Files
accounted/lib/supabase/__tests__/middleware.test.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00

1302 lines
49 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
/**
* Middleware redirect-destination tests.
*
* Focus: every auth bounce must (a) remember where the user was heading,
* (b) reject an off-origin destination, and (c) not leak the original query
* string onto the auth page. MFA enforcement decides on server-authenticated
* data only (the getUser() factor list and the signature-verified `aal`
* claim), never on the editable cookie session.
*/
const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
user: null as null | {
id: string
email?: string
app_metadata?: Record<string, unknown>
// What GoTrue returns on /user: the server-side factor list.
factors?: Array<{ id: string; status: string; factor_type: string }>
},
sessionId: 'session-1' as string | null,
authError: null as unknown,
// `aal` claim of the (mock) signature-verified access token, i.e. what
// getClaims() reports. null = the token carries no aal claim.
jwtAal: null as string | null,
// Make getClaims() fail: an error result or a throw.
claimsFailure: null as null | 'error' | 'throw',
// The cookie-derived assurance lookup and the listFactors round trip. The
// proxy must call NEITHER any more: the first computes nextLevel from the
// editable cookie session, the second is a getUser() the proxy has already
// paid for. Spies so tests can prove it. getAal answers the way a cookie
// with `user.factors` stripped would: "nothing to step up to".
getAal: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal1' },
error: null,
})),
listFactors: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: { totp: [] }, error: null })),
company: {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null as unknown,
} as {
data: Array<{
company_id: string | null
locale: string | null
used_fallback: boolean
}>
error: unknown
},
// Rows the team_members query resolves to (the byrå exception in the
// no-company branch and the home-domain guard both await eq-terminated
// chains, so the from() mock makes exactly that table thenable).
byraMemberships: [] as Array<{
role?: string
teams: { kind: string; brands?: { domain: string } | Array<{ domain: string }> | null }
}>,
// Rows any awaited company_members filter chain resolves to: the Rule 2
// home-domain client lookup AND the Rule 1 canonical personal-company
// exemption both land here (each scenario exercises only one of them).
clientMemberships: [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>,
clientMembershipsError: null as unknown,
// What the mocked resolveBrandByHost returns for the request host.
hostBrand: null as null | { teamId: string; id?: string },
// What the mocked isEmailOnBrandAllowlist returns (Rule 2 exemption).
allowlisted: false,
signOut: vi.fn(async () => ({ error: null })),
// Cookies auth-js writes through the `cookies.setAll` callback while
// getUser() runs: the ROTATED tokens after a successful refresh, and the
// maxAge-0 deletions when it removes a dead session. The middleware has to
// carry these onto whatever response it returns.
cookieWrites: [] as Array<{
name: string
value: string
options?: Record<string, unknown>
}>,
// Row returned for user_preferences reads (the auto_logout mint lookup).
userPreferences: null as null | { auto_logout: boolean },
userPreferencesError: null as unknown,
}))
vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
createServerClient: vi.fn((
_url: string,
_key: string,
options: {
cookies: {
setAll: (
cookies: Array<{
name: string
value: string
options?: Record<string, unknown>
}>,
) => void
}
},
) => ({
auth: {
getUser: vi.fn(async () => {
if (state.cookieWrites.length > 0) options.cookies.setAll(state.cookieWrites)
return {
data: { user: state.user },
error: state.authError,
}
}),
getClaims: vi.fn(async () => {
if (state.claimsFailure === 'throw') throw new Error('jwks fetch failed')
if (state.claimsFailure === 'error') {
return {
data: null,
error: { name: 'AuthInvalidJwtError', message: 'Invalid JWT signature' },
}
}
return {
data: {
claims: {
...(state.sessionId ? { session_id: state.sessionId } : {}),
...(state.jwtAal ? { aal: state.jwtAal } : {}),
// Satisfy the iss/aud pinning the MFA gates apply (lib/auth/claims.ts).
