give the missing-chart-accounts refusal a code agents can dispatch on (#2075)
getStructuredError resolves an error with no `code` to UNKNOWN_ERROR, whose registry text is the constant "Något gick fel. Försök igen." So an agent branching on `code` saw "unknown" for a failure whose own message already named the accounts and the two tools that fix it. On production that was 40 of the create_voucher failures in 60 days. Everything needed already existed: the ACCOUNTS_NOT_IN_CHART code, its registry entry, its remediation pointing at the chart-of-accounts resource, and a typed error class that storno-service already throws. This path just never attached the code. Attached with Object.assign rather than by throwing AccountsNotInChartError, because that class builds its own generic English message from the account list and would discard the richer Swedish one, which is the more useful half. Pinned by a test asserting the same message WITHOUT the code still resolves to UNKNOWN_ERROR, so this cannot silently regress. Not fixed here: the MCP server has ~155 bare Swedish-prose throws against 3 uses of codedError(), so most domain failures remain undispatchable. This fixes the one instance telemetry actually proved rather than converting 155 sites blind. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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36123cef23 |
feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget (#1751)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real prior RPC source (20260831190000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1 Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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cfce2de925 |
feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' (#1747)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(entitlements): self-host connector gate honors only source=connector grants The trial-seed trigger (seed_trial_capability_grants) writes 30-day source='trial' rows for bank_sync and skatteverket on every company insert, self-hosts included. The partitioned self-host gate read every active grant, so a fresh self-host company held every connector capability for a month with no connector key (CodeRabbit finding on #1747, verified against migration 20260818170000). hasCapability and getCompanyIdsWithCapability now add .eq('source', 'connector') on a self-host; getCompanyEntitlements skips non-connector rows there. Hosted reads every source exactly as before (covered by a test asserting no source filter is applied). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(entitlements): pin the early-grants wave on the self-host partition, fix stale docstrings Address the review round on the readGrants() merge resolution: - Add two recording-mock tests for getCompanyEntitlements with teamId (the dashboard layout path): on a self-host the early grants read must narrow to the connector keys and carry source = 'connector'; on hosted it reads every paid key with no source filter. The in-loop source check masked a lost narrowing, so this pins the query itself. - Move the getCompanyEntitlements docstring back above the function and replace "Self-hosted holds everything" with the actual partition. - keys.ts: say that lib/connect/instance arrives with stack PR #1748 so a reader on main does not chase a module that is not there yet. - DECISIONS.md: describe the InvoiceInboxWorkspace.tsx merge resolution accurately (set to the #1753 blob origin/main carried at push time, not the merged parent's) and note that stack children must merge this branch forward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NdxH4DGnggvqHBCmif6B16 * chore(connector): merge origin/main, re-version connector migration to 20260831170000 Migration 20260820122000 predates versions already applied to prod (latest 20260831150000); renamed to keep Supabase branching history monotonic. Test reference updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(entitlements): own-credentials seam so self-hosts running their own EB/SKV are never connector-gated Forward-ports the connector-mode seam's own-credentials half from the instance-wiring layer: a self-host with its own Enable Banking or Skatteverket credentials holds that capability outright, exactly like every other local capability. Without this, upgrading an own-credentials self-host silently killed working bank sync and SKV integrations and showed a hosted subscription upsell whose remedy does not exist for a self-host. capability_blocked copy gains a self-host variant naming GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY; stale all-on comments updated at the two gate call sites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(entitlements): route the pending-op capability block through capabilityBlockedError for self-host copy Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(entitlements): PR #1747 review batch: connector-grant expiry CHECK, test cleanup, DECISIONS correction - Migration 20260831180000: CHECK (source <> 'connector' OR expires_at IS NOT NULL); connector grants are a short-lived offline cache, a NULL expiry would be a permanent unlock nothing revokes. pg test added. - beforeEach vi.clearAllMocks() in the three entitlements test files. - DECISIONS entry corrected: the trial seed DOES write trial rows for bank_sync/skatteverket; what it never writes is source='connector' or the connector-only keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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9fe37b85b5 |
feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended (#2079)
* feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended An API key gets an optional ceiling in SEK. Above it the agent may still stage the work, it just may not finish it alone: a human approves the same verifikat in the app. Default is NULL, so every existing key keeps its behaviour and turning this on is entirely opt-in. Enforced at the two places an API key reaches the ledger, and at both the refusal happens BEFORE the point of no return: - MCP: in commitPendingOperation, before the atomic claim, so the operation stays 'pending'. Behind the claim it would be caught by the generic handler, marked terminal 'rejected', and the staged verifikat would be gone. - REST: in journal-entries.commit, before commitEntry, so the draft stays a draft and the voucher sequence never advances (BFL 5 kap. 7 §). The dry run refuses too, rather than promising a voucher number the key cannot deliver. Not enforced inside commit_journal_entry: a RAISE there is swallowed by engine.ts into a retryable 500, and it would cost a DROP+CREATE on the function that issues every voucher number. Operations whose amount is only known during dispatch (batch allocation, bulk booking, the settlement link paths) fail OPEN behind an explicit allowlist. Pricing them ahead of dispatch would be a guess, and a wrong guess silently breaks batch allocation the day someone sets a limit. The allowlist is derived from what production actually stores: create_voucher carries total_debit on 1389 of 1389 rows, categorize_transaction carries amount on 2002 of 2003, create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox carries total on 208 of 228. This is a blast-radius cap, not a security boundary. A per-entry ceiling is defeated by splitting one entry into several, and an LLM will find that, so UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED forbids splitting first: one affärshändelse is one verifikat (BFL 5 kap. 6 §). A cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that actually bounds exposure and is left to a separate change. The guard is written NULL-first everywhere. An absent, unparseable or non-positive ceiling always means unlimited, never "block everything". Agents read their own ceiling from gnubok_get_agent_briefing instead of discovering it by burning a staged verifikat on a 403. Changing a ceiling is auditable: it now renders in behandlingshistorik (BFL 5 kap. 11 §). The audit trigger already fired on the column, but the report dropped the event because the field was not in its diff map. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(skill): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new commit pitfall apiskill:check is a ratchet: the generated reference must match the endpoint registry. Never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(agents): pin the DB default itself, and declare the briefing field required Two review findings, both real: - the default test stored an explicit NULL, so it stayed green even if the column default changed to a positive ceiling: the one change that would silently start blocking every existing key. It now omits the column. - gnubok_get_agent_briefing documents unattended_commit_limit as always present and emits it unconditionally, so it belongs in the output schema's required list. Declined the NOT VALID constraint suggestion, with the reason recorded in the migration: api_keys is 388 rows / 768 kB in production. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): name the TOCTOU window in the REST ceiling check A security scan flagged that the line sum is read before commitEntry, so a concurrent write to the draft's lines can post over the ceiling. Real, and accepted: closing it means enforcing inside commit_journal_entry, where a RAISE becomes a retryable 500 and destroys the staged operation on the MCP path. Recorded in the code rather than left implicit, so nobody later mistakes this for a hard control. A per-entry ceiling is already defeated by splitting, which needs no race; the cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that bounds exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): price the settlement and batch paths that were bypassing the ceiling A security scan flagged that known money-posting operations fail open, and it was right. The first cut priced only create_voucher, categorize_transaction and create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox, on the belief that the batch and settlement paths computed their totals only inside SQL at dispatch. Production says otherwise: the staged preview already carries the amount, because it is the number a human is shown when approving the operation. Over the last 120 days each of these is present and numeric on 100% of that type's staged rows: link_transaction_journal_entry transaction_amount 1369 rows bulk_book_transactions tx_sum 273 rows link_supplier_invoice_voucher payment_amount 55 rows match_batch_allocate total_allocated 24 rows mark_invoice_paid total 3 rows So a key with a ceiling could post any amount through the four largest settlement paths. Now priced, and the ceiling applies. Only reconciliation_match stays unpriced: it carries pair_count, which is a COUNT. Pricing off that would compare pairs against kronor, which is worse than not enforcing. link_document_to_voucher and attach_document_to_transaction move no money at all; the transaction_amount they carry is context, not a posting. Genuinely unpriceable types still fail OPEN. This control can only ever narrow what a key does, and a wrong guess at an amount blocks a legitimate commit, so guessing high would leave an agent unable to work. Adds a test that walks the whole allowlist, so a typo'd field name cannot silently make a type unpriceable again: that is exactly the hole this closes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): drop the ceiling from the agent briefing, the payload budget has no room The tools/list context-budget bench sits at 65 000 tokens and main now leaves roughly 20 tokens of headroom. An always-present field on the briefing's output schema costs about 85, so this addition alone pushed the bench red. The bench's own note is explicit that the answer is to demote a tool rather than raise the ceiling, so raising it here would be the wrong trade for a nice-to-have. Nothing is lost that matters: the operation is never destroyed when it is refused, so discovering the ceiling from UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED costs one round trip and no work. That error already carries both attempted and limit, and GET /api/settings/api-keys returns the value. Re-exposing it on the briefing is worth doing once there is budget to spend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(api): spell affärshändelse correctly in the commit pitfall Fixed in the route's registerEndpoint pitfalls, which is the source; the skill reference is regenerated from it and never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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f216a60bf8 |
feat(invoices): per-line percentage discount and separate fakturamarkning (#2084)
* feat(invoices): per-line percentage discount and separate fakturamarkning User request: rabatt i procent per artikelrad, and a marking field separate from Er referens. - invoice_items.discount_percent (0-100, default 0): line_total and vat_amount are stored NET of the discount. Shared exact-ore math in lib/invoices/line-amounts.ts (gross, discount, net) used by the web builder, staged-operation commit, editor preview, PDF, and Peppol. Undiscounted lines keep the legacy unrounded qty*price byte-identical. - ROT/RUT deduction computes on the discounted net line total. - invoices.invoice_marking: printed on the PDF next to the references and mapped to Peppol BT-10 BuyerReference (marking wins over your_reference; either satisfies the BT-10 requirement). - Peppol renders the discount as a BG-27 line AllowanceCharge (reason code 95, MultiplierFactorNumeric, Amount, BaseAmount). - Editor: "Lagg till rabatt" in the row menu (same reveal pattern as ROT/RUT), Markning row next to Er referens, forval chip, review dialog shows discounts and marking. - Plumbed through v1 REST projections, MCP create/get/update invoice tools, pending-operations update path, and copy-invoice (discount copied; marking deliberately not, it is recipient-specific). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJAt9yM7tgZ69f1XnNnq52 * fix(invoices): carry discount_percent through every deduction, credit, convert and preview path Skeptic + CI findings on the discount/marking feature, one pass: - generateRotRutLines and propose-send-lines now pass discount_percent into computeDeduction: the send/credit/cash verifikat booked 1513 on the GROSS line while deduction_total, the PDF and the Skatteverket claim carried the net, stranding the difference on 1513 and pushing 1510 negative once the customer paid. Test pins 1513=3000/1510=7000 for a 20%-discounted 10 000 kr ROT line. - preview-pdf route accepts discount_percent (net totals + net-based deduction) and invoice_marking; the editor now sends the marking, so the preview equals the invoice it becomes. - Credit notes carry discount_percent (buildCreditNoteItem, v1 credit route select+insert, MCP credit executor) and invoice_marking, so the kreditfaktura face arithmetic multiplies out and shows the Rabatt column (ML 17 kap 24 §). - Proforma->invoice convert copies discount_percent + invoice_marking: the converted invoice previously failed Peppol LINE_TOTAL_MISMATCH and lost the rebate on the next builder pass. - Editor hides the discount menu in self-billed mode (the self-billed wire shape has no discount; previewed net would book gross). - MCP staging and commitCreateInvoice reject a non-number discount_percent (a string coerced past the range check but was ignored by the totals math and still stored). - Regenerated skills/accounted-api (apiskill:check CI failure). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJAt9yM7tgZ69f1XnNnq52 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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84c8e1ce59 |
fix(inbox): never extract the receiving company as its own supplier (#2080)
* fix(inbox): never extract the receiving company as its own supplier The model sometimes reads the Kund/Kunduppgifter block of bank agreements and similar documents as the issuer, so the inbox offered to create the user's own company as a leverantor. Two layers: a supplier-direction rule in the extraction prompt (issuer, never the customer/recipient block), and a deterministic post-extraction guard that nulls the supplier block when its org number, derived VAT number, or exact name equals the receiving company's own. All AI extraction paths (upload, deferred, retry, attach-document, document-extraction, MCP) pass the company identity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): keep the own-company guard alive for photographed documents Skeptic findings on PR #2080: normalizeImageForExtraction rebuilt the input without ownCompany, so the guard never fired for HEIC/oversized phone photos (the motivating case). Spread the original input instead. Also let a provably different extracted org number outvote a name coincidence, and accept 12-digit personnummer-form own org numbers (19/20 century prefix, enskild firma) alongside the 16-prefixed organisation form. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * docs(compliance): add RoPA entry for the own-company-identity lookup Compliance swarm (GDPR Art. 30): fetchOwnCompanyIdentity reads companies.name and org_number on every extraction; record the processing activity (transient in-memory comparison, never sent to the model). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): log own-company identity lookup failures instead of failing silent Compliance swarm (SOC 2 CC7.2): the bare catch in fetchOwnCompanyIdentity made a persistently broken lookup (RLS misconfig, DB outage) disable the guard invisibly. Also pin the VAT-number match across prefixed and bare digit forms in the test matrix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): surface maybeSingle query errors in the own-company lookup CodeRabbit: maybeSingle() reports RLS/query failures in error without throwing, so the failure log added for SOC 2 CC7.2 never fired for exactly those cases. Throw the reported error into the existing catch (still fail open to nulls). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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6dfaa45061 |
feat(notifications): opt-in daily "nytt att bokföra" email digest (#2078)
* feat(notifications): opt-in daily "nytt att bokföra" email digest Users asked for an email when new work arrives: bank transactions that synced overnight and documents that landed in the inbox. Adds a daily 05:45 UTC cron (after the 05:00 bank sync) that emails opted-in users a per-company summary with counts only, no amounts (data-minimization stance of the kvittens/skattekonto mails). - notification_settings.email_digest_enabled, NOT NULL DEFAULT false: strictly opt-in via a new toggle in the notification settings panel - notification_log type 'bookkeeping_digest' with the claim-then-send partial unique index pattern: one mail per user per company per day - counts unbooked transactions and unprocessed inbox items created in the last 24h; empty digests are never sent - brand-aware sender + link base via lib/email/brand-sender - docker crontabs regenerated from vercel.json Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0122MznXxrLRyT96fGhfyzD4 * fix(notifications): digest review findings in one pass Skeptic + bot findings on PR #2078, resolved together: - Count queries now match the canonical worklist anchors: ignored transactions excluded; inbox items already booked directly or matched to a transaction (created_journal_entry_id / matched_transaction_id) no longer counted (skeptic: spurious digests). - Memberships sweep and member-email lookups chunk .in() id lists at 150 ids to stay under proxy URL limits (HTTP 414 at ~350 opted-in users). - Recoverable claim lifecycle (CodeRabbit): claim inserts as 'pending', flips to 'sent' only after the provider accepted the mail; a stale pending claim is atomically taken over by a later run, so a worker death mid-send no longer swallows the day's digest. New migration 20260831110000 admits 'pending' to the delivery_status CHECK. - Company name sanitized against CRLF header injection before the mail subject (compliance swarm ASVS V1.2.5), with test. - RoPA entry for the new processing activity in .compliance/ropa.yaml (compliance swarm GDPR Art. 30). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0122MznXxrLRyT96fGhfyzD4 * fix(types): admit 'pending' to NotificationLog delivery_status union Matches migration 20260831110000; surfaced by fix re-verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0122MznXxrLRyT96fGhfyzD4 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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1a3686dd45 |
feat(inbox): promote a single prominent amount into the editable total (#2073)
* feat(inbox): promote a single prominent amount into the editable total Follow-up to #2048 after founder review: the Belopp row was load-bearing for matching but read-only, so a misread amount could not be corrected, and an empty TOTALT still read as "extraction failed". - promoteSingleProminentAmount (extraction post-step, all intake paths): documentKind other/government_letter with no total and exactly one distinct nonzero prominent amount gets it copied into totals.total, stamped totalSource: 'prominent'. Multi-amount documents are left alone: picking one silently would invent a total. - provenance keeps the safety rails: matching demotes a promoted total back through the prominent-amounts fallback (0.85 discount, date guard, amountSource tag), so the nightly receipt-hunt still excludes these documents and confidence never presents as certainty. - the fields-PATCH route clears totalSource when a human edits TOTALT: a user-set amount is a verified total at full weight. - the read-only Belopp row now renders only for multi-amount documents, and filters zero amounts ("Totalt manadspris: 0 kr" noise). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): review pass: concurrency-safe fields PATCH, zero-amount predicate CodeRabbit findings on #2073: - the fields-PATCH read-merge-write could let a racing autosave restore a stale extracted_data blob (including a totalSource stamp a concurrent TOTALT edit had just cleared). The update is now conditional on the trigger-maintained updated_at; zero rows matched returns 409 and the client's next debounced save re-reads. - hasAnyExtractedField now uses the same meaningful-amount predicate as the Belopp render filter, so a zero-only prominentAmounts list no longer suppresses the retry / upgrade affordances. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Pierre Grönberg
