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* feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended An API key gets an optional ceiling in SEK. Above it the agent may still stage the work, it just may not finish it alone: a human approves the same verifikat in the app. Default is NULL, so every existing key keeps its behaviour and turning this on is entirely opt-in. Enforced at the two places an API key reaches the ledger, and at both the refusal happens BEFORE the point of no return: - MCP: in commitPendingOperation, before the atomic claim, so the operation stays 'pending'. Behind the claim it would be caught by the generic handler, marked terminal 'rejected', and the staged verifikat would be gone. - REST: in journal-entries.commit, before commitEntry, so the draft stays a draft and the voucher sequence never advances (BFL 5 kap. 7 §). The dry run refuses too, rather than promising a voucher number the key cannot deliver. Not enforced inside commit_journal_entry: a RAISE there is swallowed by engine.ts into a retryable 500, and it would cost a DROP+CREATE on the function that issues every voucher number. Operations whose amount is only known during dispatch (batch allocation, bulk booking, the settlement link paths) fail OPEN behind an explicit allowlist. Pricing them ahead of dispatch would be a guess, and a wrong guess silently breaks batch allocation the day someone sets a limit. The allowlist is derived from what production actually stores: create_voucher carries total_debit on 1389 of 1389 rows, categorize_transaction carries amount on 2002 of 2003, create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox carries total on 208 of 228. This is a blast-radius cap, not a security boundary. A per-entry ceiling is defeated by splitting one entry into several, and an LLM will find that, so UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED forbids splitting first: one affärshändelse is one verifikat (BFL 5 kap. 6 §). A cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that actually bounds exposure and is left to a separate change. The guard is written NULL-first everywhere. An absent, unparseable or non-positive ceiling always means unlimited, never "block everything". Agents read their own ceiling from gnubok_get_agent_briefing instead of discovering it by burning a staged verifikat on a 403. Changing a ceiling is auditable: it now renders in behandlingshistorik (BFL 5 kap. 11 §). The audit trigger already fired on the column, but the report dropped the event because the field was not in its diff map. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(skill): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new commit pitfall apiskill:check is a ratchet: the generated reference must match the endpoint registry. Never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(agents): pin the DB default itself, and declare the briefing field required Two review findings, both real: - the default test stored an explicit NULL, so it stayed green even if the column default changed to a positive ceiling: the one change that would silently start blocking every existing key. It now omits the column. - gnubok_get_agent_briefing documents unattended_commit_limit as always present and emits it unconditionally, so it belongs in the output schema's required list. Declined the NOT VALID constraint suggestion, with the reason recorded in the migration: api_keys is 388 rows / 768 kB in production. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): name the TOCTOU window in the REST ceiling check A security scan flagged that the line sum is read before commitEntry, so a concurrent write to the draft's lines can post over the ceiling. Real, and accepted: closing it means enforcing inside commit_journal_entry, where a RAISE becomes a retryable 500 and destroys the staged operation on the MCP path. Recorded in the code rather than left implicit, so nobody later mistakes this for a hard control. A per-entry ceiling is already defeated by splitting, which needs no race; the cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that bounds exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): price the settlement and batch paths that were bypassing the ceiling A security scan flagged that known money-posting operations fail open, and it was right. The first cut priced only create_voucher, categorize_transaction and create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox, on the belief that the batch and settlement paths computed their totals only inside SQL at dispatch. Production says otherwise: the staged preview already carries the amount, because it is the number a human is shown when approving the operation. Over the last 120 days each of these is present and numeric on 100% of that type's staged rows: link_transaction_journal_entry transaction_amount 1369 rows bulk_book_transactions tx_sum 273 rows link_supplier_invoice_voucher payment_amount 55 rows match_batch_allocate total_allocated 24 rows mark_invoice_paid total 3 rows So a key with a ceiling could post any amount through the four largest settlement paths. Now priced, and the ceiling applies. Only reconciliation_match stays unpriced: it carries pair_count, which is a COUNT. Pricing off that would compare pairs against kronor, which is worse than not enforcing. link_document_to_voucher and attach_document_to_transaction move no money at all; the transaction_amount they carry is context, not a posting. Genuinely unpriceable types still fail OPEN. This control can only ever narrow what a key does, and a wrong guess at an amount blocks a legitimate commit, so guessing high would leave an agent unable to work. Adds a test that walks the whole allowlist, so a typo'd field name cannot silently make a type unpriceable again: that is exactly the hole this closes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): drop the ceiling from the agent briefing, the payload budget has no room The tools/list context-budget bench sits at 65 000 tokens and main now leaves roughly 20 tokens