iss: `${(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL ?? '').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/auth/v1`,
aud: 'authenticated',
sub: state.user?.id,
},
},
error: null,
}
}),
signOut: state.signOut,
mfa: {
getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: () => state.getAal(),
listFactors: () => state.listFactors(),
},
},
rpc: vi.fn(async () => state.company),
from: vi.fn((table: string) => {
const chain: Record<string, unknown> = {}
const self = new Proxy(chain, {
get: (_t, prop) => {
if (prop === 'then') {
// The byrå-membership lookup and the home-domain client lookup
// await their filter chains directly (no .maybeSingle terminal),
// so those tables must be thenable.
if (table === 'team_members') {
return (resolve: (v: unknown) => void) =>
resolve({ data: state.byraMemberships, error: null })
}
if (table === 'company_members') {
return (resolve: (v: unknown) => void) =>
resolve({
data: state.clientMembershipsError ? null : state.clientMemberships,
error: state.clientMembershipsError,
})
}
return undefined
}
if (prop === 'maybeSingle' || prop === 'single') {
return async () => ({
data:
table === 'user_preferences' && !state.userPreferencesError
? state.userPreferences
: null,
error:
table === 'user_preferences' ? state.userPreferencesError : null,
})
}
return () => self
},
})
return self
}),
})),
}))
const logState = vi.hoisted(() => ({ info: vi.fn() }))
vi.mock('@/lib/logger', () => {
const logger = {
info: (...args: unknown[]) => logState.info(...args),
warn: vi.fn(),
error: vi.fn(),
debug: vi.fn(),
child: () => logger,
}
return { createLogger: () => logger }
})
vi.mock('@/lib/branding/resolve', async (importOriginal) => ({
...(await importOriginal<typeof import('@/lib/branding/resolve')>()),
resolveBrandByHost: vi.fn(async () =>
state.hostBrand
? { id: state.hostBrand.id ?? 'brand-host', teamId: state.hostBrand.teamId }
: null,
),
}))
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate', async (importOriginal) => ({
...(await importOriginal<typeof import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')>()),
isEmailOnBrandAllowlist: vi.fn(async () => state.allowlisted),
}))
import { updateSession } from '../middleware'
import {
createSessionTimeoutState,
signSessionTimeoutState,
verifySessionTimeoutState,
} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout'
import { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE } from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout-shared'
const ORIGIN = 'http://localhost:3000'
const SIGNED_IN = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: {} }
const VERIFIED_TOTP = { id: 'f1', status: 'verified', factor_type: 'totp' }
/** A user whose server-side record carries a verified TOTP factor. */
const MFA_USER = { ...SIGNED_IN, factors: [VERIFIED_TOTP] }
function locationOf(response: Response) {
return response.headers.get('location')
}
function run(path: string, init?: RequestInit) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${ORIGIN}${path}`, init))
}
function runAt(origin: string, path: string, headers?: Record<string, string>) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${origin}${path}`, { headers }))
}
describe('updateSession redirect destinations', () => {
const envBackup = {
require: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA,
selfHosted: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED,
signingSecret: process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET,
idleTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
absoluteTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
warning: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
logState.info.mockClear()
state.listFactors.mockClear()
state.getAal.mockClear()
state.user = null
state.sessionId = 'session-1'
state.authError = null
state.cookieWrites = []
state.jwtAal = null
state.claimsFailure = null
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null,
}
state.byraMemberships = []
state.clientMemberships = []
state.clientMembershipsError = null
state.hostBrand = null
state.allowlisted = false
state.userPreferences = null
state.userPreferencesError = null
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = 'middleware-test-secret'
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
})
afterEach(() => {
if (envBackup.require === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = envBackup.require
if (envBackup.selfHosted === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = envBackup.selfHosted
if (envBackup.signingSecret === undefined) delete process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET
else process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = envBackup.signingSecret
if (envBackup.idleTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.idleTimeout
if (envBackup.absoluteTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.absoluteTimeout
if (envBackup.warning === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = envBackup.warning
})
describe('session timeout enforcement', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = '30000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = '60000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = '10000'
})
async function signedCookie(args?: {
startedAt?: number
lastActivityAt?: number
method?: 'password' | 'bankid'
userId?: string
sessionId?: string | null
autoLogout?: boolean
legacy?: boolean
}) {
const stateValue = {
...createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: args?.userId ?? 'user-1',
sessionId: args?.sessionId === undefined ? 'session-1' : args.sessionId,
method: args?.method ?? 'password',
// Default the opt-in to true: these tests exercise enforcement.