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8b0aa80ea0 |
feat(arcim-migration): import the Fortnox asset register during migration (#1999)
The Fortnox migration now imports the asset register (GET /3/assets + /3/assets/types) as local register rows via createAsset: category from the type's anskaffningskonto BAS class, useful life from the source's depreciation window (K2 schablon fallback), never any journal entries (values arrived via SIE; the source's depreciated-to date is recorded in notes for review of the first proposal). Sold/scrapped/voided assets are skipped, re-runs dedupe, one bad asset counts as skipped. Gated behind FORTNOX_ASSET_SCOPES_APPROVED=false until the portal registration for integration 39254 carries the Assets scope, so hosted consents are unchanged and the wizard shows an honest skipped row. Co-authored-by: pgronberg <pgronberg@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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dc07ca8872 |
feat(transactions): steer private marking in locked periods to ignore, with v1 and MCP ignore verbs (#1661) (#2031)
Decision (option a): a private marking stays a real booking (eget uttag/insattning), so it remains blocked in a locked or closed period; the legal escape for rows that are not affarshandelser is ignore. Private + locked now returns TX_CATEGORIZE_PRIVATE_PERIOD_LOCKED with remediation naming the ignore paths instead of a bare PERIOD_LOCKED, on all four categorize surfaces and the bulk driver. New v1 POST/DELETE /transactions/{id}/ignore (isTransactionBooked-based 409, idempotent) and a staged MCP gnubok_ignore_transaction (+ accounted_ alias, search visibility to respect the tools/list payload ceiling) with operation_type ignore_transaction; the CHECK pair 20260831070000/070001 rebuilds the constraint from main's newest list plus the new value. Dashboard toast gains an Ignorera i stallet action. Closes #1661
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Mattsson
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516e8b62ff |
feat(inbox): match non-invoice documents via prominent amounts (#2048)
* feat(inbox): match non-invoice documents via prominent amounts Bankintyg, bank agreements and other documentKind "other" PDFs carry no invoice-style total, so extraction correctly left totals.total null and the document became structurally unmatchable: findUnderlagCandidates hard-drops items without a comparable amount and the picker lost the 40% amount signal. - extraction: new prominentAmounts[] field (amount + document's own label), populated only when totals.total is null; account/org/phone/reference numbers and zero amounts excluded. totals.total semantics untouched. - matching: bestProminentAmountVariance() tries each printed amount and feeds calculateMatchConfidence at reduced weight (0.3 vs 0.4) in both the agent candidate scorer and TransactionMatchPicker. - UI: inbox rail shows the detected amounts read-only for such documents, list falls back to a single distinct prominent amount, and extraction no longer reads as "found nothing". Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): discount prominent-amount fallback instead of reweighting it Skeptic pass refutations on the first commit: normalized weighting made a reduced amount weight self-defeating. Date + exact fallback amount with no merchant scored (0.25+0.3)/0.55 = 1.0 ("100% sakerhet" on a wrong same-day transaction), and a DISAGREEING fallback amount scored above a disagreeing invoice total (0.67 vs 0.60) because shrinking the weight also shrank the penalty. - score fallbacks at full amount weight, then multiply by a flat FALLBACK_CONFIDENCE_FACTOR (0.85): agreement caps below certainty, disagreement stays at least as damning as for a real total. - agent candidate surface additionally requires the document date within DATE_TOLERANCE_DAYS, so an avtal listing 349 kr no longer matches every future 349 kr charge from the same counterparty. - bestProminentAmountVariance returns which amount matched + its document label, and the match reason names it ("Exakt belopp i dokumentet: 2 500 SEK (Engangspris)"): no more bare "Exakt belopp" reaching the agent while total_amount is null. - prompt: prominentAmounts restricted to non-invoice documentKinds, and never a parking spot for an unreadable invoice total. - fix the stale "deliberately the same list" comment on EXTRACTED_FIELD_ACCESSORS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(receipt-hunt): never propose on the prominent-amounts fallback Second skeptic pass: the nightly hunt is a third consumer of scoreUnderlagCandidates and inherited the fallback unaware. A bankintyg whose printed "Insatt belopp" equals a same-day outflow scores 0.85, which clears CERTAIN_CONFIDENCE (0.8) and skips LLM adjudication, on a pairing wrong by construction (the hunt scans outflows only; "Insatt belopp" labels an inflow), with document_amount null in the approval preview. UnderlagCandidate now carries amountSource ('total' | 'prominent') and selectProposals drops fallback-scored candidates. Non-invoice documents stay reachable through the manual picker and the agent candidate surface, both of which have a human reading the amounts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb * fix(inbox): round fallback confidence via roundOre, not the naive pattern The two confidence discounts (and their test) tripped the naive-ore-round antipattern ratchet (625 vs baseline 622); use the sanctioned helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hqm9QgdyNAFaWiz6Ww7pgb --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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f43a6653f1 |
feat(salary): update_salary_run MCP tool and editable draft payment date (#2041)