of headroom. An always-present field on the briefing's output schema costs about 85, so this addition alone pushed the bench red. The bench's own note is explicit that the answer is to demote a tool rather than raise the ceiling, so raising it here would be the wrong trade for a nice-to-have. Nothing is lost that matters: the operation is never destroyed when it is refused, so discovering the ceiling from UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED costs one round trip and no work. That error already carries both attempted and limit, and GET /api/settings/api-keys returns the value. Re-exposing it on the briefing is worth doing once there is budget to spend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(api): spell affärshändelse correctly in the commit pitfall Fixed in the route's registerEndpoint pitfalls, which is the source; the skill reference is regenerated from it and never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
6.0 KiB
PL/PgSQL
142 lines
6.0 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- Approval-authority limit per API key: what an agent may finish WITHOUT a human.
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--
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-- This is deliberately NOT a write limit and deliberately NOT enforced inside
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-- commit_journal_entry. Over the ceiling the agent may still stage a
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-- pending_operation; it just may not commit it unattended, so a human approves
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-- it in /pending. Nothing is destroyed, no voucher number is burned, and no
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-- löpnummer gap is created (BFL 5 kap. 7 §).
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--
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-- ## Why the limit lives on api_keys and never on company_settings
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--
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-- company_settings.agent_auto_commit_max_amount existed once
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-- (20260501120000) and was dropped four days later (20260505190027). A
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-- company-scoped money threshold catches HUMANS too, which is the opposite of
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-- the intent. Keyed on the credential, the check can only ever fire for an
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-- agent: the gate reads actor.type = 'api_key' plus a non-null limit on that
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-- key, and human approvals ({type:'user'}), cron, and every cookie-session
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-- route commit with a different actor or none at all.
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--
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-- ## Why validate_and_increment_api_key returns it
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--
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-- That function is the one place the database itself verifies which credential
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-- is acting: it matches the key hash. A limit returned from there is bound to a
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-- DB-verified key rather than asserted by the caller. Passing a key id into
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-- commit_journal_entry would have been caller-asserted and unverifiable (the
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-- pending-op path runs as service_role, where the tenant guard bypasses by
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-- design), while costing a DROP+CREATE on the function that issues every
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-- voucher number. Two of that function's seven redefinitions were emergency
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-- fixes for PostgREST overload ambiguity; there is no upside left to pay that.
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--
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-- pg-test: tests/pg/api-key-unattended-commit-limit.pg.test.ts
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ALTER TABLE public.api_keys
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ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS unattended_commit_limit numeric(14, 2);
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-- The single most important line in this migration.
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--
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-- A stored 0 would block every commit for that key, and NULL-read-as-0 is the
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-- catastrophic failure mode of the whole feature. Making zero unrepresentable
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-- at the storage layer means that state cannot be reached even by a bad UI
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-- write, a bad PATCH body, or a bad backfill. Absence of a limit is expressed
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-- ONLY as NULL, never as 0.
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ALTER TABLE public.api_keys
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DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS api_keys_unattended_commit_limit_positive;
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-- Added VALIDATED, not NOT VALID: api_keys is 388 rows / 768 kB in production,
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-- so the validating scan is sub-millisecond. The NOT VALID + VALIDATE dance
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-- buys nothing at this size and can leave the constraint permanently unenforced
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-- if the second statement is ever skipped.
