43a71aec3c
* fix(supabase): stop server clients leaking a 30s refresh ticker per request
`autoRefreshToken` defaults to true in supabase-js, and off-browser
@supabase/auth-js starts the refresh ticker unconditionally:
// in non-browser environments the refresh token ticker runs always
this.startAutoRefresh()
That is a setInterval firing every 30 s. It calls unref(), so the process
still exits, tests pass, and Vercel never notices because the process is
torn down long before the tickers accumulate. But unref() does not make a
timer collectable: it stays registered in the event loop and remains a GC
root for its callback, which closes over the GoTrueClient, the
SupabaseClient, and the whole request scope around it.
A long-running self-hosted instance therefore leaks one timer plus one
entire request graph (socket, IncomingMessage, ServerResponse, headers,
route context: ~100 kB) per client constructed. One died of "JavaScript
heap out of memory" after 42 h, the last 24 of them completely idle. The
heap snapshot showed 445 retained request graphs and ~1050 Timeouts in
the 30 000 ms bucket, retained via `autoRefreshTicker`, and the rate
matched the traffic exactly: the Docker healthcheck polls /api/health
every 30 s and the webhook dispatch cron runs every minute, so
3 clients/min x 148 min = 444.
- new lib/supabase/service-client.ts: createServiceRoleClient() applies
SERVER_AUTH_OPTIONS, spread LAST so a caller passing its own auth block
cannot re-enable the ticker
- 22 call sites migrated; only booking-templates/sync/cron had ever
passed the options itself
- guard 9 in no-new-antipatterns.mjs fails CI on any new value import of
supabase-js's createClient outside the wrapper; type-only imports are
fine. Verified to fail on a deliberate regression and pass once fixed
- browser clients untouched: a signed-in tab genuinely needs the refresh,
and lib/supabase/client.ts is built on createBrowserClient anyway
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(checks): catch namespace imports in the leaky-supabase-client guard
The guard only matched named imports, so
import * as sb from '@supabase/supabase-js'
sb.createClient(url, key)
reached createClient through member access without ever naming it, and
passed. Verified against the real script before and after: the shape is
flagged now, and `import type * as sb` still passes.
Namespace value imports are treated as leaky outright rather than tracking
member access, which keeps the check a regex over source text with no new
dependency.
Review also suggested excluding *.test.tsx alongside *.test.ts. Skipped: the
repo has no .test.tsx files, and all four sibling checks in this file use
`.test.ts`. Diverging in one of them would read as an accident; if such files
appear, all four should change together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
510 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
510 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
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const KEY_PREFIX = 'gnubok_sk_'
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const REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX = 'gnubok_rt_'
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// ── API Key Scopes ──────────────────────────────────────────
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export const API_KEY_SCOPES = {
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'transactions:read': { label: 'Transaktioner: läs', description: 'Lista transaktioner, mallförslag, kategoriförslag (3 verktyg)' },
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'transactions:write': { label: 'Transaktioner: skriv', description: 'Kategorisera, av-kategorisera, kvittomatchning, koppling mot faktura (4 verktyg)' },
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'customers:read': { label: 'Kunder: läs', description: 'Lista kunder (1 verktyg)' },
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'customers:write': { label: 'Kunder: skriv', description: 'Skapa och uppdatera kunder (2 verktyg)' },
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'articles:read': { label: 'Artiklar: läs', description: 'Lista artiklar i artikelregistret (1 verktyg)' },
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'articles:write': { label: 'Artiklar: skriv', description: 'Skapa och uppdatera artiklar (2 verktyg)' },
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'invoices:read': { label: 'Fakturor: läs', description: 'Lista fakturor (1 verktyg)' },
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'invoices:write': { label: 'Fakturor: skriv', description: 'Skapa, skicka, markera betald/skickad (4 verktyg)' },
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'suppliers:read': { label: 'Leverantörer: läs', description: 'Lista leverantörer och leverantörsfakturor, hitta verifikat-kandidater (3 verktyg)' },
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'suppliers:write': { label: 'Leverantörer: skriv', description: 'Skapa leverantörer; godkänn, kreditera, betal-länka och hantera leverantörsfakturor (6 verktyg)' },
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'reports:read': { label: 'Rapporter: läs', description: 'Kontoplan, huvudbok, balansräkning, resultaträkning, moms, KPI, reskontra, perioder, bankavstämning, SIE-export (12 verktyg)' },
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'bookkeeping:write': { label: 'Bokföring: skriv', description: 'Stänga/låsa perioder, ingående balans, bokslut, SIE-import, voucher-gap-förklaringar, kontoplan (skapa/ändra konton), verifikat-anteckningar' },
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'payroll:read': { label: 'Löner: läs', description: 'Lista anställda, lönekörningar, lönejournal, körjournal' },
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'payroll:write': { label: 'Löner: skriv', description: 'Skapa lönekörning, beräkna, generera AGI, logga körjournalresor' },