autoLogout: args?.autoLogout ?? true,
now: args?.startedAt ?? Date.now(),
}),
...(args?.lastActivityAt === undefined
? {}
: { lastActivityAt: args.lastActivityAt }),
}
if (args?.legacy) {
// Pre-toggle cookies carry no auto_logout snapshot.
delete (stateValue as { autoLogout?: boolean }).autoLogout
}
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(stateValue)
if (!signed) throw new Error('test signing secret missing')
return signed
}
it('initializes a signed, session-bound cookie for an existing session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: 'gnubok-auth-method=bankid' },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
expect(encoded).toBeTruthy()
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'bankid',
})
expect(response.cookies.get('gnubok-auth-method')?.value).toBe('')
})
it('rejects a tampered cookie and revokes only the current session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=tampered.value` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('absolute')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('redirects an idle session with its original method and deep link', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 40_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
method: 'bankid',
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('idle')
expect(url.searchParams.get('method')).toBe('bankid')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
})
it('gives absolute expiry precedence and returns structured API errors', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 60_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
})
const response = await run('/api/invoices', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(401)
expect(response.headers.get('x-session-timeout-reason')).toBe('absolute')
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
error: { code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED', reason: 'absolute' },
})
})
it('does not let a forged Authorization header bypass normal APIs', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({ lastActivityAt: now - 30_000, startedAt: now - 40_000 })
const headers = {
authorization: 'Bearer forged',
cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}`,
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(401)
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
})
it('mints the cookie with the auto_logout opt-out default for new sessions', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: false,
})
})
it('snapshots an opted-in preference at mint time', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('persists no snapshot when the preference read fails', async () => {
state.userPreferencesError = { message: 'connection reset' }
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
// Unknown preference: nothing minted, nobody logged out; the next
// request retries the read.
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)).toBeUndefined()
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
})
it('never logs out a session that has not opted in', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
// Far past both limits: without the opt-in the session must survive.
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 600_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 600_000,
autoLogout: false,
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('upgrades a pre-toggle cookie in place instead of treating it as forged', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const startedAt = Date.now() - 5_000
const encoded = await signedCookie({ startedAt, legacy: true })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
const upgraded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
// Timers survive the upgrade: only the opt-in snapshot is added.
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(upgraded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
startedAt,
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('starts a new timeout window when the Supabase session changes', async () => {
const encoded = await signedCookie({ sessionId: 'old-session' })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const renewed = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(renewed)).resolves.toMatchObject({
sessionId: 'session-1',
})
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── Public agent-discovery + docs surfaces ────────────────────────────
describe('anonymous access to agent-discovery and docs surfaces', () => {
it.each(['/llms.txt', '/llms-full.txt', '/docs/api', '/docs/api.md', '/docs/api/reference.md', '/docs/api/cookbook/quickstart.md'])(
'serves %s without a login bounce',
async (path) => {
const response = await run(path)
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
},
)
it('does not treat a /docs prefix on another route as public', async () => {
// /docsy-dashboard must still bounce: only /docs and /docs/* are public.
const response = await run('/docsy-dashboard')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/login')
})
it('serves docs to a signed-in user without redirecting away', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const response = await run('/docs/api')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
})
})
// ── Site 1: protected-route bounce ────────────────────────────────────
describe('protected route bounce to /login', () => {
it('preserves the deep link the anonymous user was heading for', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/tax')
})
it('does not leak the original query string onto /login', async () => {
// The Stripe Checkout return: /settings/billing?success=1. Overwriting
// only the pathname used to carry ?success=1 onto /login.