* feat(salary): update_salary_run MCP tool and editable draft payment date payment_date drives the booking entry date but was only editable via the v1 PATCH. Close the gap on both remaining surfaces: - New staged MCP write tool gnubok_update_salary_run (search-only catalog; tools/list budget is at zero headroom) accepting the exact v1 PATCH field set: payment_date, voucher_series, notes. Draft-only with the same optimistic lock semantics, via a new shared service lib/salary/update-run.ts used by both the staging preflight and the commit executor. - Run header UI: payment date on a draft run is now an inline date input (prefilled, committed on blur/Enter, snaps back on failure), saved through the existing internal PATCH. Read-only once not draft. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(salary): op-type migration, calc invalidation on date change, scanner compliance Consolidated CI + review fix pass for #2041: - pg-real: add 'update_salary_run' to pending_operations_operation_type_check (wholesale re-create, NOT VALID + VALIDATE pair, mirroring 20260828160000/1). - Swedish accounting review: a payment_date change on a draft run now clears every roster row's calculation_breakdown (shared service and internal PATCH alike), so both book preflights refuse the run until a recalculation has run against the new date; skatteavdrag and the AGI redovisningsperiod follow the payment month. Staging preview exposes invalidates_calculation and the next hint states the clearing. - no-phantom-columns: literal select strings in update-run.ts; ceiling +1 with a documented reason for the inherent patch-shaped UPDATE payload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(salary): close skeptic findings on payment_date editing Skeptic round 1 refuted two paths; both closed: - Retry idempotency (correctness): the calculation_breakdown clear was gated on new-date-differs-from-stored, so a retry after a partial failure (header committed, clear failed) compared against the already updated date and skipped the clear forever, leaving a stale calculation bookable. The clear is now gated on payment_date being SUPPLIED, on all three surfaces (shared service, internal PATCH, v1 PATCH: the v1 route previously had no clear at all and bypassed the invariant). - Kontantprincipen (compliance): AGI derives its redovisningsperiod from period_year/period_month while the verifikat books on payment_date, so a cross-month payment_date change could book salary in one month and declare it in another. All three edit surfaces now refuse a payment_date outside the run's period month with the new structured error SALARY_RUN_PAYMENT_DATE_OUTSIDE_PERIOD; the UI date input is min/max-bounded to the period month. - The internal PATCH update is now optimistic-locked on status='draft' (races return 400 instead of silently writing), matching the v1 PATCH and the shared service, and the clear cannot fire for a run that left draft. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(salary): carry book_skattekonto op types through the constraint re-create The sibling migration 20260830130000 (merged from main) re-created pending_operations_operation_type_check with book_skattekonto_row and book_skattekonto_rows. This branch's 20260830150000 sorts after it and re-creates the constraint wholesale, so its list must be that migration's superset or the two values would be silently revoked at apply time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(salary): value-validate internal PATCH and grandfather out-of-period dates Two skeptic follow-ups: - The internal PATCH now validates values, not just keys: JSON body must be an object, payment_date must be ISO (shared ISO_DATE_RE), voucher_series a single A-Z letter, notes a string of max 2000 chars or null: the same rules as the v1 UpdateSalaryRunSchema, so nothing unvalidated can reach the DB through the whitelist. - Creation does not (yet) couple payment_date to the period month, so a legally created out-of-period date must stay correctable. All three edit surfaces now allow day adjustments within the run's CURRENT payment month as well as the period month (grandfather clause); no move can introduce a new wrong month. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(salary): resolve migration version collision with delete_draft_invoice Main's delete_draft_invoice PR landed on the same 20260830150000/150001 versions and also re-creates pending_operations_operation_type_check. Rename this branch's pair to 20260830160000/160001 (applies last) and carry delete_draft_invoice through the wholesale re-create so nothing is silently revoked. Final list = sibling's list + update_salary_run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * docs(salary): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new PATCH pitfalls apiskill:check byte-compares the generated skill against the registry; the two pitfalls added to the v1 salary-runs PATCH endpoint made references/salary-runs.md stale and failed Core Build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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9f8fa1b692 |
feat(invoices): draft invoice delete on v1 and MCP with staged approval (#2036)
* feat(invoices): draft invoice delete on v1 and MCP with staged approval
Draft customer-invoice deletion was web-only. This makes the same
semantics available on the v1 API-key surface and as an MCP write tool:
unnumbered drafts are hard deleted (no F-series number was consumed, so
no gap arises), numbered drafts are makulerade (status 'cancelled',
number retained so the F-series stays gap-free per ML 17 kap 24 and
BFNAR 2013:2). Non-drafts are refused; posted invoices can only be
reversed via a credit note.
- extract the web DELETE logic into lib/invoices/delete-draft-invoice.ts
with an explicit userId param (service-role clients null auth.uid());
the cookie route behavior is unchanged
- add DELETE /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/invoices/{id}: 409
INVOICE_DELETE_NOT_DRAFT for non-drafts (status override; the cookie
route keeps its 400), 404 generic NOT_FOUND, dry-run preview of the
outcome, mandatory Idempotency-Key; scope invoices:write
- fix the stale v1 PATCH pitfall that claimed a DELETE handler existed
- new MCP tool gnubok_delete_draft_invoice: staged operation requiring
approval, risk 'high' (both outcomes irreversible, never
auto-committed), catalogVisibility 'search' (tools/list budget at zero
headroom)
- delete_draft_invoice commit executor delegating to the shared service,
plus pending_operations CHECK constraint migration pair
(20260830100000/100001), risk tier, scope map, Granskning vocabulary
and sv/en labels
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98
* fix(migrations): renumber delete_draft_invoice pair after 20260830101500 on main
Merging origin/main brought 20260830101500_seed_agent_atom_bodies; the
constraint pair must sort after every version already on main so it
never applies out of order at merge time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98
* docs(api-skill): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new invoices.delete endpoint
apiskill:check failed on CI: registering DELETE /invoices/{id} makes the
generated skills/accounted-api docs stale. Output of npm run
apiskill:generate, no hand edits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98
* fix(invoices): pin staged delete outcome and align v1 risk metadata
Skeptic findings on PR #2036:
- Outcome pin: gnubok_delete_draft_invoice stages
expected_invoice_number alongside invoice_id; the executor passes it to
deleteDraftInvoice, which refuses with INVOICE_CANCEL_RACE when the
draft's number changed since staging. An unnumbered draft finalized
between staging and approval is now auto-rejected with a message naming
the new number, instead of silently switching from the approved hard
delete to a makulering. Ops staged without the pin keep legacy
semantics; single-phase callers (web, v1) are unaffected.
