Files
accounted/supabase/migrations/20260831200000_connector_proxy_ledger.sql
T
36123cef23 feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget (#1751)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment

GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB
session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in
cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque
segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the
connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real
prior RPC source (20260831190000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1

Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending
row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes
the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling
391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
2026-08-31 21:46:50 +02:00

202 lines
9.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL

-- Connector proxy: per-connection ledger, global upstream budget, key limits.
--
-- WS3 PR5. The hosted proxy under /api/connect/* brokers Enable Banking (and,
-- next, Skatteverket) for self-hosted instances. Tokens stay on the instance;
-- the proxy holds NO usable credential per customer. What it needs hosted-side
-- is only: (1) a way to recognise a connection an instance obtained through
-- its own key so it cannot use one it did not create or one belonging to
-- another instance, (2) a global rate budget so all connector traffic plus
-- hosted stays under Enable Banking's shared quota (Annex 1 §5: 20 rps /
-- 300 rpm / 10 000 per hour), and (3) per-key entitlement limits (e.g. one
-- bank connection per company) that the package sells.
--
-- Everything here is service-role only (RLS on, no policies); the validate and
-- reserve RPCs are SECURITY DEFINER and REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated.
-- 1. Per-key limits (the sellable package shape). Defaulted so existing keys
-- get sane values without a data backfill.
ALTER TABLE public.connector_keys
ADD COLUMN limits jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT
'{"bank_connections_per_company": 1, "skv_connections_per_company": 1, "sync_min_interval_s": 0}'::jsonb;
-- 2. Connection ledger: one row per bank/SKV connection an instance holds,
-- identified by the SHA-256 of the upstream handle (EB session id, SKV
-- access token). The handle value itself is NEVER stored: the row proves
-- "this key created this connection for this company_ref" and nothing more.
CREATE TABLE public.connector_connections (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
connector_key_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES public.connector_keys(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
service text NOT NULL CHECK (service IN ('bank', 'skatteverket')),
-- The instance's own company id, opaque to us: the "per company" unit for
-- the entitlement limit. Never resolvable to a hosted company.
company_ref text NOT NULL,
provider text,
-- SHA-256 of the live handle (EB session_id / SKV access_token). Rotated on
-- refresh. Unique per service so a handle maps to at most one ledger row.
handle_hash text,
-- SHA-256 of the SKV refresh token, so a refresh exchange can be tied back
-- to its connection without storing the token.
refresh_hash text,
-- Bank account uids this connection covers (EB), for ownership checks on
-- /accounts/{uid}/... calls.
account_uids text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
status text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending' CHECK (status IN ('pending', 'active', 'revoked')),
-- Signed connector-state nonce while a consent round-trip is in flight, so
-- the callback can find the pending row.
pending_state text,
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
activated_at timestamptz,
last_used_at timestamptz,
revoked_at timestamptz
);
CREATE INDEX idx_connector_connections_key ON public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, status);
CREATE INDEX idx_connector_connections_company ON public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, company_ref, service) WHERE status = 'active';
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_connector_connections_handle ON public.connector_connections (service, handle_hash) WHERE handle_hash IS NOT NULL;
CREATE INDEX idx_connector_connections_pending_state ON public.connector_connections (pending_state) WHERE pending_state IS NOT NULL;
ALTER TABLE public.connector_connections ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- No policies: service role only.
-- 3. Global upstream budget. One shared counter per (service, window), so all
-- connector traffic is bounded well below the ASPSP-provider quota that is
-- shared with hosted. Same shape and RPC pattern as agent_rate_counters.
CREATE TABLE public.connector_upstream_counters (
service text NOT NULL,
window_kind text NOT NULL CHECK (window_kind IN ('minute', 'hour')),
window_key text NOT NULL,
count integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
PRIMARY KEY (service, window_kind, window_key)
);
ALTER TABLE public.connector_upstream_counters ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
CREATE POLICY connector_upstream_counters_no_select ON public.connector_upstream_counters FOR SELECT USING (false);
-- Reserve one upstream call against the global budget. Returns { ok, scope,
-- retry_after_sec }. Atomic increment-then-check with rollback, so two
-- concurrent proxy requests cannot both slip past the ceiling.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.connector_reserve_upstream(
p_service text,
p_minute_max integer,
p_hour_max integer
) RETURNS jsonb
LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_minute_key text := to_char(now() AT TIME ZONE 'UTC', 'YYYY-MM-DD"T"HH24:MI');
v_hour_key text := to_char(now() AT TIME ZONE 'UTC', 'YYYY-MM-DD"T"HH24');
v_minute_count integer;
v_hour_count integer;
BEGIN
INSERT INTO public.connector_upstream_counters (service, window_kind, window_key, count)
VALUES (p_service, 'minute', v_minute_key, 1)
ON CONFLICT (service, window_kind, window_key)
DO UPDATE SET count = connector_upstream_counters.count + 1, updated_at = now()
RETURNING count INTO v_minute_count;
IF v_minute_count > p_minute_max THEN
UPDATE public.connector_upstream_counters SET count = count - 1
WHERE service = p_service AND window_kind = 'minute' AND window_key = v_minute_key;
RETURN jsonb_build_object('ok', false, 'scope', 'minute', 'retry_after_sec', 60);
END IF;
INSERT INTO public.connector_upstream_counters (service, window_kind, window_key, count)
VALUES (p_service, 'hour', v_hour_key, 1)
ON CONFLICT (service, window_kind, window_key)
DO UPDATE SET count = connector_upstream_counters.count + 1, updated_at = now()
RETURNING count INTO v_hour_count;
IF v_hour_count > p_hour_max THEN
UPDATE public.connector_upstream_counters SET count = count - 1
WHERE service = p_service AND window_kind = 'hour' AND window_key = v_hour_key;
UPDATE public.connector_upstream_counters SET count = count - 1
WHERE service = p_service AND window_kind = 'minute' AND window_key = v_minute_key;
RETURN jsonb_build_object('ok', false, 'scope', 'hour', 'retry_after_sec', 3600);
END IF;
RETURN jsonb_build_object('ok', true);
END;
$$;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.connector_reserve_upstream(text, integer, integer) FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.connector_reserve_upstream(text, integer, integer) TO service_role;
-- 4. validate RPC v2: also return the key's limits, so the proxy has the
-- entitlement caps in the same round-trip as auth. Additive: the return
-- columns 1-7 are unchanged from 20260831190000, `limits` is appended.
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text);
CREATE FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(p_key_hash text)
RETURNS TABLE(
connector_key_id uuid,
org_number text,
instance_url text,
scopes text[],
status text,
current_period_end timestamptz,
rate_limited boolean,
limits jsonb
)
LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_id uuid;
v_org_number text;
v_instance_url text;
v_scopes text[];
v_status text;
v_period_end timestamptz;
v_limits jsonb;
v_rate_limit_rpm integer;
v_request_count integer;
v_window_start timestamptz;
BEGIN
SELECT ck.id, ck.org_number, ck.instance_url, ck.scopes, ck.status, ck.current_period_end, ck.limits,
ck.rate_limit_rpm, ck.request_count, ck.rate_limit_window_start
INTO v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, v_limits,
v_rate_limit_rpm, v_request_count, v_window_start
FROM public.connector_keys ck
WHERE ck.key_hash = p_key_hash
AND ck.revoked_at IS NULL
AND ck.status <> 'revoked'
FOR UPDATE;
IF v_id IS NULL THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
IF v_status <> 'active' THEN
UPDATE public.connector_keys SET last_seen_at = now() WHERE id = v_id;
RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false, v_limits;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF v_window_start IS NULL OR v_window_start < now() - interval '1 minute' THEN
UPDATE public.connector_keys
SET request_count = 1, rate_limit_window_start = now(), last_seen_at = now()
WHERE id = v_id;
RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false, v_limits;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF v_request_count >= v_rate_limit_rpm THEN
RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, true, v_limits;
RETURN;
END IF;
UPDATE public.connector_keys
SET request_count = request_count + 1, last_seen_at = now()
WHERE id = v_id;
RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false, v_limits;
END;
$$;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text) FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text) TO service_role;
COMMENT ON TABLE public.connector_connections IS
'Secret-free ledger of bank/SKV connections a self-hosted instance obtained through its connector key. handle_hash = sha256 of the upstream handle; the handle never rests here. Service-role only.';