const response = await run('/settings/billing?success=1')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('success')).toBeNull()
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['next'])
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/billing?success=1')
})
it('keeps ?org_number= on a logged-out /onboarding link', async () => {
const response = await run('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
})
it('sends no destination parameter when the target is the dashboard root', async () => {
const response = await run('/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/login`)
})
it('carries the cookies that clear a dead session', async () => {
// auth-js removes the session inside getUser() and queues the deletion
// on the response. Dropping it on the bounce made the browser replay
// the dead refresh token on /login, spending a second GoTrue 400 per
// expiry (paired 400s ~100 ms apart in production).
state.authError = { name: 'AuthApiError', code: 'refresh_token_not_found' }
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: '', options: { path: '/', maxAge: 0 } },
]
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: {
cookie: `sb-test-auth-token=dead; ${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=stale`,
},
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/login')
const cleared = response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')
expect(cleared?.value).toBe('')
expect(cleared?.maxAge).toBe(0)
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('drops a request path that normalises to a protocol-relative URL', async () => {
// /..//evil.com normalises to the pathname //evil.com. Reflecting that
// back as ?next= would hand the login page an off-origin destination.
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBeNull()
})
})
// ── Site 4: authenticated user on an auth page ────────────────────────
describe('authenticated user landing on /login or /register', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('honours ?next= instead of discarding the query string', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('honours ?next= on /register too', async () => {
const response = await run('/register?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('falls back to the dashboard when there is no destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an absolute URL as the destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.com%2Fx')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects a protocol-relative destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2F%2Fevil.com')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an encoded traversal that normalises off-origin', async () => {
// /..//evil.com and /%2e%2e//evil.com both normalise to //evil.com.
for (const hostile of ['%2F..%2F%2Fevil.com', '%2F%252e%252e%2F%2Fevil.com']) {
const response = await run(`/login?next=${hostile}`)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
}
})
it('still bounces /auth and /sandbox to the dashboard, query and all', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/sandbox?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
// Email-change confirmation links are usually clicked while still logged
// in (the change starts in settings), and the completing verify mints a
// session before the status page renders. Bouncing either request off the
// /auth prefix silently swallowed the confirmation.
it('lets an authenticated email-change confirmation reach the callback', async () => {
const response = await run('/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=email_change')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
})
it('lets an authenticated user see the email-change status page', async () => {
const response = await run('/auth/email-change?status=done')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
})
it('still bounces other authenticated token types off the callback', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=signup'))).toBe(
`${ORIGIN}/`,
)
})
})
// ── Sites 2 and 3: MFA step-up and forced enrollment ──────────────────
describe('MFA step-up bounce to /mfa/verify', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
// Verified factor on the server-side user, single-factor token.
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['returnTo'])
})
it('still fires the step-up when the request carries its own returnTo', async () => {
// A crafted ?returnTo= must never be mistaken for a completed step-up.
const response = await run('/settings/tax?returnTo=%2Fanywhere')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('does not reflect a request path that normalises off-origin', async () => {
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBeNull()
})
it('carries the rotated auth cookie instead of re-minting it next request', async () => {
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: 'rotated', options: { path: '/' } },
]
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')?.value).toBe('rotated')
})
it('decides on the server-side factor list, never on the cookie session', async () => {
// The attack: the sb-*-auth-token cookie is unsigned JSON, so the
// password holder strips `user.factors` and the local assurance lookup
// reports nextLevel aal1 ("nothing to step up to"). state.getAal is
// that view; the proxy must not even ask for it.
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it.each(['error', 'throw'] as const)(
'fails closed when getClaims reports %s',
async (failure) => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.claimsFailure = failure
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
},
)
it('fails closed when the verified claims carry no aal', async () => {
state.jwtAal = null
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
})
describe('forced enrollment bounce to /mfa/enroll', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
// No factor on the server-side user, single-factor token.
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/invoices/new')
})
it('steps up instead of enrolling when the server-side user already has a verified factor', async () => {
// Previously this scenario (cookie says no factor, server says one
// exists, token at aal1) rendered the page at AAL1: the verify bounce
// trusted the cookie and the enrolment check then found the factor.
state.user = MFA_USER
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('skips enrollment for a user with no company, as before', async () => {
state.company = { data: [{ company_id: null, locale: null, used_fallback: false }], error: null }
const response = await run('/select-company')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('reads the factor list off the getUser() round trip, not a second auth call', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('lets an aal2 token through even when the server-side user has no factor left', async () => {
// A user who unenrols their last factor mid-session keeps aal2 until
// the next token refresh; the enrolment bounce lands on the refresh,
// not on the next click (unchanged deferral, PR #1922).
