0ff1b05553
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache, zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape X-Connector-Key exists for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403 A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour. Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months - GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key. - instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and reports the winner's pin. - extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key. - Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside a request scope). - Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes. - issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
237 lines
9.7 KiB
TypeScript
237 lines
9.7 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
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import {
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CONNECTOR_ENTITLEMENTS_PATH,
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type ConnectorEntitlements,
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type ConnectorSyncReport,
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} from '../contract'
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import { getConnectorConfig, type ConnectorConfig } from './config'
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const log = createLogger('connector-sync')
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/**
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* Grant rows ARE the offline cache. Each sync re-stamps the connector grants
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* to expire at min(now + 72h, period_end + 3d): the hosted service only has
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* to be reachable once in three days, and a lapsed subscription freezes the
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* connector capabilities within days even if the sync keeps running. Uses
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* the existing expiry check in lib/entitlements, zero new cache code.
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*/
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export const CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS = 72 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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export const CONNECTOR_PERIOD_GRACE_MS = 3 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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const UPSERT_CHUNK = 500
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export type ConnectorSyncOutcome =
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| 'not_configured'
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| 'synced'
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| 'revoked'
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| 'network_error'
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| 'server_error'
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export interface ConnectorSyncResult {
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outcome: ConnectorSyncOutcome
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companies: number
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grantsUpserted: number
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grantsDeleted: number
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status?: string
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httpStatus?: number
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scopes?: string[]
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expiresAt?: string
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message?: string
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}
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export interface ConnectorSyncOptions {
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fetchImpl?: typeof fetch
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now?: Date
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config?: ConnectorConfig | null
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instanceUrl?: string | null
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appVersion?: string | null
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}
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export function connectorGrantExpiry(now: Date, currentPeriodEnd: string | null): string {
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const ttl = now.getTime() + CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS
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if (!currentPeriodEnd) return new Date(ttl).toISOString()
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const periodGrace = new Date(currentPeriodEnd).getTime() + CONNECTOR_PERIOD_GRACE_MS
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return new Date(Math.min(ttl, periodGrace)).toISOString()
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}
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async function deleteConnectorGrants(supabase: SupabaseClient, keepKeys: string[] | null): Promise<number> {
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let query = supabase.from('capability_grants').delete({ count: 'exact' }).eq('source', 'connector')
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if (keepKeys && keepKeys.length > 0) {
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query = query.not('capability_key', 'in', `(${keepKeys.join(',')})`)
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}
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const { error, count } = await query
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if (error) throw new Error(`Failed to delete connector grants: ${error.message}`)
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return count ?? 0
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}
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/**
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* One sync run: report the active company count to the hosted service, then
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* translate the answer into source='connector' capability grants for every
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* company on this instance.
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*
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* 200 active -> upsert grants for scopes, drop grants for scopes no
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* longer covered (synced)
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* 200 non-active -> delete all connector grants (freeze-and-retain) (revoked)
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* 401 / 403 -> delete all connector grants (revoked)
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* network error,
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* 429, 5xx, other -> leave grants alone, they expire on their own (network_error / server_error)
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*/
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export async function syncConnectorEntitlements(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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options: ConnectorSyncOptions = {},
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): Promise<ConnectorSyncResult> {
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const config = options.config === undefined ? getConnectorConfig() : options.config
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if (!config) return { outcome: 'not_configured', companies: 0, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted: 0 }
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const now = options.now ?? new Date()
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const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch
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const companies = await fetchAllRows<{ id: string }>(({ from, to }) =>
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supabase
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.from('companies')
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.select('id')
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.is('archived_at', null)
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.order('id', { ascending: true })
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.range(from, to),
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)
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const companyIds = companies.map((c) => c.id)
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const report: ConnectorSyncReport = {
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active_company_count: companyIds.length,
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...(options.instanceUrl ? { instance_url: options.instanceUrl } : {}),
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...(options.appVersion ? { app_version: options.appVersion } : {}),
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}
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let response: Response
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try {
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response = await fetchImpl(`${config.baseUrl}${CONNECTOR_ENTITLEMENTS_PATH}`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: {
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Authorization: `Bearer ${config.key}`,
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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Accept: 'application/json',
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},
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body: JSON.stringify(report),
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})
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} catch (err) {
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
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log.warn('connector sync: hosted service unreachable, keeping existing grants', { message })
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return { outcome: 'network_error', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted: 0, message }
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}
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if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
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// Delete the grant cache ONLY on a genuine connector rejection, proven by
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// the hosted route's own JSON body code (with-connector-auth always sends
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// one). A bare-status 401/403 also comes from layers where the app never
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// ran: a Vercel WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, an egress
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// proxy at the self-host. Trusting the status alone let any of those wipe
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// a paying instance's 72h offline grace within the hour: the same failure
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// class as the RPC-error-to-401 mapping, one layer up. Anything without a
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// known rejection code keeps the grants and expires naturally.
