Files
accounted/lib/core/documents/storage-proxy.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00

239 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Same-origin proxy for Supabase Storage signed URLs.
*
* Agent sandboxes (Claude Desktop's code execution, some MCP clients) only
* allow network egress to the host the MCP server lives on. Our signed
* Storage URLs point at <project>.supabase.co, so a model-free upload or a
* document download from such a sandbox was refused before it left the box
* (user report 2026-08-21). These helpers rewrite a signed URL onto this
* app's own origin (`/api/storage/...`) and resolve it back to the upstream
* Storage URL inside the proxy route.
*
* The signed token travels unchanged and is the only credential on both
* sides: the proxy grants nothing the public Storage host did not already
* grant, and it refuses every path that is not a signed object path on the
* documents bucket. Without NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL (a self-host that never set
* it) the rewrite is a no-op rather than a broken localhost link.
*/
export const STORAGE_PROXY_ROUTE = '/api/storage'
/**
* Content types a browser renders natively without a script context: PDF
* and the raster image formats the document archive accepts. These are the
* only types either document-serving route (the inline preview proxy and the
* signed-URL proxy below) hands to the browser as-is. Everything else that
* can reach the archive (text/html mail bodies, application/xhtml+xml
* iXBRL, Peppol application/xml and text/xml, image/svg+xml, application/json,
* unknown or legacy types) is active content when it lands on our origin:
* an uploader-controlled <script> inside it would run with the app origin's
* authority (stored XSS). Those types are served under OPAQUE_DOCUMENT_CSP.
*/
export const INLINE_SAFE_MIME_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'application/pdf',
'image/jpeg',
'image/png',
'image/webp',
'image/gif',
'image/heic',
'image/heif',
])
/**
* Policy for every served document that is not natively inline-safe.
* `sandbox` (no tokens) makes the rendered document opaque-origin and
* script-free wherever it is opened, iframe or direct tab. The source
* directives block outbound requests on top of that: sandbox alone still
* loads remote images, so a tracking pixel in a mail body would notify the
* sender when the preview is opened. Inline styles and embedded data:/blob:
* images keep working, so HTML mail previews and XML views still render.
*/
export const OPAQUE_DOCUMENT_CSP =
"sandbox; default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data: blob:"
/**
* Canonical (lower-case, parameter-free) form of `mimeType` when it is one
* of INLINE_SAFE_MIME_TYPES, else null. Legacy rows hold client-declared
* strings, so parameters and case are tolerated on the way in but never
* echoed back out.
*/
export function inlineSafeMimeType(mimeType: string | null | undefined): string | null {
if (!mimeType) return null
const essence = mimeType.split(';')[0]?.trim().toLowerCase() ?? ''
return INLINE_SAFE_MIME_TYPES.has(essence) ? essence : null
}
/**
* The documents-bucket object key behind a proxied download path
* (`sign/documents/<key>`, still percent-encoded), decoded so it can be
* matched against `document_attachments.storage_path`. Null for upload paths
* and anything else.
*/
export function documentKeyFromProxyPath(objectPath: string): string | null {
const prefix = 'sign/documents/'
if (!objectPath.startsWith(prefix)) return null
try {
return decodeURIComponent(objectPath.slice(prefix.length))
} catch {
return null
}
}
/** Upstream prefix under the Storage API that every signed object URL shares. */
const UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX = '/storage/v1/object/'
/**
* Only token-authenticated object paths on the documents bucket: signed
* downloads (`sign/documents/...`) and signed uploads
* (`upload/sign/documents/...`). Anything else (public objects, bucket
* admin, other buckets) is not this proxy's business.
*/
const ALLOWED_OBJECT_PATH_RE = /^(sign|upload\/sign)\/documents\/[^/]+/
export type StorageProxyResolution =
| { ok: true; url: string }
| { ok: false; reason: 'unsupported_path' | 'missing_token' | 'storage_unconfigured' }
/**
* True when every segment of the (still percent-encoded) object path is a
* plain name: no empty segment, no `.`/`..` in raw or percent-encoded form
* (`%2e%2e`, `.%2e`, `%2e.`: the WHATWG URL parser normalises those away,
* which would let `sign/documents/%2e%2e/other/x` leave the documents
* bucket), no backslash (a path separator for https URLs), no malformed
* escapes.