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// v1 REST API: added Phase 1
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'companies:read': { label: 'Företag: läs', description: 'Lista och visa företagsprofiler som API-nyckeln har tillgång till' },
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'companies:write': { label: 'Företag: skriv', description: 'Uppdatera företagsinställningar via stagade verktyg eller REST-endpointen PATCH /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/settings' },
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'events:read': { label: 'Händelser: läs', description: 'Polla händelseloggen (event_log) som webhook-fallback' },
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'webhooks:manage': { label: 'Webhooks: hantera', description: 'Skapa, lista, uppdatera och radera webhook-prenumerationer' },
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'operations:read': { label: 'Operationer: läs', description: 'Hämta status för långkörande operationer (importer, bokslut, omvärdering)' },
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'documents:read': { label: 'Dokument: läs', description: 'Lista och hämta dokumentbilagor' },
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'documents:write': { label: 'Dokument: skriv', description: 'Ladda upp och koppla dokument till verifikationer' },
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'compliance:read': { label: 'Compliance: läs', description: 'Pre-flight-kontroller: momsstängning, bokslutsberedskap, voucher-gap, IB/UB-kontinuitet; Skatteverket-status (moms + AGI)' },
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'skatteverket:write': { label: 'Skatteverket: skriv', description: 'Lämna momsdeklaration och arbetsgivardeklaration (AGI) till Skatteverket (stagas; signeras med BankID)' },
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'agent:read': { label: 'Agent: läs', description: 'Specialiserad bokföringsassistent: profil, laddade specialister/atomer, minnen (briefing + skill-katalog)' },
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'agent:write': { label: 'Agent: skriv', description: 'Spara och ta bort agentens minnen om företaget (remember_fact, forget_fact)' },
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'pending_operations:read': { label: 'Stagade operationer: läs', description: 'Lista pending_operations (staged writes awaiting approval)' },
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'pending_operations:approve': { label: 'Stagade operationer: godkänn', description: 'Godkänn eller avvisa stagade operationer via API/MCP: agenten ersätter web-UI:s granskning' },
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} as const
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export type ApiKeyScope = keyof typeof API_KEY_SCOPES
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export const ALL_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = Object.keys(API_KEY_SCOPES) as ApiKeyScope[]
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/** The read-only scopes assigned to keys with no explicit scopes (legacy/null). */
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export const DEFAULT_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:read',
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'customers:read',
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'articles:read',
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'invoices:read',
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'suppliers:read',
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'reports:read',
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]
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/**
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* Default scope grant for OAuth-issued keys when the client did not pass an
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* explicit `scope` parameter at /authorize. Read-only by design: every
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* write or approval scope must be requested explicitly by the client AND
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* affirmatively ticked by the user on the consent screen.
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*
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* Rationale (do not weaken without a documented security decision):
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* - GDPR Art. 25(2) data-protection-by-default: the minimum-necessary
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* access set must be the silent baseline.
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* - ISO 27001:2022 A.5.18 / A.8.2 / SOC 2 CC6.3: privileged capabilities
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* (write, approve) must not be bundled into a default grant.
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* - Segregation of Duties (findStageApproveConflict below): granting any
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* STAGING_SCOPES member together with `pending_operations:approve` on a
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* single key lets an automated agent both stage AND commit financial
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* postings without a human-in-the-loop review. Keeping the default
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* read-only prevents this combination from being silently issued.
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* - BFL 5 kap 5§ / BFNAR 2013:2 behandlingshistorik: write paths that
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* create or modify verifikationer must be opt-in at the authorization
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* layer; conversational acknowledgement at the agent layer is not an
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* auditable substitute.