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let rejectionCode: string | null = null
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try {
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const body = (await response.clone().json()) as { code?: string }
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if (typeof body.code === 'string') rejectionCode = body.code
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} catch {
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// Non-JSON body (challenge/error page): not a connector rejection.
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}
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const isConnectorRejection =
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rejectionCode === 'CONNECTOR_KEY_MISSING' ||
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rejectionCode === 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID' ||
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rejectionCode === 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED'
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if (isConnectorRejection) {
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const grantsDeleted = await deleteConnectorGrants(supabase, null)
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log.warn('connector sync: key rejected by hosted service, connector grants removed', {
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httpStatus: response.status,
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code: rejectionCode,
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grantsDeleted,
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})
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return { outcome: 'revoked', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted, httpStatus: response.status }
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}
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log.warn('connector sync: 401/403 without a connector rejection code (edge/proxy?), keeping existing grants', {
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httpStatus: response.status,
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code: rejectionCode,
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})
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return { outcome: 'server_error', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted: 0, httpStatus: response.status }
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}
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if (!response.ok) {
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log.warn('connector sync: hosted service error, keeping existing grants', { httpStatus: response.status })
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return { outcome: 'server_error', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted: 0, httpStatus: response.status }
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}
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let entitlements: ConnectorEntitlements
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try {
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const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: ConnectorEntitlements }
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// Full shape validation, not just presence: an UNKNOWN status string must
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// land in keep-grants (server_error), not fall through to the
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// "status !== 'active'" delete below (contract drift or a tampering
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// middlebox must never wipe the cache), and a malformed
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// current_period_end would make connectorGrantExpiry throw mid-write.
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if (
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!body.data ||
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!['active', 'suspended', 'revoked'].includes(body.data.status as string) ||
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!Array.isArray(body.data.scopes) ||
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!body.data.scopes.every((s) => typeof s === 'string') ||
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!(
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body.data.current_period_end === null ||
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body.data.current_period_end === undefined ||
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(typeof body.data.current_period_end === 'string' &&
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Number.isFinite(new Date(body.data.current_period_end).getTime()))
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)
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) {
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throw new Error('unexpected entitlements payload')
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}
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entitlements = body.data
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} catch (err) {
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
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log.warn('connector sync: unreadable entitlements payload, keeping existing grants', { message })
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return { outcome: 'server_error', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted: 0, httpStatus: response.status, message }
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}
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if (entitlements.status !== 'active') {
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const grantsDeleted = await deleteConnectorGrants(supabase, null)
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log.warn('connector sync: key not active, connector grants removed', { status: entitlements.status, grantsDeleted })
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return { outcome: 'revoked', companies: companyIds.length, grantsUpserted: 0, grantsDeleted, status: entitlements.status }
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}
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const scopes = entitlements.scopes.filter((s) => (CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES as readonly string[]).includes(s))
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const expiresAt = connectorGrantExpiry(now, entitlements.current_period_end)
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let grantsUpserted = 0
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if (scopes.length > 0 && companyIds.length > 0) {
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const rows = companyIds.flatMap((companyId) =>
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scopes.map((capabilityKey) => ({
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company_id: companyId,
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team_id: null,
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capability_key: capabilityKey,
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source: 'connector',
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expires_at: expiresAt,
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})),
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)
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for (let i = 0; i < rows.length; i += UPSERT_CHUNK) {
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const chunk = rows.slice(i, i + UPSERT_CHUNK)
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const { error } = await supabase
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.from('capability_grants')
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.upsert(chunk, { onConflict: 'company_id,team_id,capability_key,source' })
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if (error) throw new Error(`Failed to upsert connector grants: ${error.message}`)
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grantsUpserted += chunk.length
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}
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}
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// Scopes the subscription no longer covers (or none at all): drop them.
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const grantsDeleted = await deleteConnectorGrants(supabase, scopes.length > 0 ? scopes : null)
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log.info('connector sync complete', { companies: companyIds.length, scopes, grantsUpserted, grantsDeleted, expiresAt })
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return {
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outcome: 'synced',
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companies: companyIds.length,
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grantsUpserted,
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grantsDeleted,
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status: entitlements.status,
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scopes,
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expiresAt,
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httpStatus: response.status,
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}
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}
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