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('does not spend an MFA lookup on RSC and prefetch requests at aal2 either', async () => {
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── API branch: the MFA gate for cookie sessions ──────────────────────
describe('API MFA gate for cookie sessions', () => {
const FORBIDDEN = { error: 'MFA-verifiering krävs.' }
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('returns 403 for an AAL1 session whose server-side user has a verified factor', async () => {
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual(FORBIDDEN)
})
it('never consults the cookie-derived assurance level or a second factor lookup', async () => {
// state.getAal reports nextLevel aal1: the answer a cookie with
// `user.factors` stripped produces. It must not be asked at all.
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('lets an AAL2 session through', async () => {
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it.each(['error', 'throw'] as const)(
'fails closed when getClaims reports %s',
async (failure) => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.claimsFailure = failure
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
},
)
it('fails closed when the verified claims carry no aal', async () => {
state.jwtAal = null
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
})
it("passes a user with nothing to step up to (enrolment stays the page gate's job)", async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
state.user = {
...SIGNED_IN,
factors: [{ id: 'f2', status: 'unverified', factor_type: 'totp' }],
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('keeps the AAL1 escape hatches and the OAuth endpoints open', async () => {
for (const path of ['/api/account/delete', '/api/company/current', '/api/mcp-oauth/token']) {
expect((await run(path)).status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('skips Bearer-auth surfaces by path, and only with the header present', async () => {
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer key' }
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
expect((await run('/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
// A cookie session on a v1 path without the header is still a cookie session.
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices')).status).toBe(403)
// A forged header on a cookie-authenticated route never disables the gate.
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(403)
})
it('does not gate BankID-linked users, nor anyone when MFA is off', async () => {
state.user = { ...MFA_USER, app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
state.user = MFA_USER
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
})
it('carries the rotated auth cookie on the 403', async () => {
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: 'rotated', options: { path: '/' } },
]
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')?.value).toBe('rotated')
})
})
// ── No-company branch: the byrå cockpit exception ─────────────────────
describe('byrå team members with zero companies', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
// No resolvable company at all (fresh byrå, no client memberships).
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: null, locale: 'sv', used_fallback: true }],
error: null,
}
})
it('steers a byrå owner from the dashboard root to the empty cockpit, not onboarding', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'owner', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/byra')
})
it('lets a byrå admin through to cockpit routes', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'admin', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
for (const path of ['/byra', '/clients', '/companies/new-client', '/settings/brand']) {
const response = await run(path)
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('steers a plain byrå member to the cockpit too (any role counts)', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'member', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/byra')
})
it('keeps the onboarding redirect for non-byrå users', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = []
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/onboarding')
})
})
// ── Home-domain affinity (WL): the domain corrects itself ─────────────
describe('home-domain affinity', () => {
const ARBORE = 'https://arbore.accounted.se'
const ACOUNT = 'https://acount.accounted.se'
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('redirects a byrå member on a foreign byrå domain to their own domain', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('redirects a byrå member on the platform domain to their byrå domain', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/`)
})
it('preserves path and query across the affinity redirect', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/invoices/abc?tab=payments')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/invoices/abc?tab=payments`)
})
it('lets a byrå member through on their own domain and caches the verdict', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/byra')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
)
})
it('keeps a byrå member with a brandless personal company on the canonical host', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
// A personal company with no team at all: homed on canonical.
state.clientMemberships = [{ companies: { team_id: null, teams: null } }]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~app.gnubok.se',
)
})
it('counts a company whose team has no brand as canonical-homed too', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [
{ companies: { team_id: 'team-personal', teams: { brands: null } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~app.gnubok.se',
)
})
it('still redirects a byrå member whose companies are all brand-homed', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [
{ companies: { team_id: 'team-arbore', teams: { brands: { id: 'brand-1' } } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/`)
})
it('still redirects off a FOREIGN byrå domain even with a canonical personal company', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [{ companies: { team_id: null, teams: null } }]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('stays put without caching when the canonical-company lookup fails', async () => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMembershipsError = { message: 'connection reset' }
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
// Fail open: no redirect, and no home-ok cookie so the next request
// re-runs the check instead of freezing the error verdict for the TTL.