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*/
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export const DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:read',
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'customers:read',
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'articles:read',
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'invoices:read',
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'suppliers:read',
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'reports:read',
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'companies:read',
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'events:read',
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'operations:read',
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'documents:read',
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'compliance:read',
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'payroll:read',
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'pending_operations:read',
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]
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/**
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* Scopes advertised in the RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata document
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* (/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server). Restricted to the same set that
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* /authorize will grant by default: destructive scopes still work when
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* requested explicitly, they just aren't enumerated for unauthenticated
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* callers (defense-in-depth against scope-escalation reconnaissance).
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*/
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export const PUBLIC_OAUTH_METADATA_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [...DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES]
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/**
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* Scopes that allow staging a pending_operation. Used to detect a
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* segregation-of-duties conflict when paired with `pending_operations:approve`
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* on the same API key (ISO 27001:2022 A.5.3, SOC 2 CC6.1).
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*
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* Documented system control (BFNAR 2013:2 systemdokumentation): `agent:write`
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* is deliberately NOT a staging scope. The memory tools it gates
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* (gnubok_remember_fact/forget_fact) write advisory agent context: they
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* cannot create, mutate, or stage räkenskapsinformation, so memory-write +
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* approve on one key does not let an agent both stage and commit bookkeeping.
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* If a future memory surface ever feeds DIRECTLY into voucher generation
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* (rather than via a separately staged-and-approved operation), revisit this
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* classification.
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*/
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export const STAGING_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:write',
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'customers:write',
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'articles:write',
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'invoices:write',
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'suppliers:write',
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'bookkeeping:write',
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'payroll:write',
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'documents:write',
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'companies:write',
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// Skatteverket submit tools stage submit_vat_declaration / submit_agi, so a
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// key holding both this and pending_operations:approve is a SoD conflict:
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// findStageApproveConflict picks it up automatically from this list.
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'skatteverket:write',
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]
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/**
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* Detect a segregation-of-duties conflict between staging and approval scopes
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* on the same key. Returns the offending staging scope, or null when the
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* combination is clean. Callers may choose to block, warn, or record an
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* acknowledged risk acceptance.
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*
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* Granting both stage+approve to the same actor lets an automated agent both
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* stage AND commit financial postings without a human-in-the-loop review,
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* which is the explicit control surface for BFNAR 2013:2 (behandlingshistorik)
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* and BFL 5 kap 5§ traceability requirements.
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*/
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export function findStageApproveConflict(scopes: ApiKeyScope[]): ApiKeyScope | null {
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if (!scopes.includes('pending_operations:approve')) return null
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return scopes.find((s) => STAGING_SCOPES.includes(s)) ?? null
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}
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/** Scope domain groups for UI rendering */
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export const SCOPE_GROUPS = [
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{ domain: 'companies', label: 'Företag', read: 'companies:read' as const, write: 'companies:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'transactions', label: 'Transaktioner', read: 'transactions:read' as const, write: 'transactions:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'customers', label: 'Kunder', read: 'customers:read' as const, write: 'customers:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'articles', label: 'Artiklar', read: 'articles:read' as const, write: 'articles:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'invoices', label: 'Fakturor', read: 'invoices:read' as const, write: 'invoices:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'suppliers', label: 'Leverantörer', read: 'suppliers:read' as const, write: 'suppliers:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'reports', label: 'Rapporter', read: 'reports:read' as const, write: null },
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{ domain: 'bookkeeping', label: 'Bokföring', read: null, write: 'bookkeeping:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'payroll', label: 'Löner', read: 'payroll:read' as const, write: 'payroll:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'pending_operations', label: 'Stagade operationer', read: 'pending_operations:read' as const, write: 'pending_operations:approve' as const },
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{ domain: 'agent', label: 'Agent', read: 'agent:read' as const, write: 'agent:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'skatteverket', label: 'Skatteverket', read: null, write: 'skatteverket:write' as const },
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] as const
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/** Map MCP tool name → required scope. Tools omitted from this map are available to any authenticated key (e.g. discovery/search/skill loading). */
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export const TOOL_SCOPE_MAP: Record<string, ApiKeyScope> = {
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// Companies
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gnubok_list_companies: 'companies:read',
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gnubok_get_company_settings: 'companies:read',
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gnubok_update_company_settings: 'companies:write',
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// Transactions
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gnubok_list_uncategorized_transactions: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_list_transactions_without_documents: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_create_transactions: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_categorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_receipt_matcher: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_get_counterparty_templates: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_suggest_categories: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_match_transaction_to_invoice: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_link_transaction_to_journal_entry: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_match_batch_allocate: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_bulk_book_transactions: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_bulk_book_inbox_items: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_auto_match_period: 'transactions:write',
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// Customers
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gnubok_list_customers: 'customers:read',
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gnubok_create_customer: 'customers:write',
