* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check. (cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000) Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat * feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector (WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route. Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502). Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER. Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it. Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on. Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope every operation answers 403. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance (connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref. Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors. issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and --peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK (the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor, deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor cross-pair rows can consume the limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
95 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
95 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { generateConnectorKey, hashConnectorKey, isConnectorKeyFormat, validateConnectorKey } from '../keys'
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function supabaseWithRpc(result: { data?: unknown; error?: unknown }): { supabase: SupabaseClient; rpc: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> } {
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const rpc = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: result.data ?? null, error: result.error ?? null })
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return { supabase: { rpc } as unknown as SupabaseClient, rpc }
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}
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const ROW = {
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connector_key_id: '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',
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org_number: '5561234567',
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instance_url: 'https://bokforing.example.se',
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scopes: ['bank_sync', 'skatteverket'],
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status: 'active',
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current_period_end: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
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rate_limited: false,
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limits: { bank_connections_per_company: 2, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 3600 },
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}
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describe('connector key primitives', () => {
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it('generates a gnubok_ck_ key with a display prefix and a SHA-256 hash', () => {
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const { key, hash, prefix } = generateConnectorKey()
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expect(key.startsWith('gnubok_ck_')).toBe(true)
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expect(key.length).toBeGreaterThan(40)
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expect(prefix).toBe(key.slice(0, 18))
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expect(hash).toBe(hashConnectorKey(key))
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expect(hash).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/)
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expect(generateConnectorKey().key).not.toBe(key)
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})
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it('recognises the key format', () => {
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expect(isConnectorKeyFormat(generateConnectorKey().key)).toBe(true)
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expect(isConnectorKeyFormat('gnubok_sk_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz')).toBe(false)
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expect(isConnectorKeyFormat('gnubok_ck_short')).toBe(false)
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})
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})
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describe('validateConnectorKey', () => {
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it('rejects a malformed key without touching the database', async () => {
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const { supabase, rpc } = supabaseWithRpc({ data: [ROW] })
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expect(await validateConnectorKey('nope', supabase)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID' })
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expect(rpc).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it('hashes the key and calls the atomic RPC', async () => {
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const { key, hash } = generateConnectorKey()
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const { supabase, rpc } = supabaseWithRpc({ data: [ROW] })
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const result = await validateConnectorKey(key, supabase)
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expect(rpc).toHaveBeenCalledWith('validate_and_increment_connector_key', { p_key_hash: hash })
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expect(result).toEqual({
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ok: true,
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key: {
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id: ROW.connector_key_id,
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orgNumber: '5561234567',
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instanceUrl: 'https://bokforing.example.se',
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scopes: ['bank_sync', 'skatteverket'],
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status: 'active',
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currentPeriodEnd: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
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limits: { bank_connections_per_company: 2, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 3600 },
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},
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})
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})
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it('fills default limits when the RPC returns null limits', async () => {
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const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
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const result = await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, limits: null }] }).supabase)
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expect(result.ok && result.key.limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 1, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 0 })
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})
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it('maps no row (unknown/revoked) to 401, but an RPC error to 503', async () => {
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const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
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expect(await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [] }).supabase)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401 })
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// NEVER 401 on a database error: the instance sync deletes its whole
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// connector grant cache on 401/403, so a hosted pooler blip answered as
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// 401 would destroy a paying instance's 72h offline grace. 503 lands in
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// the sync's keep-grants branch.
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expect(await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ error: { message: 'boom' } }).supabase)).toMatchObject({
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ok: false,
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status: 503,
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code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE',
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})
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})
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it('maps a suspended key to 403 and a rate-limited one to 429', async () => {
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const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
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expect(
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await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, status: 'suspended' }] }).supabase),
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).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED' })
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expect(
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await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, rate_limited: true }] }).supabase),
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).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 429, code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED' })
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})
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})
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