aabddb592f
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
163 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
163 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import type Stripe from 'stripe'
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import {
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statusGrantsAccess,
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subscriptionToState,
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applySubscriptionState,
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} from '../subscription-sync'
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afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllEnvs())
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// Recording mock: captures the from()/upsert()/delete()/eq() operations so we
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// can assert what applySubscriptionState wrote, without a real DB.
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interface RecordedOp {
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table: string
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op: 'upsert' | 'delete' | 'update' | null
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payload: unknown
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conflict: string | undefined
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filters: Array<[string, unknown]>
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}
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function recordingSupabase() {
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const calls: RecordedOp[] = []
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const supabase = {
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from(table: string) {
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const ctx: RecordedOp = { table, op: null, payload: null, conflict: undefined, filters: [] }
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const chain = {
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upsert(payload: unknown, opts?: { onConflict?: string }) {
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ctx.op = 'upsert'
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ctx.payload = payload
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ctx.conflict = opts?.onConflict
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calls.push(ctx)
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return chain
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},
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delete() {
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ctx.op = 'delete'
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calls.push(ctx)
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return chain
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},
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update(payload: unknown) {
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ctx.op = 'update'
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ctx.payload = payload
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calls.push(ctx)
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return chain
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},
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eq(col: string, val: unknown) {
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ctx.filters.push([col, val])
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return chain
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},
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neq(col: string, val: unknown) {
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ctx.filters.push([`neq:${col}`, val])
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return chain
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},
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or(filter: string) {
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ctx.filters.push(['or', filter])
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return chain
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},
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then(resolve: (v: { data: null; error: null }) => void) {
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resolve({ data: null, error: null })
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},
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}
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return chain
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},
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}
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return { supabase: supabase as unknown as SupabaseClient, calls }
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}
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function fakeSub(over: Partial<{ status: string; priceId: string; interval: string; periodEnd: number; customer: string }> = {}): Stripe.Subscription {
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return {
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id: 'sub_123',
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customer: over.customer ?? 'cus_123',
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status: over.status ?? 'active',
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metadata: {},
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items: {
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data: [
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{
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price: { id: over.priceId ?? 'price_x', recurring: { interval: over.interval ?? 'month' } },
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current_period_end: over.periodEnd ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 30 * 86400,
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},
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],
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},
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} as unknown as Stripe.Subscription
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}
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describe('statusGrantsAccess', () => {
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it('grants for active/trialing/past_due, denies otherwise', () => {
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expect(statusGrantsAccess('active')).toBe(true)
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expect(statusGrantsAccess('trialing')).toBe(true)
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expect(statusGrantsAccess('past_due')).toBe(true)
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expect(statusGrantsAccess('canceled')).toBe(false)
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expect(statusGrantsAccess('unpaid')).toBe(false)
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expect(statusGrantsAccess(null)).toBe(false)
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})
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})
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describe('subscriptionToState', () => {
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it('maps status, customer, id, and period end', () => {
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const end = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 1000
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const state = subscriptionToState(fakeSub({ status: 'active', periodEnd: end }), 'co_1')
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expect(state.companyId).toBe('co_1')
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expect(state.stripeCustomerId).toBe('cus_123')
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expect(state.stripeSubscriptionId).toBe('sub_123')
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expect(state.status).toBe('active')
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expect(state.currentPeriodEnd).toBe(new Date(end * 1000).toISOString())
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})
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it('derives plan from the env price id, falling back to interval', () => {
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vi.stubEnv('STRIPE_PRICE_YEARLY', 'price_year')
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vi.stubEnv('STRIPE_PRICE_MONTHLY', 'price_month')
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expect(subscriptionToState(fakeSub({ priceId: 'price_year' }), 'co').plan).toBe('yearly')
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expect(subscriptionToState(fakeSub({ priceId: 'price_month' }), 'co').plan).toBe('monthly')
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// unknown price id -> interval fallback
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expect(subscriptionToState(fakeSub({ priceId: 'price_other', interval: 'year' }), 'co').plan).toBe('yearly')
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})
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})
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describe('applySubscriptionState', () => {
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it('grants the PAID keys when the subscription is active', async () => {
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const { supabase, calls } = recordingSupabase()
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await applySubscriptionState(supabase, {
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companyId: 'co_1',
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stripeCustomerId: 'cus_1',
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stripeSubscriptionId: 'sub_1',
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status: 'active',
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plan: 'yearly',
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currentPeriodEnd: new Date().toISOString(),
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})
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const subUpsert = calls.find((c) => c.table === 'company_subscriptions')
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expect(subUpsert?.op).toBe('upsert')
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const grantUpsert = calls.find((c) => c.table === 'capability_grants')
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expect(grantUpsert?.op).toBe('upsert')
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const rows = grantUpsert?.payload as Array<{ capability_key: string; source: string }>
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.capability_key).sort()).toEqual(['ai', 'bank_sync', 'email_send', 'multi_user', 'shopify_sync', 'skatteverket', 'stripe_payments', 'woocommerce_sync'])
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expect(rows.every((r) => r.source === 'stripe')).toBe(true)
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})
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it('removes the stripe grants when canceled but EXPIRES multi_user (grace anchor)', async () => {
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const { supabase, calls } = recordingSupabase()
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await applySubscriptionState(supabase, {
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companyId: 'co_1',
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stripeCustomerId: 'cus_1',
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stripeSubscriptionId: 'sub_1',
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status: 'canceled',
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plan: null,
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currentPeriodEnd: null,
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})
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const grantOps = calls.filter((c) => c.table === 'capability_grants')
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// Freeze-and-retain deletes every external-service grant, except
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// multi_user, whose 20-day grace window hangs on an EXPIRED row: a
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// deleted row would freeze the churned payer's staff instantly.
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const deleteOp = grantOps.find((c) => c.op === 'delete')
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expect(deleteOp?.filters).toContainEqual(['company_id', 'co_1'])
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expect(deleteOp?.filters).toContainEqual(['source', 'stripe'])
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expect(deleteOp?.filters).toContainEqual(['neq:capability_key', 'multi_user'])
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const updateOp = grantOps.find((c) => c.op === 'update')
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expect(updateOp?.filters).toContainEqual(['capability_key', 'multi_user'])
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const payload = updateOp?.payload as { expires_at: string }
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expect(new Date(payload.expires_at).getTime()).toBeLessThanOrEqual(Date.now())
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// Only a still-active row is expired: a re-delivered cancel event must
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// not slide the grace anchor forward (the .or filter scopes the update).
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expect(updateOp?.filters.some(([col]) => col === 'or')).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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