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gnubok_update_customer: 'customers:write',
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// Articles (artikelregister)
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gnubok_list_articles: 'articles:read',
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gnubok_create_article: 'articles:write',
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gnubok_update_article: 'articles:write',
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// Invoices
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gnubok_list_invoices: 'invoices:read',
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gnubok_get_invoice_deliveries: 'invoices:read',
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gnubok_create_invoice: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_update_invoice: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_send_invoice: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_mark_invoice_as_paid: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_mark_invoice_as_sent: 'invoices:write',
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// Recurring invoice schedules (staged template writes; no send/book at commit)
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gnubok_list_recurring_schedules: 'invoices:read',
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gnubok_create_recurring_schedule: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_update_recurring_schedule: 'invoices:write',
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// Suppliers
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gnubok_list_suppliers: 'suppliers:read',
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gnubok_list_supplier_invoices: 'suppliers:read',
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// Reports
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gnubok_get_trial_balance: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_vat_report: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_vat_review_widget: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_vat_close_check: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_kpi_report: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_income_statement: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_list_accounts: 'reports:read',
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// Kontoplan management: staged reference-data writes
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gnubok_create_account: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_update_account: 'bookkeeping:write',
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// Verifikat annotation (notes-only edit: allowed on posted entries)
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gnubok_set_voucher_note: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_get_balance_sheet: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_general_ledger: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_query_journal: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_ar_ledger: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_supplier_ledger: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_list_fiscal_periods: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_reconciliation_status: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_list_accrual_schedules: 'reports:read',
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// Dimensions (kostnadsställe/projekt) registry: reads next to the report
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// tools; the staged value-create is a bookkeeping write (dimensions PR3).
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gnubok_list_dimensions: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_list_dimension_values: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_create_dimension_value: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_get_dimension_pnl: 'reports:read',
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// Staged bulk retag of posted-line dimensions (dimensions PR6).
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gnubok_tag_journal_lines: 'bookkeeping:write',
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// Document inbox
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gnubok_create_document_upload: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_complete_document_upload: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_upload_document: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_list_inbox_items: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_get_inbox_item: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_list_unmatched_documents: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_get_document_content: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_attach_document_to_transaction: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_link_document_to_voucher: 'bookkeeping:write',
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// Körjournal (mileage): trip log reads/writes are payroll surface
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// (milersättning, 7331); booking the verifikat is a journal write.
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gnubok_list_mileage_trips: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_log_mileage_trip: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_book_mileage_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
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// Payroll
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gnubok_list_employees: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_get_salary_run: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_get_salary_journal: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_create_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_calculate_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_book_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_generate_agi: 'payroll:write',
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// Payroll gap-closure: reads + staged writes (1.6-1.8, 2.4)
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gnubok_get_employee: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_get_payslip: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_list_absence: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_update_payslip_line: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_register_absence: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_delete_absence: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_create_employee: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_update_employee: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_set_employee_opening_balances: 'payroll:write',
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gnubok_get_vacation_balance: 'payroll:read',
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gnubok_close_vacation_year: 'payroll:write',
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// Bookkeeping write (Stream 1 Phase 1): high-risk, always staged
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gnubok_close_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_lock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_unlock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_run_year_end: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_post_kontantmetod_cutoff: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_year_end_readiness: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_set_opening_balances: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_run_currency_revaluation: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_explain_voucher_gap: 'bookkeeping:write',
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gnubok_list_voucher_gaps: 'reports:read',
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// Transaction reversal (medium-risk)
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gnubok_uncategorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
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// SIE export (read-only) + import (write)
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gnubok_export_sie: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_audit_package: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_import_sie: 'bookkeeping:write',
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// Rot/rut begäran om utbetalning (records a payout request on generate)
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gnubok_generate_rot_rut_file: 'invoices:write',
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// Supplier CRUD
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gnubok_create_supplier: 'suppliers:write',
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// Supplier invoice lifecycle
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gnubok_approve_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
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gnubok_credit_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
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gnubok_create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
gnubok_set_inbox_extracted_data: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
// Supplier invoice payment via existing verifikat (no new bokföring)
|
|
gnubok_find_voucher_candidates_for_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:read',
|
|
gnubok_link_supplier_invoice_to_voucher: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
// Invoice conversion + crediting
|
|
gnubok_convert_invoice: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_credit_invoice: 'invoices:write',
|
|
// Phase 4: arbitrary-line bookkeeping primitives (high-risk, always staged)
|
|
gnubok_create_voucher: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_correct_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_reverse_journal_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
// Agent surface (Phase 6 MCP parity): briefing tool exposes company-specific
|
|
// profile + memory so it's scoped; gnubok_list_skills / gnubok_load_skill
|
|
// stay unscoped (discovery + static Markdown bodies + globally-readable atom
|
|
// registry: no per-company data).
