Jakob Wennberg
c74b19df1b
* feat(reconciliation): close the bank-feed loop on voucher links and re-tag mis-typed opening balances
Two related fixes to bank reconciliation correctness:
1. Auto-reconcile on voucher link. Linking an invoice or supplier invoice to
an existing voucher previously advanced only the invoice — the bank
transaction that paid it kept sitting in the Transactions inbox with a null
journal_entry_id. linkInvoiceToVoucher / linkSupplierInvoiceToVoucher now
call autoReconcileTransactionForLinkedVoucher (lib/reconciliation), which
links the bank transaction to the same verifikat when exactly one unbooked
line matches it. Best-effort and post-commit: a failure here never fails the
link. The result surfaces reconciledTransactionId; the inbox row leaves the
list and the UI shows link_success_tx_reconciled.
2. Re-tag mis-typed opening balances. getReconciliationStatus and the GL-line
matching RPCs identify a cash account's ingående balans solely by
journal_entries.source_type='opening_balance'. Companies migrated from other
systems often booked the bank IB as an ordinary voucher (source_type
'import' or 'manual'), so it was never excluded and surfaced as a phantom
reconciliation difference equal to the opening balance. Adds:
- migration mark_entry_as_opening_balance: a GUC-gated carve-out in the
immutability trigger plus a SECURITY DEFINER RPC that validates the entry
(balance-sheet lines only, dated on a fiscal-period boundary), flips the
source_type, and writes an audit row — no blanket data sweep.
- POST /api/reconciliation/bank/mark-opening-balance + MarkOpeningBalanceSchema.
- BankReconciliationView action to trigger it from the IB diff.
The gnubok_create_voucher executor now accepts a typed is_opening_balance flag
and derives source_type='opening_balance' only after validating class 1/2 lines
on the period start, so new IBs land correctly typed.
Covered by lib/reconciliation auto-reconcile tests, voucher-executors tests,
and a mark-entry-as-opening-balance pg-real test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: rebrand gnubok → Accounted and prune swarm agent skills
Product rebrand and skills housekeeping. No runtime behaviour change.
Rebrand: replace user-visible "gnubok" with "Accounted" across docs, READMEs,
in-code comments, doc-site content, MCP skill/resource prose, and the
gnubok-mcp package description. The MCP resource URI scheme is moved gnubok://
→ Accounted:// consistently across resource registrations, the event-type
comment, and the resource/skill tests. Deliberately preserved as stable
identifiers (NOT rebranded): the gnubok-company-id cookie, gnubok_sk_ / gnubok_inv_
token prefixes, the gnubok-mcp npm bridge name, and the AGI <gem:Programnamn>
value (kept 'gnubok' per its source comment — it is the software identifier sent
to Skatteverket and must not churn across visual rebrands).
Skills: remove the 27 swarm-* agent SKILL.md atoms (no longer used; already
absent from the agent_atom_registry in prod), refresh the remaining skill docs,
add the .claude/rules/ path-scoped rule set, and regenerate the
seed_agent_atom_bodies migration + .skill-body-manifest.json via
`npm run skills:generate` so the DB-backed skill bodies match the trimmed set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
40 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
40 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Reporting Vulnerabilities
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If you discover a security vulnerability in Accounted, please report it responsibly. **Do not open a public issue.**
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Email: **security@arcim.io**
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Include:
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- Description of the vulnerability
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- Steps to reproduce
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- Potential impact
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- Suggested fix (if any)
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## Scope
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The following areas are in scope for security reports:
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- **Authentication and authorization** -- Supabase auth, RLS policies, API route guards
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- **Accounting data integrity** -- journal entry immutability, period lock enforcement, balance validation
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- **Document retention** -- 7-year retention enforcement, deletion prevention
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- **API routes** -- injection, authorization bypass, data leakage
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- **Extension system** -- privilege escalation, sandbox escape
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## Response Timeline
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- **Acknowledgment**: within 48 hours
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- **Initial assessment**: within 7 days
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- **Fix for critical issues**: within 30 days
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- **Public disclosure**: coordinated with the reporter after the fix is released
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## Safe Harbor
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We will not pursue legal action against security researchers who:
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- Act in good faith to avoid harm to users and data
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- Report vulnerabilities promptly and do not exploit them beyond what is necessary to demonstrate the issue
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- Do not access, modify, or delete other users' data
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- Follow the reporting process described above
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