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').not.toContain('gnubok-home-ok')
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
})
it('tolerates the array shape for the embedded brand', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: [{ domain: 'acount.accounted.se' }] } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('redirects a user with no byrå ties off a brand domain to the platform', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('keeps an allowlisted email on the brand domain before any membership exists', async () => {
// The partner owner between allowlisted signup and team provisioning:
// no team_members row, no company, only a brand_signup_allowlist entry.
const { isEmailOnBrandAllowlist } = await import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')
state.user = { ...SIGNED_IN, email: 'owner@partner.example' }
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = true
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
)
expect(isEmailOnBrandAllowlist).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'brand-arbore',
'owner@partner.example',
)
})
it('still redirects a non-allowlisted email off the brand domain', async () => {
state.user = { ...SIGNED_IN, email: 'stranger@example.com' }
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = false
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('skips the allowlist lookup for a user without an email', async () => {
const { isEmailOnBrandAllowlist } = await import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = true
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
expect(isEmailOnBrandAllowlist).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('keeps a byrå client user on the byrå domain their company lives under', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
state.clientMemberships = [{ company_id: 'company-1' }]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does nothing on the platform domain for regular users', async () => {
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does nothing on localhost and direct Vercel hosts', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
for (const origin of [ORIGIN, 'https://erp-base-abc123.vercel.app']) {
const response = await runAt(origin, '/byra')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('skips the check while this user\'s OK cookie for this host is fresh', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('ignores an OK cookie left behind by a DIFFERENT user and still bounces', async () => {
// The amnas account-switch repro (2026-08-31): the byrå owner signs in
// on the brand host (cookie set), signs out, and a second account with
// no ties to the brand signs in within the TTL window. The inherited
// host-only verdict skipped the bounce; the user-scoped value must not.
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=user-OTHER~arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('ignores a stale host-only cookie from the pre-user-scoped format', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
})
// ── MFA semantics that must not change ────────────────────────────────
describe('per-request timing header and log line', () => {
const TIMING_RE =
/^mw-auth;dur=\d+, mw-session;dur=\d+, mw-company;dur=\d+, mw-mfa;dur=\d+, mw-total;dur=\d+$/
function lastLog() {
expect(logState.info).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
const [msg, ctx] = logState.info.mock.calls[0] as [string, Record<string, unknown>]
expect(msg).toBe('proxy completed')
return ctx
}
it('page responses carry Server-Timing and log kind=page with the route', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toBeNull()
const ctx = lastLog()
expect(ctx.kind).toBe('page')
expect(ctx.route).toBe('/invoices')
expect(ctx.status).toBe(200)
expect(typeof ctx.totalMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.authMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.companyMs).toBe('number')
})
it('classifies prefetch and RSC requests from the app-router headers', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('prefetch')
logState.info.mockClear()
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('rsc')
})
it('/api responses use X-Proxy-Timing and leave Server-Timing to the route wrapper', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/api/settings')
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toBeNull()
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('api')
})
it('redirect responses also carry the header and log their status', async () => {
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(307)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(lastLog().status).toBe(307)
})
it('never logs a token-carrying path or a raw entity id', async () => {
const res = await run('/invite/9f8e7d6c5b4a3928171605f4e3d2c1b0')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invite/*')
logState.info.mockClear()
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices/6f1c2a3e-1234-4bcd-9abc-0123456789ab')
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invoices/:id')
})
})
describe('MFA-disabled and self-hosted paths are unchanged', () => {
it('does not redirect when NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA is unset', async () => {
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect on self-hosted even with MFA required', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = 'true'
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect BankID-linked users, who are already 2FA', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = { ...MFA_USER, app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
})
})