|
|
gnubok_get_agent_briefing: 'agent:read',
|
|
// Agent memory write (previously UNMAPPED → callable by any key). Mapping to
|
|
// agent:write; existing non-revoked keys are grandfathered in the
|
|
// 20260619140000 migration so this does not regress them.
|
|
gnubok_remember_fact: 'agent:write',
|
|
gnubok_forget_fact: 'agent:write',
|
|
// Pending operations approval (mirrors the /pending web UI)
|
|
gnubok_list_pending_operations: 'pending_operations:read',
|
|
gnubok_approve_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
|
|
gnubok_reject_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
|
|
// Skatteverket filing (PR5). Reads are compliance:read (status of moms/AGI);
|
|
// the two submit tools require the opt-in skatteverket:write staging scope.
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_validate: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_status: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_agi_status: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: 'skatteverket:write',
|
|
gnubok_agi_submit: 'skatteverket:write',
|
|
|
|
// ── Audit retrofit (agent-native audit P0: unmapped = default-allow) ──
|
|
// These tools shipped without a scope mapping, making them callable by ANY
|
|
// authenticated key. Mapping them is accept-the-break by decision
|
|
// (2026-07-13): keys that relied on the default-allow hole lose access
|
|
// until granted the proper scope. Release-note callout required for the
|
|
// four WRITES below.
|
|
gnubok_link_invoice_to_voucher: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_undo_sie_import: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_post_annual_depreciation: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_import_rot_rut_beslut: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_list_verifikat_without_documents: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_find_voucher_candidates_for_invoice: 'invoices:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_dispositioner: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_accruals: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_annual_depreciation: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_preview_arsredovisning: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_validate_arsredovisning: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_arsredovisning_versions: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_arsredovisning_filing_status: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_preview_ef_declaration: 'reports:read',
|
|
// Deliberately UNSCOPED (available to any authenticated key):
|
|
// gnubok_search_tools, gnubok_list_skills, gnubok_load_skill,
|
|
// gnubok_feedback. Discovery + static skill bodies + feedback channel
|
|
// carry no per-company data; keeping them open is what lets an agent
|
|
// orient itself before its key's scopes are known.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function validateScopes(scopes: unknown): ApiKeyScope[] | null {
|
|
if (scopes === null || scopes === undefined) return null
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(scopes)) return null
|
|
const valid = scopes.filter((s): s is ApiKeyScope => s in API_KEY_SCOPES)
|
|
return valid.length > 0 ? valid : null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Create a Supabase service client that doesn't require cookies.
|
|
* Used for API key validation (MCP, webhooks) where there's no browser session.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function createServiceClientNoCookies() {
|
|
return createServiceRoleClient(
|
|
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
|
|
process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function generateApiKey(mode: ApiKeyMode = 'live'): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
|
|
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
|
|
// Test keys carry an explicit `test_` infix so integrators can tell at a
|
|
// glance which environment a key targets (matches the llms.txt contract:
|
|
// `gnubok_sk_test_<random>`). The infix is purely cosmetic: the authoritative
|
|
// mode is the `mode` column on api_keys, read back by hash in validateApiKey,
|
|
// so nothing trusts the key string. Both variants keep the `gnubok_sk_`
|
|
// prefix so the `startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)` check in validateApiKey still holds.