- v1 invoices.delete registerEndpoint risk raised medium -> high to match
the delete_draft_invoice pending-op tier (both outcomes irreversible);
generated accounted-api docs regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98
* fix(migrations): renumber delete_draft_invoice pair after skattekonto collision
Merging origin/main brought PR #2039's 20260830130000/130001 pair, which
collides with this branch's versions AND re-creates the same
pending_operations CHECK wholesale. Renumber to 20260830150000/150001 and
rebuild the value list as a strict superset (skattekonto list plus
delete_draft_invoice) so applying last revokes nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
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32cb8a22ce |
feat(mcp): Swedish keyword synonyms in tool search index (#2043)
gnubok_search_tools matched only English tool names and descriptions, so Swedish queries like "bankkonto" or "lönekörning" returned zero hits. Adds an optional keywords field on tool definitions, folded into the search matcher (name + description + keywords, case-insensitive, same ranking family as name matches) and seeds Swedish domain terms on 152 tools. Keywords are matcher-side only: they are never serialized into tools/list or search_tools output, since that payload budget has zero headroom. Guarded by new tests in search-tools.test.ts and lazy-auth.test.ts. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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15df4c741c |
feat(mcp): supplier and date filters on list_supplier_invoices (#2035)
* feat(mcp): supplier and date filters on list_supplier_invoices Add supplier_id, supplier_name (case-insensitive substring, resolved server-side against the suppliers table), date_from and date_to (inclusive, on invoice_date) to gnubok_list_supplier_invoices, mirroring the v1 REST supplier-invoices filter shapes (eq on supplier_id, gte/lte on invoice_date). Unknown supplier_name returns an empty result without touching the invoice table; malformed dates and non-uuid supplier_id fail loudly with pointer messages. Schema text is kept deliberately terse: the tools/list payload guard sits at near-zero headroom, so the date format hint lives once in the tool description and the redundant status enum prose was trimmed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98 * fix(mcp): bound the supplier_name match set fed to the IN clause PR Agent review flagged the unbounded id list: a broad substring on a large supplier register could build an IN clause past PostgREST URL limits. Cap name matches at 200 (cap + 1 fetched so overflow is detected) and fail loudly with a refine hint instead of degrading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98 * fix(mcp): loud validation, literal name matching, truncation signal on list_supplier_invoices Skeptic review refuted three behaviors; all three fixed: 1. Silent truncation: date filters invite period reconciliation but the 50-row cap was unsignalled. The invoice query now uses count exact and returns total_count and has_more (same contract as list_invoices), with a unique-id order tiebreaker so identical calls return identical subsets. 2. Silent filter drop: non-string values for the new params (and blank supplier_name) fell through typeof guards and returned the UNFILTERED ledger presented as filtered, the same class arg-guard exists for. They now throw clear errors. Dates are also calendar-validated, so 2026-02-30 fails loudly instead of as a raw Postgres cast error. 3. Wildcard broadening: PostgREST rewrites * in ilike values to %, so Star*Mart matched Starke Martinsson AB. supplier_name is now matched as a literal case-insensitive substring in JS over the company's suppliers (fetchAllRows, parity with list_suppliers), cap unchanged. Two redundant property descriptions dropped to fund the outputSchema additions under the tools/list payload ceiling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtvffGr6uVk2J2Skuz6L98 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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8f68421fef |
feat(skatteverket): expose skattekonto row booking via MCP staged operations (#2039)
* feat(skatteverket): expose skattekonto row booking via MCP staged operations Skattekonto READ and RECONCILE were already MCP tools, but BOOKING rows existed only behind the cookie-session extension routes. This closes the flow on API-key surfaces: - New staged MCP write tools gnubok_book_skattekonto_row and gnubok_book_skattekonto_rows (batch, 1-200 ids), catalogVisibility 'search', STAGED_OPERATION_SCHEMA, stage-time bookability gates and rule-matched counter-account preview. Staging never books. - New pending-operation types book_skattekonto_row / book_skattekonto_rows (CHECK constraint migration pair, risk tier medium, sv/en labels). - Commit executor reaches the skatteverket extension through the registry-resolved services channel (core never imports @/extensions): new commitBookSkattekontoRows service wraps the SAME bokforSkattekontoTransactionsBatch helper the HTTP bokfor-batch route uses (draft + commit per row via the bookkeeping engine, requireSettled), with the approving user id passed explicitly (auth.uid() is NULL on the service client). No booking math or account mapping changed: auth-surface exposure only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * chore(migrations): move book_skattekonto constraint pair after main's newest version origin/main gained 20260830101500 while this branch was in flight; keep the new pending_operations constraint migrations sorted after it so they apply in order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy * fix(skatteverket): resolve CI and review findings for skattekonto booking tools - Inline the skattekonto_transactions select strings at both stage-time call sites so the no-phantom-columns scanner can resolve them (the shared const pushed the unresolvable-expression count past the ceiling and failed Unit tests 3/4). - Return a fixed public message from the commitBookSkattekontoRows batch-level catch instead of the raw exception text; the raw error stays in the server log (Superagent P2). - Add verifikat_description to the staged previews so the reviewer sees the exact ledger text the booking helper writes, Skatteverket motpart included (Swedish accounting review). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018zGah8Yy49esAwpnKGxiGy --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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d39a9719a3 |
