Files
accounted/app/api/mcp-oauth/token/route.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.6 5d66dd6bfc feat: MCP server, API keys, OAuth, and KPI dashboard (#72)
* fix: prevent Chrome auto-translate from crashing React during onboarding

Chrome auto-translate modifies DOM text nodes when it detects a Swedish
page (lang="sv") in a browser set to English. React does not expect
external DOM mutations and throws, crashing the entire component tree
into global-error.tsx on every step transition.

Add translate="no" and <meta name="google" content="notranslate"> to
suppress browser translation. Also fix timezone-unsafe date parsing in
fiscal period validation (new Date("YYYY-MM-DD") + getDate() returns
local-timezone values, shifting dates by -1 day in Western timezones).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add notranslate meta tag to global-error.tsx for consistency

Per review feedback — global-error.tsx renders its own <html> document,
so it needs the same <meta name="google" content="notranslate"> tag as
layout.tsx to fully suppress Chrome translation on error pages.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add MCP server extension with OAuth, API keys, and KPI dashboard

Let users do bookkeeping through Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or any
MCP-compatible client. "Show my uncategorized transactions." "Book that
as office supplies." "Invoice Acme for 15,000 kr."

MCP server (extension):
- 10 tools: transactions, categorization, customers, invoices,
  trial balance, VAT report, KPI report, income statement
- JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol (no SDK dependency, works in serverless)
- Tool annotations, pagination, input validation per MCP best practices
- Same engine as web UI (VAT rules, exchange rates, event emission)

API key infrastructure (core):
- api_keys table with RLS, rate limiting (100 RPM), scopes column
- Atomic rate limit via DB RPC (validate_and_increment_api_key)
- Key management API routes + settings UI panel

OAuth 2.1 for Claude Desktop connectors:
- .well-known/oauth-protected-resource + oauth-authorization-server
- Authorization endpoint with consent page
- Token endpoint with PKCE verification
- Stateless encrypted auth codes (AES-256-GCM, no DB storage)
- Dynamic client registration

KPI dashboard:
- /nyckeltal page with hero cards, operational grid, trend chart
- GET /api/reports/kpi endpoint
- Gross margin, cash position, expense ratio, avg payment days,
  VAT liability, revenue/expense trend

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address OAuth security vulnerabilities from code review

Critical fixes:
- Auth code replay: Track used codes in oauth_used_codes table with
  unique constraint. Codes are single-use per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.
- Open redirect: Validate redirect_uri against hardcoded allowlist
  of known Claude callback URLs + localhost for dev.

P1 fixes:
- Move API key creation from /authorize to /token endpoint. Keys are
  only created after PKCE verification, preventing orphaned keys on
  abandoned OAuth flows.
- Add ensureInitialized() to MCP server so event handlers load and
  transaction.categorized events reach extensions.

P2 fixes:
- Remove 'plain' from PKCE methods — only S256 is advertised and
  accepted.
- Fix extension count in sectors test (10 → 11 for mcp-server).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove duplicate ensureInitialized() that caused circular import

The extension router (ext/[...path]/route.ts) already calls
ensureInitialized() before dispatching to handlers. The duplicate
call in server.ts created a circular import that Turbopack couldn't
resolve, breaking the Vercel build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-21 12:57:14 +01:00

129 lines
3.8 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { decryptAuthCode, verifyPkce, hashAuthCode } from '@/lib/auth/oauth-codes'
import { generateApiKey } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
/**
* OAuth 2.0 Token Endpoint.
*
* Exchanges an authorization code for an API key (access token).
* 1. Decrypts the stateless auth code
* 2. Checks for replay (single-use enforcement per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2)
* 3. Verifies PKCE (S256 only)
* 4. Creates the API key (deferred from /authorize to prevent orphaned keys)
* 5. Returns the key as a bearer token
*/
export async function POST(request: Request) {
let params: URLSearchParams
const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') || ''
if (contentType.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
const text = await request.text()
params = new URLSearchParams(text)
} else if (contentType.includes('application/json')) {
const json = await request.json()
params = new URLSearchParams(json as Record<string, string>)
} else {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'unsupported_content_type' }, { status: 400 })
}
const grantType = params.get('grant_type')
const code = params.get('code')
const codeVerifier = params.get('code_verifier')
const redirectUri = params.get('redirect_uri')
if (grantType !== 'authorization_code') {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'unsupported_grant_type', error_description: 'Only authorization_code is supported' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (!code) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'Missing code parameter' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Decrypt the auth code
const payload = decryptAuthCode(code)
if (!payload) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Invalid or expired authorization code' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Verify redirect_uri matches
if (redirectUri && redirectUri !== payload.redirectUri) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'redirect_uri mismatch' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Verify PKCE (S256 only)
if (!codeVerifier) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'code_verifier is required' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (!verifyPkce(codeVerifier, payload.codeChallenge)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Single-use enforcement: check and mark code as used (atomically via unique constraint)
const codeHash = hashAuthCode(code)
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const { error: replayError } = await supabase
.from('oauth_used_codes')
.insert({ code_hash: codeHash })
if (replayError) {
// Unique constraint violation = code already used
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Authorization code already used' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Clean up expired codes (non-blocking, best-effort)
supabase
.from('oauth_used_codes')
.delete()
.lt('created_at', new Date(Date.now() - 10 * 60 * 1000).toISOString())
.then(() => {})
// Create the API key now (after PKCE verification — prevents orphaned keys)
const { key, hash, prefix } = generateApiKey()
const { error: insertError } = await supabase
.from('api_keys')
.insert({
user_id: payload.userId,
key_hash: hash,
key_prefix: prefix,
name: 'MCP-klient (OAuth)',
})
if (insertError) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'server_error', error_description: 'Failed to create API key' },
{ status: 500 }
)
}
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: key,
token_type: 'Bearer',
scope: 'mcp',
})
}