*/
function hasOnlyPlainSegments(objectPath: string): boolean {
for (const segment of objectPath.split('/')) {
if (segment === '') return false
let decoded: string
try {
decoded = decodeURIComponent(segment)
} catch {
return false
}
if (decoded === '.' || decoded === '..') return false
if (decoded.includes('\\') || decoded.includes('/')) return false
}
return true
}
function trimTrailingSlash(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/\/+$/, '')
}
function upstreamStorageOrigin(): string | null {
const raw = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL?.trim()
if (!raw) return null
try {
return new URL(raw).origin
} catch {
return null
}
}
/**
* Rewrite a Supabase signed Storage URL onto this app's origin. Returns the
* input unchanged when it is not a signed documents-bucket URL on our Storage
* host, or when the app has no public URL configured.
*/
export function toSameOriginStorageUrl(
signedUrl: string,
appBaseUrl: string | undefined = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL,
): string {
const base = appBaseUrl?.trim()
const upstream = upstreamStorageOrigin()
if (!base || !upstream) return signedUrl
let url: URL
try {
url = new URL(signedUrl)
} catch {
return signedUrl
}
if (url.origin !== upstream) return signedUrl
if (!url.pathname.startsWith(UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX)) return signedUrl
// Keep the pathname exactly as Storage encoded it: object keys may hold
// spaces and non-ASCII, and the token was signed over the real key.
const objectPath = url.pathname.slice(UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX.length)
if (!ALLOWED_OBJECT_PATH_RE.test(objectPath)) return signedUrl
if (!url.searchParams.has('token')) return signedUrl
return `${trimTrailingSlash(base)}${STORAGE_PROXY_ROUTE}/${objectPath}${url.search}`
}
/**
* Resolve the proxied path (everything after `/api/storage/`, still
* percent-encoded as received) plus its query back to the upstream Storage
* URL. Fails closed on anything outside the signed documents-bucket paths.
*/
export function resolveUpstreamStorageUrl(
objectPath: string,
search: URLSearchParams,
): StorageProxyResolution {
const upstream = upstreamStorageOrigin()
if (!upstream) return { ok: false, reason: 'storage_unconfigured' }
if (!ALLOWED_OBJECT_PATH_RE.test(objectPath) || !hasOnlyPlainSegments(objectPath)) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'unsupported_path' }
}
if (!search.get('token')) return { ok: false, reason: 'missing_token' }
const query = search.toString()
const url = `${upstream}${UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX}${objectPath}${query ? `?${query}` : ''}`
// Belt and braces: whatever fetch() will actually request, after URL
// normalisation, must still sit inside the allowlist.
let normalisedPath: string
try {
normalisedPath = new URL(url).pathname
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: 'unsupported_path' }
}
if (
!normalisedPath.startsWith(UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX) ||
!ALLOWED_OBJECT_PATH_RE.test(normalisedPath.slice(UPSTREAM_OBJECT_PREFIX.length))
) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'unsupported_path' }
}
return { ok: true, url }
}
/**
* Read a request body into memory, aborting as soon as it exceeds `maxBytes`
* instead of buffering an unbounded payload first and measuring afterwards
* (the proxy is unauthenticated until Storage checks the token, so a
* self-host without a platform body limit must not be forced to hold an
* arbitrary upload in RAM). Returns null when the cap is exceeded.
*/
export async function readBodyWithCap(
body: ReadableStream<Uint8Array> | null,
maxBytes: number,
): Promise<ArrayBuffer | null> {
if (!body) return new ArrayBuffer(0)
const reader = body.getReader()
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = []
let total = 0
try {
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read()
if (done) break
if (!value) continue
total += value.byteLength
if (total > maxBytes) {
await reader.cancel()
return null
}
chunks.push(value)
}
} finally {
reader.releaseLock()
}
const out = new Uint8Array(total)
let offset = 0
for (const chunk of chunks) {
out.set(chunk, offset)
offset += chunk.byteLength
}
return out.buffer
}