fix(peppol): say Peppol send is gated per company, never absent (#546) (#2021)
Peppol sending has been live since #1780 behind a per-company access grant, but the MCP skills, the swedish-invoice-compliance atom, docs/PEPPOL_FOUNDATION.md and the v1 :send / :mark-sent descriptions still told agents it did not exist. Every text now says gated per company (requested under Installningar > Fakturering) and keeps the restrictions explicit: aktiebolag senders, standard invoices only, Swedish org-number buyers, no MCP or v1 Peppol send verb yet, :mark-sent as the recovery step when a network-accepted send fails issuance. The skills guard test pins the truthful claim across all surfaces. Includes the regenerated agent_atom_registry seeds and skills/accounted-api references. Refs #546 |
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Jakob Wennberg
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d11d0a2e90 |
feat(reconciliation): match one bank event to several verifikationer (1:N) (#1553) (#2029)
One bank row can now settle several vouchers: journal_entry_id stays NULL and one transaction_voucher_links row per voucher carries a signed allocated_amount slice (sum must equal the row within the link tolerance, each slice bounded by the voucher's net line on the account). linkTransactionToVouchers does the locked transaction UPDATE first and rolls back on a failed junction insert; unlink and the re-booking guards understand junction-only rows; a storno of one of the N vouchers releases the row when the remaining slices no longer sum to its amount. The worksheet's right pane becomes multi-select when exactly one bank row is picked (Koppla only at difference 0); the v1/dashboard pair schemas accept allocations; the MCP reconcile resolver and executor carry 1:N pairs; skattekonto keeps single-pointer semantics. Closes #1553 |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
749f90fe62 |
feat(inbox): direct-to-storage upload for files over the hosted body limit (#1551) (#2030)
Hosted uploads larger than the 4 MB multipart ceiling (Vercel's 4.5 MB request-body cap) now go POST /upload/create (signed PUT URL, rate-limited) -> PUT to the raw Storage URL -> POST /upload/complete (server-side magic-byte and size validation, sha256, WORM move, idempotent), reusing the #1378 pending-upload primitives. uploadAndExtract is split into uploadDocument + processArchivedDocument so both paths share the inbox pipeline. Dokumentinkorgen and the supplier-invoice form use the new path only above the threshold; files that fit keep the multipart route. Cap stays at 10 MB (the issue asks for 20 MB: founder call). Refs #1551 |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
523fba0419 |
feat(email): SMTP mailer behind the EmailService seam (EMAIL_PROVIDER=smtp); Resend stays the hosted default (#1746)
SmtpEmailService (nodemailer 9.0.5, exact-pinned) behind the existing EmailService seam. Provider resolution: EMAIL_PROVIDER wins, else RESEND_API_KEY selects Resend (hosted byte-identical), else SMTP_HOST selects SMTP. From header is built exactly like the Resend service after #1956 (no 'via <app>', fromAddress honored, platform-sender retry). STARTTLS is required by default (requireTLS) with SMTP_REQUIRE_TLS=false as an explicit opt-out for a plaintext LAN relay. Docs, env examples and the generated extension registry updated. |
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Jakob Wennberg
|
521f437072 |
feat(migration): link migrated invoices to their registration voucher (#1463) (#2024)
Visma and Fortnox migrations now carry each invoice's source voucher reference, and after the invoice steps a core linker resolves it against the SIE-imported ledger (voucher-ref resolver by date, corroborated by the 244x credit / 151x debit amount, posted only, unreferenced only) and writes registration_journal_entry_id / journal_entry_id. Anything ambiguous, mismatched or unresolved is reported and left NULL; journal entries are never written. The arcim-migration /reconcile endpoint can relink already-migrated companies. Payment vouchers are PR B. Refs #1463 |
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Jakob Wennberg
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4b7343d5ec |
fix(errors): keep the SQLSTATE when wrapping database errors (#2027)
isTransientFailure() checks the driver's error code first, and 57014
(statement timeout) is already in its transient set. But the wrapping idiom
across the codebase was `throw new Error(\`Database error: ${err.message}\`)`,
which keeps the prose and drops the code. A retryable timeout therefore
arrived anonymous and resolved to UNKNOWN_ERROR: "Något gick fel. Försök
igen." An agent cannot dispatch on that, so it retried.
On production over 60 days, with the two bot integrations excluded: 1024 real
agent failures, 645 of them UNKNOWN_ERROR across 60 actors and 57 companies.
82 retry streaks of three or more identical failures, 462 wasted repeat calls,
53.1% of all agent error calls sitting inside a streak.
The worst offender traces to one line in core. gnubok_query_journal failed 164
times at a p50 of 8110ms while every other failing tool sat between 1 and
315ms, and its path is fetchEntryLines -> fetchAllRows, where
lib/supabase/fetch-all.ts threw `new Error(error.message)`. That is the
highest-traffic strip point in the repo: 31 callers, every paginated read.
query_journal already had a correct TRANSIENT_ERROR branch offering "retry, or
narrow with date_from/date_to" which could never fire, because by the time it
looked, the code was gone.
fetch-all keeps the driver message verbatim: callers match on the existing
text, and this adds the code rather than rewording anything.