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ALTER TABLE public.api_keys
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ADD CONSTRAINT api_keys_unattended_commit_limit_positive
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CHECK (unattended_commit_limit IS NULL OR unattended_commit_limit > 0);
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COMMENT ON COLUMN public.api_keys.unattended_commit_limit IS
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'SEK ceiling on what this key may commit without human approval. NULL = no limit, and NULL is the only representation of "no limit": zero is forbidden by CHECK because a stored 0 would block every commit. Over the ceiling the agent still stages the operation for a human to approve.';
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-- Surface the limit on the one call that already verifies the credential.
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--
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-- The body below is copied VERBATIM from 20260621130000_api_keys_rotation_grace.sql
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-- (the latest definition, which added previous_key_hash rotation grace) with
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-- exactly two changes: unattended_commit_limit joins the RETURNS TABLE, and it
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-- is selected into a variable and returned in all three RETURN QUERY branches.
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-- Copying an older body would silently revert key rotation and lock out every
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-- rotating integration.
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DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS public.validate_and_increment_api_key(text);
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CREATE FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_api_key(p_key_hash text)
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RETURNS TABLE(
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user_id uuid,
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company_id uuid,
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api_key_id uuid,
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api_key_name text,
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rate_limited boolean,
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scopes text[],
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mode text,
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unattended_commit_limit numeric
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)
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LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_id uuid;
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v_user_id uuid;
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v_company_id uuid;
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v_api_key_name text;
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v_rate_limit_rpm integer;
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v_request_count integer;
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v_window_start timestamptz;
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v_scopes text[];
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v_mode text;
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v_unattended_commit_limit numeric;
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BEGIN
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-- Match the live key_hash, OR a previous (just-rotated) key_hash that is still
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-- inside its grace window. Both gated by revoked_at IS NULL.
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SELECT ak.id, ak.user_id, ak.company_id, ak.name,
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ak.rate_limit_rpm, ak.request_count, ak.rate_limit_window_start, ak.scopes, ak.mode,
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ak.unattended_commit_limit
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INTO v_id, v_user_id, v_company_id, v_api_key_name,
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v_rate_limit_rpm, v_request_count, v_window_start, v_scopes, v_mode,
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v_unattended_commit_limit
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FROM public.api_keys ak
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WHERE ak.revoked_at IS NULL
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AND (
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ak.key_hash = p_key_hash
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OR (
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ak.previous_key_hash = p_key_hash
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AND ak.previous_key_expires_at IS NOT NULL
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AND ak.previous_key_expires_at > now()
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)
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)
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FOR UPDATE;
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IF v_id IS NULL THEN
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RETURN; -- no live match (incl. expired grace) → caller returns 401, as before
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END IF;
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-- Reset the rate-limit window if it is unset or older than one minute.
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IF v_window_start IS NULL OR v_window_start < now() - interval '1 minute' THEN
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UPDATE public.api_keys
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SET request_count = 1,
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rate_limit_window_start = now(),
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last_used_at = now()
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WHERE id = v_id;
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_user_id, v_company_id, v_id, v_api_key_name, false, v_scopes, v_mode,
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v_unattended_commit_limit;
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RETURN;
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END IF;
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IF v_request_count >= v_rate_limit_rpm THEN
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_user_id, v_company_id, v_id, v_api_key_name, true, v_scopes, v_mode,
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v_unattended_commit_limit;
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RETURN;
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END IF;
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UPDATE public.api_keys
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SET request_count = request_count + 1,
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last_used_at = now()
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WHERE id = v_id;
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_user_id, v_company_id, v_id, v_api_key_name, false, v_scopes, v_mode,
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v_unattended_commit_limit;
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END;
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$$;
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NOTIFY pgrst, 'reload schema';
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