Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 5
ece6eca922
* fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket
20240101000024 documents this bucket as WORM: "No UPDATE or DELETE policies".
That described the repo, not production. Production carries a
users_delete_own_documents policy that exists in no migration file:
FOR DELETE TO authenticated
USING (bucket_id = 'documents'
AND (storage.foldername(name))[2] = auth.uid()::text)
Under it, the uploading user can delete the storage bytes of any document
they uploaded under the legacy documents/{userId}/... layout, using nothing
but their normal browser token. That includes documents linked to a posted
verifikat, which are rakenskapsinformation under the BFL 7 kap 2 § seven-year
retention duty. deleteDocument()'s linked-check and the
block_document_deletion() trigger both guard the document_attachments ROW,
not the object: the row survives, still pointing at a file that is gone.
Reproduced against a local replay of the full migration stream: with the
policy present the uploader's own DELETE removes the object; with it dropped
the same statement matches zero rows. Company-scoped keys were never exposed
(their second path segment is the company id, not auth.uid()), so this only
ever reached the legacy layout, which is where most documents still live.
Safe because every in-app remove() on this bucket already runs on the service
role, covered by service_role_all_documents.
Deliberately narrow: users_read_own_documents and users_upload_own_documents
stay. The Phase B backfill from 20260726092000 has not run, so dropping the
legacy SELECT policy now would make existing documents unreadable. That is
Phase C.
The pg-real test asserts no DELETE and no UPDATE policy over the bucket under
ANY name: the hole arrived under a name this repo never used, so pinning a
name would not have caught it.
Refs #1208
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(storage): make the WORM ratchet see FOR ALL and WITH CHECK policies
Review caught two blind spots in the ratchet, both fair. It matched only
polcmd 'd' and 'w', but polcmd '*' (FOR ALL) grants DELETE and UPDATE just as
effectively, and FOR ALL is the shape the one legitimate policy on this table
already uses, so a hostile one would look unremarkable in the catalogue. It
also read only polqual, so an UPDATE policy carrying its bucket restriction in
WITH CHECK was invisible.
Both assertions now run through one helper that covers d/w/*, concatenates
USING and WITH CHECK, and filters by grantee so service_role_all_documents
(how the application does its authorized deletes) is excluded while every
client-reachable role is not. A policy granted to PUBLIC has an empty
polroles, which is the most permissive case there is, so it is treated as
client-reachable rather than as "no roles".
Matching on the substring rather than the exact `bucket_id = 'documents'`
shape pg_get_expr emits today: a policy written as bucket_id::text or with the
comparison reversed would slip past a stricter match, and for a WORM ratchet a
false alarm is cheap while a silent hole is not.
Adds a probe case that creates a FOR ALL policy and asserts the helper sees
it, so the main assertion cannot pass vacuously. That case earned its keep
immediately: it caught that node-postgres hands back a raw string for a name[]
column, so the role filter needed rolname::text to work at all.
Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
original prod FOR DELETE policy present, red with a FOR ALL probe, green
without either. Full pg-real suite 933 passed.
Refs #1208
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(storage): catch a destructive policy that names no bucket at all
Adversarial review of the previous commit found the ratchet still failed
open, and reproduced it: a policy with no bucket_id predicate covers EVERY
bucket, documents included, so gating on the bucket name discarded exactly
the widest hole. The concrete shape is Supabase's own stock "Enable delete for
users based on user_id" template, USING (auth.uid() = owner), which is the
single most likely form of a future dashboard edit.
A destructive policy is now in scope unless it provably cannot reach this
bucket, i.e. only a bucket_id predicate naming some other bucket exempts it.
The behavioural assertions had the matching blind spot: fixtures were seeded
without an owner, so an owner-based policy matched NULL and the DELETE
reported 0 rows for the wrong reason. Objects now carry an owner the way
storage-api stamps them in production, so those tests fail loudly instead of
passing by accident.
Two probes pin both directions: a bucketless policy must be reported (and is
shown to really permit the delete), and a policy scoped to another bucket must
not be, so the ratchet cannot start crying wolf on receipts or sie-files and
get switched off.
Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
stock bucketless template installed, green without it. Full pg-real suite 935
passed.
Refs #1208
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted
Open-source Swedish accounting software for sole traders (enskild firma) and limited companies (aktiebolag). Double-entry bookkeeping that complies with Swedish accounting law, built to be operated by you or by your AI agent.
Website · Hosted app · Documentation
Why Accounted?
Compliant by construction. Accounted implements double-entry bookkeeping under Swedish accounting law (Bokföringslagen). Voucher immutability, sequential voucher numbering, period locks, and 7-year document retention are enforced by database triggers, not by convention. Corrections are made the legal way, with reversal entries (storno), never by editing history. See ARCHITECTURE.md for how.
Agent-native. The full bookkeeping engine is exposed as 100+ MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools with scoped API keys, so an AI agent can do the books in Accounted: categorize transactions, draft vouchers, reconcile periods, and prepare declarations. Posting is staged for human approval, so the agent proposes and you decide.
Yours to run. AGPL-3.0 licensed and fully self-hostable with Docker and Supabase. Use the hosted version at app.gnubok.se or run your own.
Features
- Double-entry bookkeeping -- BAS 2026 chart of accounts, draft/commit workflow, sequential voucher numbering
- Invoicing -- Create, send, and track invoices with mixed VAT rates and PDF generation
- Bank reconciliation -- PSD2 bank connection via Enable Banking, 4-pass automatic matching
- VAT declaration -- SKV 4700 form mapping, per-rate breakdown, EU/export handling
- Tax reports -- NE-bilaga, INK2, SRU export for Skatteverket
- Payroll -- Salary runs, payslips, and AGI (arbetsgivardeklaration) employer declarations
- Supplier invoices -- Registration, payment tracking, input VAT deduction
- Document archive -- SHA-256 integrity, 7-year retention enforcement, full archive ZIP export
- SIE import/export -- Standard Swedish accounting interchange format
- Agent access (MCP) -- 100+ bookkeeping tools over the Model Context Protocol, with scoped API keys and staged approvals
- Extension system -- Opt-in plugins for AI categorization, receipt OCR, email, calendar, and more
Self-Hosting
git clone https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted.git
cd accounted
./setup.sh # Prompts for Supabase credentials, generates .env
docker compose up -d
You need a Supabase project and must apply the database migrations before first use. See docs/SELF-HOSTING.md for the full step-by-step guide, including Supabase setup, auth configuration, optional features (AI, email, push notifications), and troubleshooting.
Development Setup
Prerequisites: Node.js 20+, a Supabase project.
npm install
npm run dev # Start dev server (auto-generates extension registry)
npm test # Run tests
npm run build # Production build
npm run lint # ESLint
See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development workflow.
Tech Stack
- Framework: Next.js 16 (App Router), React 19, TypeScript (strict)
- Database: Supabase (PostgreSQL + Row Level Security + email/password auth + TOTP MFA)
- Styling: Tailwind CSS 4 + shadcn/ui
- Integrations: Enable Banking (PSD2), Anthropic SDK, LangChain, OpenAI, Resend, JSZip
Documentation
- User and API documentation -- Guides for using the product and the public API
- ARCHITECTURE.md -- How the system is built: bookkeeping engine, legal enforcement, tenancy, extensions, agent surface
- docs/SELF-HOSTING.md -- Full self-hosting guide (Docker, Supabase setup, migrations, optional features)
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md -- Extension development guide
- docs/DOCKER.md -- Docker deployment reference
- CONTRIBUTING.md -- Development workflow, code style, pull request process
- SECURITY.md -- Vulnerability reporting policy
Community
- Found a bug or have an idea? Open an issue
- Security vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md, never a public issue
- Everyone interacting in the project is expected to follow the Code of Conduct
Contributing
Contributions are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full guide.
All commits require a DCO sign-off (git commit -s).
License
AGPL-3.0-or-later with an extension exception: third-party extensions that interact solely through the documented Extension API may be licensed under any terms, including proprietary. See LICENSE for details and NOTICE for third-party attributions.