1c9d378df8
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit (reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt; self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars. Fixes #362 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review finding on PR #1387. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings - signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null - heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization - sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is never accepted on the userId fallback alone - drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen readers are not interrupted every second Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
331 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
331 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
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type SessionAuthMethod,
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type SessionTimeoutClientState,
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type SessionTimeoutReason,
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} from './session-timeout-shared'
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const DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000
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const DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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const DEFAULT_WARNING_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000
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const COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
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const SIGNING_CONTEXT = 'accounted-session-timeout-v1:'
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export interface SessionTimeoutConfig {
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enabled: boolean
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idleTimeoutMs: number
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absoluteTimeoutMs: number
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warningMs: number
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}
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export interface SessionTimeoutState {
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version: 1
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userId: string
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sessionId: string | null
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startedAt: number
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lastActivityAt: number
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method: SessionAuthMethod
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}
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type Environment = Record<string, string | undefined>
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function parseDuration(value: string | undefined, fallback: number): number {
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if (value === undefined || value.trim() === '') return fallback
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const parsed = Number(value)
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if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 0) return fallback
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return parsed
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}
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export function getSessionTimeoutConfig(
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): SessionTimeoutConfig {
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const defaultTimeout = env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED === 'true' ? 0 : undefined
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const idleTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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)
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const absoluteTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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)
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const configuredWarningMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
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DEFAULT_WARNING_MS,
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)
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const enabledTimeouts = [idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs]
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.filter((timeout) => timeout > 0)
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const warningMs = enabledTimeouts.length > 0
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? Math.min(configuredWarningMs, ...enabledTimeouts)
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: 0
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return {
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enabled: idleTimeoutMs > 0 || absoluteTimeoutMs > 0,
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idleTimeoutMs,
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absoluteTimeoutMs,
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warningMs,
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}
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}
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export function createSessionTimeoutState(args: {
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userId: string
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sessionId: string | null
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method: SessionAuthMethod
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now?: number
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}): SessionTimeoutState {
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const now = args.now ?? Date.now()
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return {
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version: 1,
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userId: args.userId,
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sessionId: args.sessionId,
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startedAt: now,
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lastActivityAt: now,
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method: args.method,
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}
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}
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export function evaluateSessionTimeout(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
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now = Date.now(),
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): SessionTimeoutReason | null {
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if (
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config.absoluteTimeoutMs > 0 &&
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now - state.startedAt >= config.absoluteTimeoutMs
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) {
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return 'absolute'
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}
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if (
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config.idleTimeoutMs > 0 &&
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now - state.lastActivityAt >= config.idleTimeoutMs
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) {
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return 'idle'
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}
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return null
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}
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function getSigningSecret(env: Environment): string {
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const dedicated = env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET?.trim()
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if (dedicated) return dedicated
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const serviceRole = env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY?.trim()
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if (serviceRole) return serviceRole
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throw new Error(
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'Session timeout enforcement requires SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET or SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY',
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)
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}
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function bytesToBase64Url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
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let binary = ''
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for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte)
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return btoa(binary)
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.replaceAll('+', '-')
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.replaceAll('/', '_')
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.replace(/=+$/u, '')
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}
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function base64UrlToBytes(value: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> | null {
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try {
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const base64 = value.replaceAll('-', '+').replaceAll('_', '/')
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const padded = base64.padEnd(Math.ceil(base64.length / 4) * 4, '=')
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const binary = atob(padded)
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const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
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for (let index = 0; index < binary.length; index += 1) {
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bytes[index] = binary.charCodeAt(index)
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}
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return bytes
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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function encodePayload(state: SessionTimeoutState): string {
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return bytesToBase64Url(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(state)))
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}
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function decodePayload(payload: string): unknown {
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const bytes = base64UrlToBytes(payload)
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if (!bytes) return null
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try {
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return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes))
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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function isValidState(value: unknown): value is SessionTimeoutState {
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if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false
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const state = value as Partial<SessionTimeoutState>
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return (
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state.version === 1 &&
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typeof state.userId === 'string' &&
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state.userId.length > 0 &&
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(state.sessionId === null || typeof state.sessionId === 'string') &&
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Number.isSafeInteger(state.startedAt) &&
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Number.isSafeInteger(state.lastActivityAt) &&
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(state.method === 'password' || state.method === 'bankid') &&
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(state.startedAt as number) > 0 &&
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(state.lastActivityAt as number) >= (state.startedAt as number)
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)
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}
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async function importSigningKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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// The signing key is HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, never
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// the raw secret: the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback must not use the
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// privileged credential itself as an HMAC key.
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const baseKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
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'HKDF',
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false,
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['deriveKey'],
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)
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return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
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{
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name: 'HKDF',
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hash: 'SHA-256',
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salt: new Uint8Array(32),
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info: new TextEncoder().encode(SIGNING_CONTEXT),
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},
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baseKey,
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{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256', length: 256 },
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false,
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['sign', 'verify'],
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)
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}
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export async function signSessionTimeoutState(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): Promise<string | null> {
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// A missing signing secret must degrade the timeout feature, never crash
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// authenticated requests: verifySessionTimeoutState already returns null in
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// the same misconfiguration, so returning null here keeps both halves of
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// the feature consistently disabled.
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try {
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const payload = encodePayload(state)
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const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
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const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(
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'HMAC',
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key,
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new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
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)
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return `${payload}.${bytesToBase64Url(new Uint8Array(signature))}`
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(
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'[session-timeout] signing failed; timeout state not persisted',
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error,
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)
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return null
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}
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}
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export async function verifySessionTimeoutState(
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value: string | undefined,
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): Promise<SessionTimeoutState | null> {
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if (!value) return null
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const [payload, signature, extra] = value.split('.')
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if (!payload || !signature || extra !== undefined) return null
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const signatureBytes = base64UrlToBytes(signature)
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if (!signatureBytes) return null
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try {
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const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
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const valid = await crypto.subtle.verify(
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'HMAC',
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key,
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signatureBytes,
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new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
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)
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if (!valid) return null
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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const state = decodePayload(payload)
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return isValidState(state) ? state : null
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}
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interface SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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path: '/'
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httpOnly: true
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secure: boolean
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sameSite: 'lax'
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maxAge: number
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}
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export function sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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return {
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path: '/',
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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}
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}
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export function sessionTimeoutClearCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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return {
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...sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(),
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maxAge: 0,
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}
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}
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export function toSessionTimeoutClientState(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
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serverNow = Date.now(),
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): SessionTimeoutClientState {
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return {
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enabled: config.enabled,
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idleTimeoutMs: config.idleTimeoutMs,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: config.absoluteTimeoutMs,
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warningMs: config.warningMs,
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serverNow,
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startedAt: state.startedAt,
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lastActivityAt: state.lastActivityAt,
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method: state.method,
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}
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}
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export function sessionStateMatchesUser(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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userId: string,
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sessionId: string | null,
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): boolean {
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if (state.userId !== userId) return false
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if (state.sessionId === null) return true
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// The state is bound to a specific Supabase session. If the current session
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// id cannot be resolved it is unknown, not a wildcard: report a mismatch so
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// the caller mints a fresh state instead of accepting another session's.
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if (sessionId === null) return false
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return state.sessionId === sessionId
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}
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export function apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout(
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pathname: string,
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hasAuthorizationHeader: boolean,
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): boolean {
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if (
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pathname === '/api/health' ||
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pathname === '/api/log' ||
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pathname.startsWith('/api/mcp-oauth/')
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) {
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return true
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}
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return hasAuthorizationHeader && (
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pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/') ||
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pathname.startsWith('/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp')
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)
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}
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export { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE }
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