Attaching the code is safe. extractCode() only accepts /^[A-Z_]+$/ and every
SQLSTATE contains digits, so it cannot be mistaken for one of our own stable
codes. There is a test for that, and one asserting the old bare-Error shape
still resolves to UNKNOWN_ERROR so the fix cannot silently regress.
Also stops rendering the literal "undefined" when a driver-level failure
carries no message, which is the string that made these unsearchable.
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
|
a1cafe495f |
fix(invoice-inbox): read whole PDFs (last-page slice + truncation retry) (#2014)
* fix(invoice-inbox): read whole PDFs (last-page slice + truncation retry) PDF extraction read only part of well-structured PDFs, two confirmed mechanisms (21-day prod window: 49 sliced docs, 29 silent empties): - The auto-extract page budget was 3 (Bedrock-latency legacy, issue #553) and the slice kept only the first pages, so multi-page invoices lost the final page where totals, OCR and 'Att betala' sit. The budget is now 8 on pdf-native backends (Claude reads PDFs directly); the slice always keeps the last page. Rasterizing self-host backends keep the old budget of 3. - A max_tokens-truncated model answer was parsed as-is, failed, and became an all-null extraction with no trace. extractFromDocument now reports stop_reason max_tokens / finish_reason length as truncated; the extractor retries once at double AI_EXTRACTION_MAX_TOKENS and logs ai_extraction_truncated either way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012xosyW53HUa9JoFiDayhSk * fix(invoice-inbox): sweep cutoff covers the slower two-call extraction Skeptic finding on #2014: the crash-recovery sweep flipped 'processing' rows to an empty skeleton after 2 minutes, but a deferred extraction can now legitimately run 3-5 minutes (8 native pages plus one truncation retry at a doubled token cap), so the sweep stole the row and the CAS discarded the worker's real result. Cutoff raised to 10 minutes. Also: pages_partial_note made period-agnostic (old rows were extracted from first-pages-only slices, so naming the last page was retroactively wrong for them), and two stale first-pages-only comments updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012xosyW53HUa9JoFiDayhSk * fix(invoice-inbox): keep the first extraction response when the retry throws CodeRabbit finding on #2014: a throttled/failed retry call bubbled to the outer catch before rawText was assigned, discarding a first response whose text may parse fine despite the truncation flag. The retry is now caught locally (logged as ai_extraction_retry_failed) and the first result flows on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012xosyW53HUa9JoFiDayhSk --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
|
e8aa0670ca |
feat(salary): agent path to set this month's per-run salary (#2015)
* feat(salary): agent path to set this month's per-run salary
Agents could not do variable owner pay: the only per-run edit tool,
gnubok_update_payslip_line, edits the display-only Grundlon line that
every recalculation rebuilds from salary_run_employees.monthly_salary,
so the fixed employee salary silently won (user-reported).
- lib/salary/run-employees.ts: setRunEmployeeSalary() shared service
(draft gate, roundOre, 0 = nollkorning, display-line refresh); the
cookie route PATCH now delegates to it (behavior unchanged)
- MCP: gnubok_set_run_salary staged tool (search catalog: tools/list
budget at zero headroom), op type set_run_salary (medium risk),
commitSetRunSalary executor, payroll:write scope, payroll_month
loadout + payroll-monthly skill step; update_payslip_line description
now warns that recalc rebuilds base salary lines
- v1 REST: PATCH /salary-runs/{id}/employees/{employeeId} accepting
monthly_salary (draft only, dry-run, idempotency key)
- Migration pair (NOT VALID + VALIDATE) adds set_run_salary to the
pending_operations op-type CHECK; base list verified against prod live
- Tests: service, staged tool, executor, cookie route, v1 route; spec
snapshot updated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MP37pE3zk667nP6S766iJG
* fix(salary): harden set_run_salary per skeptic + CI findings
- Clear calculation_breakdown when the per-run salary changes so the
existing book preflights force a recalculation: a run can no longer
be booked with gross/tax derived from the old salary (skeptic R1)
- Enforce SALARY_OVERRIDE_MAX (10 MSEK) in the shared service and the
v1 body schema: closes the unbounded/1e307-overflow path that wrote
Infinity -> NULL -> 500 (skeptic R2)
- Promote gnubok_set_run_salary to the default catalog: a search-only
WRITE is uncallable on Claude.ai (update_customer lesson) while three
surfaces pointed agents at it; payload ceiling bumped 63.8K -> 64.4K
with a ledger entry, read-demotion left as its own change (skeptic R3)
- Granskning label type_set_run_salary in vocabulary.ts + sv/en (R4)
- Display-line refresh is fire-and-forget again (write already
committed; matches pre-refactor route behavior) and DB error details
carry the SQLSTATE code for Swedish error mapping
- v1 risk metadata aligned to 'medium'; NOT_DRAFT message now covers
salary edits, not just roster changes
- npm run apiskill:generate committed (CI apiskill:check failure)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MP37pE3zk667nP6S766iJG
* chore(migrations): rename set_run_salary pair past main's newest versions
origin/main gained 20260828120000 and 20260828154800 after this branch
staged 20260828110000/1; out-of-order versions are skipped at merge, so
the pair moves to 20260828160000/1 (byte-identical SQL, reference in the
VALIDATE header updated).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MP37pE3zk667nP6S766iJG
* chore: retrigger Supabase preview after migration-version repair
The preview branch tracked 20260828110000/1 before the rename to
20260828160000/1; the orphan rows are deleted from the preview branch's
schema_migrations (preview only, prod never saw those versions) and this
empty commit re-runs the tasks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MP37pE3zk667nP6S766iJG
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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