|
|
const key = mode === 'test' ? `${KEY_PREFIX}test_${random}` : `${KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
|
|
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
|
|
// First 18 chars: 'gnubok_sk_test_xyz' for test keys, 'gnubok_sk_xxxxxxxx'
|
|
// for live: the stored prefix is what the settings UI shows, so the test_
|
|
// infix is visible in the key list without exposing the secret.
|
|
const prefix = key.slice(0, KEY_PREFIX.length + 8)
|
|
return { key, hash, prefix }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* SHA-256, deliberately, and NOT a slow KDF like bcrypt/argon2.
|
|
*
|
|
* CodeQL flags this as js/insufficient-password-hash. That rule exists for
|
|
* user-chosen passwords, which are low-entropy and brute-forceable, so the
|
|
* defence is to make each guess expensive. This input is not a password: keys
|
|
* come from generateApiKey as 32 CSPRNG bytes (`gnubok_sk_<base64url>`), and no
|
|
* work factor moves the needle on a 256-bit random secret.
|
|
*
|
|
* A slow KDF would also be actively worse here: this runs on the hot path of
|
|
* every MCP request, where the hash is the primary-key lookup used to find the
|
|
* row, so per-request cost is real latency for zero security gain.
|
|
*
|
|
* Do NOT "fix" this by changing the algorithm. The hash IS the stored
|
|
* credential, so a different function invalidates every live `gnubok_sk_` key,
|
|
* breaking existing MCP connections with no migration path.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function hashApiKey(key: string): string {
|
|
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function generateRefreshToken(): { token: string; hash: string } {
|
|
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
|
|
const token = `${REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX}${random}`
|
|
const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
|
|
return { token, hash }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function hashRefreshToken(token: string): string {
|
|
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function isRefreshToken(token: string): boolean {
|
|
return token.startsWith(REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function extractBearerToken(request: Request): string | null {
|
|
const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization')
|
|
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
|
|
return authHeader.slice(7)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate an API key and enforce rate limiting.
|
|
* Uses the DB RPC for atomic check + increment.
|
|
* Returns the user_id, company_id, api_key_id, name, and effective scopes on
|
|
* success, or an error with HTTP status.
|
|
* null scopes in DB → DEFAULT_SCOPES (read-only).
|
|
*
|
|
* api_key_id and api_key_name are returned so callers (e.g. the MCP server)
|
|
* can record actor attribution on pending_operations and audit_log.
|
|
* They may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the migration
|
|
* that adds them to the RPC return shape.
|
|
*/
|
|
/**
|
|
* Operating mode of the API key. 'live' keys see real company data; 'test' keys
|
|
* are bound to deterministic sandbox companies. Keys created before the Phase 1
|
|
* migration default to 'live' for backwards compatibility.
|
|
*/
|
|
export type ApiKeyMode = 'live' | 'test'
|
|
|
|
export async function validateApiKey(
|
|
key: string
|
|
): Promise<
|
|
| {
|
|
userId: string
|
|
companyId: string
|
|
apiKeyId?: string
|
|
apiKeyName?: string
|
|
scopes: ApiKeyScope[]
|
|
mode: ApiKeyMode
|
|
}
|
|
| { error: string; status: number }
|
|
> {
|
|
if (isRefreshToken(key)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
error: 'Refresh token cannot be used as access token; exchange it at /api/mcp-oauth/token',
|
|
status: 401,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!key.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) {
|
|
return { error: 'Invalid API key format', status: 401 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
|
|
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
|
|
|
|
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_api_key', {
|
|
p_key_hash: hash,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (error || !data || data.length === 0) {
|
|
return { error: 'Invalid API key', status: 401 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const row = data[0]
|
|
|
|
if (row.rate_limited) {
|
|
return { error: 'Rate limit exceeded', status: 429 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
userId: row.user_id,
|
|
companyId: row.company_id,
|
|
apiKeyId: row.api_key_id,
|
|
apiKeyName: row.api_key_name,
|
|
scopes: validateScopes(row.scopes) ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES,
|
|
// `mode` may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the Phase 1
|
|
// migration that adds it to the RPC return. Default to 'live' so existing
|
|
// keys behave unchanged.
|
|
mode: (row.mode === 'test' ? 'test' : 'live') as ApiKeyMode,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Check if a given scope is allowed by the key's scopes.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function hasScope(keyScopes: ApiKeyScope[], required: ApiKeyScope): boolean {
|
|
return keyScopes.includes(required)
|
|
}
|